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Clara Rellensmann
Introduction
Currently, the role of heritage places in constructing identities is frequently discussed 
in relation to the intentional destruction of cultural heritage, such as by the Islamic 
State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, by Al-Quaeda in Mali, and by the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
In these prominent cases, which have been widely reported on by international media, 
the underlying motives are likely to be identifi ed as fundamentalist religious ideologies. 
However, such approprtion of cultural heritage was not invented by contemporary 
Islamic fundamentalists: destruction, reconstruction, and other types of transformation 
and interpretation of built heritage for political purposes have existed throughout the 
history of humankind. They are visible and tangible acts of the assessment and selection 
of physical remains of the past that raise the question: should they or should they not be 
preserved for future generations?
In the summer semester of 2017, students from the master programs in World Heritage 
Studies (WHS), Heritage Conservation and Site Management (HCSM), and Architecture 
at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg participated in a 
study project on “Heritage Conservation and Ideologies” offered by the Department of 
Architectural Conservation. The study project addressed architectural conservation as a 
discipline that plays a vital role in the construction of identities, and therefore, is extremely 
prone to being appropriated for political purposes. In this context, the international 
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students from diverse academic backgrounds discussed heritage politics in different 
cultural regions, nation-states, and political systems in order to investigate cases of 
ideologised heritage conservation and their relationship to religion, history, and politics.
The study project resulted in 14 research papers, which are included in this reader. 
While the overarching theme of the papers is that of the processes of ideologised 
memorialisation, the papers can be roughly grouped into three sub-themes that provide 
the structure for this reader: destruction/reconstruction, transformation, and interpretation.
The perspectives offered in this reader show that whether one deals with the destruction, 
reconstruction, transformation, or interpretation of cultural heritage, the underlying 
political-ideological motivations are often more complex than they seem at fi rst sight.
Destruction / Reconstruction
Elisabeth Korinth’s paper, titled The Mosul Case: The ailing pillars of the artifi cially 
constructed national identity of Iraq, investigates the relationship between Mesopotamian 
heritage and its destruction by the IS through the lens of both its political and religious 
ideologies, as well as through its various historical entanglements. With reference to her 
case studies of the Mosul Museum and the archaeological site of Nineveh in Iraq, the 
author shows that to understand the destruction of cultural properties in this context, 
one must look further than just at religious motivations. Regarding the rebuilding and 
recovery of concerned sites that disregard their historical, geographical, political, and 
social entanglements, she warns that such efforts will not resonate with the respective 
societies and may eventually cause history to repeat itself.
In her paper The Buddha Statues of Bamiyan: Analysis of the conservation process 
and its political forces, Isabelle Mühlstädt evaluates the ideologies that triggered the 
different approaches to the conservation and safeguarding of the remains of this site. 
In 2001, the Buddha statues in Bamiyan Valley were destroyed by the Taliban in an act 
of performative iconoclasm. The author analyses the intensive and long-lasting debates 
on the site’s recovery and discusses the decision-making process of the stakeholders 
involved, including UNESCO, the Afghan Government, and on-site conservators. Her 
critical analysis shows that the destruction and the reconstruction of a monument are 
equally symbolic acts. The paper identifi es critical issues embodied in this famous case 
study and turns them into refl ections on more viable approaches for cultural heritage 
conservation in post-confl ict situations.
The paper The Destruction of Reza Sha’s Mausoleum: An eff ort to distort history critically 
refl ects on the destruction of tombs in Iran, which the author shows is a phenomenon that 
has become a cultural tradition in Iran. With his analysis of the destruction of Reza Sha’s 
Mausoleum, Arman Ebrahimi depicts the confl ict between Iranian identity and Islamic 
Heritage Conservation and Ideologies | 7
identity that has been prevalent in Iran since Muslim Arabs conquered the territory in 
the seventh century AD. Reza Sha’s Mausoleum once symbolised modern ideals and 
secularism, and a cultural identity based on pre-Islamic Iranianism, and it was therefore 
erased by the regime of the Islamic Revolution (1979), which was promoting a type 
of nationalism that is based on Shia religious ideology. Referring to David Lowenthal’s 
ideas on ‘improving the past’, the cases of destruction of mausoleums and gravesites in 
Iran illustrates how memorialisation is shaped by those in power, and how their selection 
is based on political interests that follow particular ideologies.
By describing the complex case of the mosque Babri Masjid, formerly known as 
Ramjanmabhoomi—an important Hindu site believed to be the birthplace of Lord 
Rama—in Ayodhya (India), Arpitha Shreedhara shows the impact that religiously backed-
up nation-building strategies can have on religious heritage sites and their respective 
communities. The case study illustrates the issue of Hindu-Muslim rivalry in India, which 
is extremely complex and has turned the religious site of Babri Masjid into a diffi cult 
heritage site due to the many casualties associated with this dispute. Acknowledging the 
complexity of the situation, the author proposes that the only solution to the on-going 
confl ict would be to change the site’s function entirely into something secular that all 
members of the different religious communities could benefi t from.
Transformation
In her paper The Palace of the Republic: When destruction creates myths, Eva Maas 
discusses the emotional debates surrounding the destruction and reconstruction of this 
symbolic site in the core of Berlin. She refl ects on its diverging and contrasting meanings 
and discusses how attempts to deal with this entanglement of different meanings turned 
into an impossible task that resulted in the deconstruction and annihilation of the site. 
However, she argues that the tale of the Palace has become a myth that might be more 
powerful in terms of remembrance than the original site would have been. In this regard, 
she refl ects on the diffi culty of representing this architectural victim within the realm of 
the future Humboldtforum.
The paper An Alternative to “Grand Narratives”: Artistic practice as preservation process 
written by Katrine Jensen focuses on the conservation of ideology-laden architecture or 
politically charged buildings, and discusses how ephemeral forms of interpretation can 
trigger new dialogues. She discusses the performative opportunities of art production 
as a tool for the preservation, promotion, and interpretation of this cultural heritage. 
Based on the case study of ’Bungalow Germania’, the German contribution to the 14th 
International Architecture Exhibition at the Venice Biennale 2014, Jensen argues that 
artistic production and experimental preservation could be an alternative voice to the 
authorised heritage discourse and conventional preservation practices, particularly when 
dealing with political heritage.
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In her paper From Church to Mosque to Museum: The infl uence of religious ideologies 
on Hagia Sophia, Sara Akhlaq reviews how this iconic monument has been appropriated 
by ruling regimes throughout history to further their political and religious ideals as 
refl ected in conservation interventions. The topic is of contemporary signifi cance, as 
Tayyip Erdogan, currently prime minister of Turkey, seems to want to follow in the 
footsteps of historical rulers by re-appropriating this monument and turning it back into a 
mosque. Akhlaq engages in a debate about the contradictions of the Hagia Sophia and 
its preservation as a visual testimony of the secular ideologies (Christian and Muslim) 
that led to the site’s conversion into a museum. She proposes that in these contexts, 
World Heritage could be a primary player in peacebuilding. Therefore, cultural diversity 
could be the tool to turn this confl ict into a dialogical resource by using the heritage site 
to stimulate a peaceful discourse.
With her contribution, The Corner House Revisited: The future perspectives of 
uncomfortable heritage, Mare Heimrāte brings together the viewpoints of various 
stakeholders regarding the approaches to the conservation and future uses of a rather 
contested heritage building in Riga. The building symbolises the social repression that 
occurred during the Soviet occupation of Latvia. Heimrāte discusses the ideologies 
that underlie the national quest for the preservation and remembrance of the site. Her 
argument explores the role of the local community in choosing and interpreting their own 
heritage. Thus, in bringing up the key aspects of the Faro Convention, the author aims to 
develop possible scenarios for the future use of the site.
Interpretation
The paper Gandhi in Ghana: Saint or racist? provides an astute analysis of the debate 
surrounding the recent erection of a statue of Gandhi on the campus of the University 
of Ghana in a prominent location in a newly established garden for communal use. For 
his analysis, Jonathan Doe applies Ashworth’s and Tunbridge’s dissonance framework 
in the context of a society moulded by Pan-Africanism. Though Gandhi’s non-violence 
philosophy had once inspired Ghanaian nationalists in their struggle for independence, 
the confl ict surrounding the statue shows that India’s commitments in Ghana are now 
perceived as a sub-imperialism that intends to establish similar dependencies of African 
countries as during colonial times. The case discussed makes clear that the meaning 
of a person and their symbolic representation may change according to its context and 
underlying ideologies.
In his paper Analysis of a Diffi  cult Heritage from an Ideology of Violence: The Nazi Party 
Rally Grounds in Nuremberg, Juan Carlos Barrientos investigates a site engraved with 
the political ideology of the National Socialist regime in Germany. He focuses on the 
aesthetic details of the site’s architecture as manifestations of an ideological language 
and vividly engages with the challenges and diffi culties of preserving and interpreting this 
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diffi cult heritage by drawing on personal experiences from visiting the site. In his analysis, 
Barrientos clearly shows how conserving this site is a battle between remembering and 
forgetting an uncomfortable past.
Estibaliz Sienra Iracheta investigates the heritage distresses and the future prospects 
of an uncomfortable heritage monument in Spain. In her paper, The Valley of the Fallen: 
Confl icts with ideology, collective memory and the conservation of heritage, she raises 
a debate on important issues that are central to the national discomfort regarding the 
conservation and interpretation of cultural heritage associated with the political ideologies 
of Franco’s totalitarian dictatorship in Spain. Recalling concepts such as collective 
memory and uncomfortable heritage, the argument is built upon the controversies and 
the possibilities considered for the future of this heritage site. Sienra calls for a complete 
process of objective resignifi cation in order to allow a transformation of the site’s meaning 
and use. Thus, in an educational shift, both victims could be memorialised and the new 
visitors could read and refl ect on the relations of the landmark with the history of Spain.
In her contribution, The Soviet War Memorial, Treptower Park, Berlin: How the ideology 
and propaganda of a memorial helped shape public memory of East Germans during 
the German Democratic Republic, Marina Freckmann discusses the impact of political 
ideology in memorialisation processes and heritage preservation in both the GDR and in 
today’s reunifi ed Germany. She focuses on the Soviet War Memorial as a transformative 
tool for constructing collective memory in Germany. She further argues that the memorial’s 
current preservation and presentation to the public shows the power of monuments 
to adapt their meaning and message to the socio-political environment in which they 
perform.
Paola Fontanella Pisa’s paper on The Social, Cultural and Political Implications of 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial’s Interpretations investigates the role of this World Heritage 
Site in the process of shaping Japan’s national identity and the effects of its interpretation 
in both national and international realms. Fontanella brings up stresses on the cultural 
production associated with the site by contrasting its interpretation as a product of war 
resulting from a nuclear disaster with its cultural signifi cance as a symbol of worldwide 
peace. The paper brings up important issues on dealing with the conservation of this 
uncomfortable heritage. In this case, neither preservation nor destruction alone could 
carry the message of its cultural signifi cance. Instead, adding a contemporary layer to 
the site allowed for its urban and ideological understanding through a new scheme of 
interpretation, thus carrying the message of conservation as a tool to raise awareness 
about reconciliation and peacebuilding.
In his paper DI QUI (NON) SI PASSA: Safeguarding and promoting Great War Heritage 
as remembrance of the confl icts XIXth century ideologies brought to Europe, Tobias 
Pagani analyses the Denti del Pasubio as a memorial landscape refl ecting the ideologies 
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of nationalism that lead to the Great War at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
clarifi es the role of such sites in contemporary Europe, with reference to EU-level 
programmes such as the Euroregions and the European Heritage Label. Through his 
analysis, Pagani reveals the stark contrast between the nationalistic use of heritage 
and invented traditions throughout nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe that were 
aimed at fostering national pride and a sense of superiority, and the idea of shared 
European heritage as promoted by various European initiatives today with a view to 
fostering peace and mutual understanding.
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Elisabeth Korinth
Introduction 
“What’s next for the city in ruins?” (Dewan & Lister, 2017). This was Angela Dewan’s and 
Tim Lister’s opening question in their article about the liberation of Mosul in July 2017 
after it had been under siege for four years. Throughout this time, the war for Mosul had 
made the headlines numerous times. Promulgated online through propaganda videos, the 
destruction of the Mosul Museum and the archaeological sites of Nineveh became one of 
the symbols of the ideological warfare of the Islamic State. Since then, different refl ections 
on the possible reasons behind the destruction have been published by various scholars, 
mostly drawing attention to the act of iconoclasm as well as to illegal traffi cking of cultural 
objects as part of an economic strategy of the Islamic State. In addition to that, UNESCO 
has emphasised the destruction of heritage as part of a systematic ethnic cleansing by 
eradicating cultural traces of minorities. Although these factors are an important part 
of the ideology of the Islamic State as well as its propaganda and fi nancing strategies, 
the Mosul case proves that these rather simplistic interpretations are inadequate. Only 
a few scholars went beyond these obvious motivations of the Islamic State in order 
to provide a different reading that sheds light on underlying historical entanglements. 
Among them, Chiara De Cesari proposed a juxtaposition of the destructive gesture of 
the Islamic State with the symbolic meaning of Mesopotamian heritage throughout time, 
and in particular its role in the building of an Iraqi national identity in the twentieth century, 
in order to contextualise the act of destruction in a more complex political genealogy 
The Mosul Case
The ailing pillars of the artifi cially 
constructed national identity of Iraq
14 | Heritage Conservation and Ideologies: a reader  
Figure 1. 
Archaeological site 
of Nineveh 
(Makinano 
2008 /PD). 
(De Cesari, 2015, p.22). Building on her theory, this article aims to 
research the symbolism of Mesopotamian heritage throughout the 
history of the Iraqi state and its role in the process of nation-building 
in the twentieth century in order to gain deeper understanding of 
the current, publicly-presented destruction by the Islamic State as a 
symbolic act. It will draw conclusions for considerations about future 
conservation programs.
As a theoretical framework, I shall rely on the theory of Ideology as 
a Cultural System developed by Clifford Geertz (1973), an approach 
to the research of ideology that includes the construction of symbols 
for the purpose of structuring, understanding, and solving a specifi c 
problem on an individual, local, or global level. In his opinion, ideology 
is concerned with the defi nition and solution of a problem. It seeks to 
respond to a felt anxiety and offers a possible way out. Geertz sees the 
construction of an image of the environment, its objects, events, and 
people as the beginning of a process in which these provided images 
are then replaced by symbols in order to be able to pattern human 
life into cultural categories to perceive and understand the complexity 
of human life and society. Institutionalised as cultural programs, 
ideology seeks to establish stability. Based on his theory, I argue that 
the destruction of Mesopotamian heritage in the case of the Mosul 
Museum and the archaeological site of Nineveh (Fig.1) has to be seen 
and understood not only in the context of the religious ideology of the 
Islamic State, but also in the context of the roots of its rise, the history 
of the objects themselves within their geographical location, as well as 
their symbolic role in the building of the modern nation-state of Iraq.
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For the purpose of understanding this deep entanglement, it is necessary to open with 
an overview of the history of Near Eastern Archaeology and its role in the nation-building 
of Iraq.
Near Eastern Archaeology, Iraq and the rise of the Islamic State
Near Eastern Archaeology developed in the early nineteenth century simultaneously to 
an increase in the imperialistic interest of the European Great Powers in the Middle 
East. As outlined in detail by Magnus T. Bernhardsson in Reclaiming a plundered past 
in 2005, the emergence of Near Eastern Archaeology can be dated back to the very 
origins of the fi rst fi eld excavations in Iraq. The fi rst archaeological excavations were 
conducted at Nineveh (what is today part of Mosul) when the country was still under the 
rule of the Ottoman Empire. Starting with the Brit Claudius James Rich and his research 
about Nineveh, the place quickly attracted the attention of the French government, which 
sent Paul Emile Botta to Mosul to start excavating. It was also in Mosul that Hormuzd 
Rassam was born in 1826. Rassam later became known as the fi rst native archaeologist 
to conduct scientifi c fi eld excavations and he also became a loyal advocate of the British 
crown, resulting in a deep rivalry with the French adversaries. In the following decades, 
the territory of today’s Iraq became an arena for the competition between the European 
Great Powers. England and France started launching large-scale fi eld excavations in 
the former ancient Assyrian capitals Nineveh, Nimrud, and Khorsabad, which were 
sponsored by their political leaders in order to fi ll the national museums with treasures 
for national prestige. In the 1850s, the excavation areas were already divided into French 
and British territories, leaving Khorsabad to the French expedition and the Tell Kuyunjik 
of Nineveh to the British. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Germany joined the 
competition with large excavations in Uruk, Babylon, Assur, and others, as did the United 
States with their excavation in Nippur (Bernhardsson, 2005). With the beginning of World 
War I, the connection between archaeology and colonial politics became most apparent 
in the work of the key fi gures Gertrude Bell and Thomas Edward Lawrence (known as 
Lawrence from Arabia). Both British archaeologists played a signifi cant political role in 
the Middle East, with Lawrence being involved in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, 
and Gertrude Bell becoming known for her work for British Intelligence when the Ottoman 
Empire was about to fall apart. Her extensive travel experiences in the Middle East and 
her in-depth knowledge about its landscape and society, which were precisely described 
in her diaries, including details about different clans and their power relations (Alexander, 
2008), helped her to gain political power. This later enabled her to directly infl uence the 
future of the Middle East by suggesting Faisal to become the king of the newly-built Iraqi 
monarchy after the British and French had divided Western Asia and the territory of Iraq 
had fallen under British mandate. Overnight, the geographical and political set up of the 
Middle East had been fundamentally changed: instead of a socio-political process of 
nation-building with natural boundaries oriented towards linguistic and cultural groups, 
the colonial history and the subsequent artifi cial division of the Middle East according to 
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the Asia Minor Agreement of 1916 led to the creation of the modern state of Iraq in 1920, 
with new, arbitrarily demarcated state boundaries. In this context, it is not necessary 
to note that the establishment of boundaries correlates with the discovery of oil, and 
that the boundaries were later corrected on the basis of pipeline routes (Kneissl, 2015). 
According to Mary Ann Tetréault, Iraq can be considered the most perverse example of 
boundary demarcation, as it incorporated the three former Ottoman districts of Baghdad, 
Basra, and Mosul, from which the fi rst one had a dense Sunni population, the second 
one was mainly inhabited by Shi’a Arabs, and Mosul was known for being a center 
for Sunni Muslim Kurds (Tetréault, 2008, p.140). This statement can be misleading, as 
it neglects the fact that Iraq’s socio-political structure is much more complex. Despite 
the religious disagreements, the general population in Iraq, whether they were Sunnis 
or Shi’a, lived peacefully together until the intervention of the US. Nevertheless, the 
statement contains some truth in so far as it caused “Iraq’s chronic problem with ‘state 
building’ […] rooted in its troubled history as a multicultural state governed by members 
of only one group” (Tetréault, 2008, p.140). A brief look at the current cultural composition 
of the Iraqi state reveals the complexity of Iraq’s internal struggle for cohesion: all in 
all, the Iraqi state is fragmented into about 150 tribes of different religious groups, from 
which the major groups exert signifi cant infl uence due to political representation and 
confederation among each other (Abid, 2015, p.14). A rather simplistic segmentation of 
Iraq’s inhabitants illustrates the state’s population in two layers according to their ethnic 
and religious affi liation: based on the statistics of the Central Intelligence Agency, Arabs 
constitute the majority, with 75 – 80% of the population (from which 20.000 – 50.000 
are Marsh Arabs), followed by Kurds with 15 – 20%, and Turkmen with around 5%. 
The minority groups of Assyrians, Aramaens, and Shabaks are estimated to be under 
5%. Religious affi liations are intermixed within the groups, with 99% being Muslims, 
divided into 55 – 60% Shi’a (from which the majority are Arabs) and about 40% Sunnis. 
Christians, Yezidis, Sabean Mandaeans, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians constitute less than 
1% of the population. Jewish and other religions are under 0.1% (CIA, 2016; Abid, 2015). 
However, a majority of the Shi’a are Arabs, whereas a large part of the Sunni population 
consists of Turkmen as well as 80% of the Kurds (Abid 2015, pp.22-23). Composed of 
Chaldaens, Assyrians, Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic, Armenian Apostolic and 
Armenian Catholic, Protestants, as well as Latin Catholics, the Christian community in 
Iraq proves to be the most diverse, although it has experienced a massive decline of 
50% since the fall of Saddam Hussein (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016, p.10).
In response to the challenge of new state boundaries, different movements emerged 
with the goal to transcend domestic divisions and provide a political system that is able 
to integrate the various ethnic and religious groups (Tetréault, 2008). Kamyar Abdi 
identifi es three main ideological streams of national identity and political agenda, which 
will be signifi cantly important for the Mosul case (Abdi, 2008). The fi rst ideology of pan-
Arabism arose during the time of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Abdi, 2008, 5) 
and embedded the Iraqi state into the larger context of the Arab world, where it had once 
The Mosul Case | 17
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“The destruction of Mesopotamian 
heritage in the case of the Mosul 
Museum and the archaeological 
site of Nineveh has to be seen 
and understood not only in the 
context of the religious ideology 
of the Islamic State, but also 
in the context of the roots 
of its rise, the history of the 
objects themselves within their 
geographical location, as well as 
their symbolic role for the building 
of the modern nation-state of Iraq.”
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existed (e.g. during the Abbasid caliphate), thus resisting the artifi cial boundaries of the 
state as imposed by the European Great Powers. De Cesari and Davis already argued 
that supporters of this vision are mainly from the Sunni minority, as they would form the 
majority in this constellation (De Cesari, 2015; Davis, 2005). With the fall of the monarchy 
in the late 1950s, an Iraqi nationalism emerged that was based on the common history 
of pre-Islamic times, emphasising Iraq as the “home of the Babylonians, Akkadian and 
Sumerian civilisation” (Bernhardsson, 2005, p.8).
With the ascendancy of the Ba’ath party in Iraq and the rise of Saddam Hussein in 
particular, we reach the third nationalistic ideology, described by Kamyar Abdi as the cult 
of personality (Abdi 2008), in which ancient Mesopotamian culture received a new political 
face. Instrumentalised to build a common national identity that would unite the Iraqi 
people, Hussein “selected elements from ancient Mesopotamian history and imagery, 
[and] incorporated them into a new Iraqi national identity and symbolism associated with 
it […]” (Abdi, 2008, 4). Based on this nationalist political agenda, the construction of a 
new identity quickly developed into a propaganda machine depicting Hussein as the 
successor of Nebuchadnezzar II. His inauguration was followed by large-scale building 
projects, such as his palace on the ancient ruins of the ziggurat, the ancient city of 
Babylon, and the palace of Nebuchadnezzar II on the exact spot of the former ancient 
palace. In the tradition of ancient Mesopotamian rulers, the bricks carried inscriptions 
such as, “this was built by Saddam, son of Nebuchadnezzar, to glory of Iraq” (Damon, 
2013), thus placing Saddam Hussein directly within the genealogical lineage of ancient 
kings (Bernhardsson, 2005; Parzinger, 2012; Damon, 2013). In this way, Mesopotamian 
heritage became not merely connected to but rather a symbol of a regime known for 
committing atrocities against its own population: aside from the victims of the following 
wars with Iran and Kuwait, Human Rights Watch estimated the amount of executions of 
government opponents ordered by the government of Saddam Hussein to be around 
250,000 (HRW, 2012).
After that, US forces invaded Iraq in 2003, joined by British forces, in an attempt to depose 
the Iraqi president. Once again, oil was an underlying factor. The Western interference 
correlated with the nationalisation of oil companies in Iraq by Saddam Hussein (Kneissl, 
2015). Thus, the fi rst building to be occupied by the US forces was the Ministry of Oil, 
leaving cultural institutions unguarded. In the background of these events, a new era of 
cultural destruction was introduced. Within the following years, Iraq experienced serious 
lootings as well as war-related and intentional destruction of the state’s heritage.
Rise of the Islamic State: Ideology and Propaganda
The departure of the US Army in 2011 and the following De- Ba’athifi cation process of 
removing former party affi  liates left the country shattered and eventually paved the way 
for the foundation of the Islamic State. Founded in 2006, the Islamic State unexpectedly 
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appeared on the international stage in 2014, when it conquered large 
parts of western and northern Iraq after having already held parts of 
Syria under its control for two years. According to De Cesari, “IS, while 
originated from al-Qaeda in Iraq, has absorbed and monopolised the 
Sunni resistance and with it former Iraqi Ba’athis offi  cials who constitute 
an important part of its middle and upper cadre and who are surely 
familiar with the older practices and spectacles of power” (De Cesari, 
2015). Thus, she further argues, the destruction of Mesopotamian 
heritage also refers to Saddam Hussein’s propaganda beside its explicit 
reference to the Qur’ān, developing into a new political symbolism.
The Case of Mosul
In regard to the ideology and propaganda strategy of the Islamic State, 
the case of Mosul plays a signifi cant role. With its history, diverse 
cultural heritage, and geographical position, it is a good starting point 
for further research into the destruction of heritage caused by the Salafi  
jihadist militant group. Monitoring operations and detailed damage 
assessments of the city allow us to gain insight into the discrepancies 
between the actual on-site destruction and the message that the 
militant group was distributing to international audiences. The ASOR 
Cultural Heritage Initiative (henceforth abbreviated to ASOR CHI), 
founded in 2014 with the aim to implement the protection of cultural 
property through damage assessment, raising global awareness, and 
contriving emergency and post-war responses, recently published a 
report on their damage documentation in Mosul (Danti, et al. 2017). 
Figure 2. 
Destruction of 
Lamassu fi gure by 
ISIS militant (extract 
from IS propaganda 
video 00h04m28s, 
2015/ PD)
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Through their monitoring operations in recaptured areas, the following statistics could be 
collected (numbers rising):
As of July 12, 2017, we have reported 87 individual incidents of damage 
to religious heritage including mosques (47 incidents), churches (26 
incidents), shrines (10 incidents), and cemeteries (4 incidents). We have 
reported 42 individual incidents of damage to secular sites, including 
University buildings (23 incidents), libraries (8 incidents), museums (4 
incidents), and other buildings (7 incidents). Lastly we have documented 
27 individual incidents of damage impacting archaeological sites, 
including 24 at Nineveh and one each to Bashtapia, Qara Serai and Deir 
Mar Elia. In all, ASOR CHI has recorded damage to 102 individual sites 
in Mosul, and the number is rising as more photographs and videos are 
released from liberated regions. (Danti, M. et al, 2017)
The numbers reveal complex damage to all types of buildings, including non-religious and 
religious sites. In fact, various scholars have already pointed out that the heaviest wave 
of destruction was carried out on Islamic heritage (De Cesari, 2015; Romey, 2015), and 
the recent destruction of the an-Nūrī Mosque shows that the Islamic State did not exclude 
any type of heritage, not even their own. However, the destruction of Mesopotamian 
heritage seems to have a different symbolic meaning for the militant group. Despite the 
diversity of Mosul’s heritage and the richness of archaeological fi nds from prehistoric 
times to Islamic times exhibited in the Mosul Museum, the Islamic State chose to only 
broadcast the destruction of specifi c objects, namely the lamassu statue of the Nergal 
Gate in Nineveh and other Mesopotamian antiquities inside the Mosul Museum, although 
the actual destruction carried out by the militant group included all types of heritage from 
prehistoric to modern times. But what makes Mosul and its Mesopotamian heritage so 
important for the history of Iraq and the Islamic State’s ideological warfare?
In the backdrop of the history of Iraq, the role of Near Eastern Archaeology, and the rise of 
the Islamic State, Mosul represents various confl ict layers that are of central importance 
to understanding the ongoing struggle and the associated symbolism of destruction: 1) 
The geographical position of Mosul in the disputed area between the Iraqi state and Iraqi 
Kurdistan, with proximity to the Turkish and Syrian borders, has turned the city into the 
setting for a proxy war between Arabs, Kurds, Da’esh, and other powers. 2) Mosul has 
symbolic meaning for the Islamic State because of its Sunni population and the great an-
Nūrī Mosque. It is the place where Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi had his fi rst public appearance 
in July 2014 and accepted the title of caliph after the new caliphate had been formally 
announced by Da’esh (Mindock, 2017). 3) Another factor is the importance of Mosul as 
an economic center due to its large oil refi neries and well- known textile industry. The 
role of oil in the politics of Iraq has already been mentioned throughout this article. Iraq 
has the second largest oil reserves in the world, with an estimated 280 billion barrels of 
oil (Kneissl, 2015), and the most important oil reserves are located in Mosul and Kirkuk 
(Schlacht um Mossul, 2016). 4) Mosul’s cultural diversity and importance as a cultural 
center rose due to the founding of Mosul University in 1967 as one of the biggest centers 
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Figure 3. Lamassu 
fi gures in Nineveh 
(Makinano 
2008/ PD).
for education and research in the Middle East. With a population of 
over 1.5 million inhabitants, the capital of the province of Nineveh was 
known as a multiethnic and multi-religious city that unifi ed the cultural 
diversity of Iraq’s population, with Yezidis, Turkmen, and Assyrians 
living side by side with Arabs and Kurds until the Islamic State occupied 
the city. Although freedom of religion is guaranteed by Article Three 
of the Iraqi constitution, the situation for minorities has increasingly 
deteriorated since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Islam remains the state 
religion and a reference point in the execution of establishing rights, 
thus creating a juridical contradiction, as every new law has to fall in 
line with both Islamic thought and with fundamental democratic rights 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2016, p.8). After the take-over of power, the 
Islamic State immediately started with a systematic ethnic cleansing 
program to eradicate minorities.
In this complex and fragile construction, the importance of Mosul for 
Near Eastern Archaeology adds another layer of signifi cance. As 
already outlined, Nineveh (which is today part of Mosul) was an ancient 
Mesopotamian city that served as a capital of the Assyrian empire in 
the seventh century B.C, and seems to have been the geographical 
starting point for European fi eld excavations in Iraq (Bernhardsson, 
2005). Additionally, the Mosul Museum was the second largest museum 
in Iraq until its destruction in 2015. Founded in 1952, it exhibited 
archaeological artifacts from prehistoric times up to the Islamic era, 
representing thousands of years of history. The museum is located 
on the west side of the city of Mosul, where the palace gardens of 
King Faisal were once situated (Albertson, 2015). Starting with only 
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one exhibition hall for discoveries from Nimrud and Hatra, the museum quickly grew, 
and in 1958 the Directorate General of Antiquities added a second hall for antiquities 
from the prehistoric to the Islamic times (Directorate-General of Antiquities, 1958, p.3). 
The collection continued to grow and was transferred to a new building in 1972, where 
it remained until its destruction in 2015 (Mohammed, 2015). The museum in its current 
structure is divided into four sections: hall one is dedicated to Assyrian artifacts from 
Nimrud, the second hall to Hellenistic and Parthian artifacts from Hatra, the third to the 
Islamic era, and the last to prehistoric fi nds mainly excavated in Hassuna (Albertson, 
2015). With the start of the Iraq War in 2003, Iraq entered a long period of destruction. 
Following the invasion by the United States, museums and other cultural institutions 
experienced systematic lootings and devastations. Within a few days after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, around 15,200 artifacts disappeared and entire archaeological sites 
were destroyed and pillaged (Müller-Karpe, 2011, p.13). Along with the National Museum 
in Baghdad, the Mosul Museum also suff ered severe lootings from which it was not able 
to fully recover. After the war, the museum was closed for reconstruction for several 
years. It was set to be reopened in 2014, but the Islamic State took power and occupied 
the museum in June 2014. On 26 February 2015 the militant group disseminated a 
propaganda video showing the destruction of the museum and of the lamassu statue 
of the Nergal Gate of Nineveh (Shaheen, 2015) (Fig.2). The lamassu is a protective 
deity, usually depicted as a winged bull or lion with a human head, and is connected 
to Assyrian culture. The face of the statue is rendered in the typical style of Assyrian 
illustrations, with a strictly ordered, curly beard. On its head, the lamassu wears a double 
crown in the shape of a bullhorn, an important attribute of a god. Consisting of human, 
animal, and godly elements, lamassu served as a guard, placed on entrances of palaces 
or city gates to protect the citizens or the king from attacks by hostile groups (Fig.3). In 
the video, a representative explains the destruction as an act of iconoclasm and refers 
to phrases from the Quran. The speech is accompanied by strong-voiced chorales of 
jihadi nasheed. The symbolism of destruction could be easily explained with religious 
motivations, if not for the fact that the Islamic State itself had commented on their motives 
in their online magazine Dabiq, drawing a very diff erent picture. In their eighth volume, as 
already pointed out by Chiara De Cesari, the Islamic State directly links the destruction 
of the Mosul Museum and the lamassu of the Nineveh site to its entangled history with 
Near Eastern Archaeology and European colonial policies by stating that “the kuff ār had 
unearthed these statues and ruins in recent generations and attempted to portray them 
as part of a cultural heritage and identity that the Muslims of Iraq should embrace and be 
proud of” (De Cesari, 2015; Dabiq 8, pp.22-23). They further connect the cultural heritage 
to Iraqi nation building: “The various apostate puppet regimes set up by the crusaders 
after the colonial era all have modifi ed versions of the fi rst fl ag designed by Mark Sykes 
[…]” (De Cesari 2015; Dabiq 9, p.22). With these statements, the militant group not only 
points out an ideological stand against the division of the Middle East in accordance with 
the Asia Minor agreement and the following construction of a modern state, but it also 
refers to the nationalistic political agenda of Saddam Hussein. In this context, the usage 
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of the lamassu for the logo of the US Forces in 2011 becomes the icing on the cake 
and proves how much Mesopotamian heritage has been used symbolically for political 
purposes and legitimations of power and war (De Cesari, 2015).
The Mosul case proves that the reasons behind the destruction of heritage by the 
Islamic State are multifaceted and accompanied by complex symbolism. Mesopotamian 
heritage has become part of several institutional programs throughout this time as a 
response to the search for stability and social cohesion. In particular, the example of the 
Mosul Museum and the lamassu statue reveals a deep entanglement of Mesopotamian 
heritage with the colonial history of Iraq and the following state building process. Spread 
in a spectacular manner, the propaganda videos of the Islamic State were mainly made 
to instill terror in the Western world. However, the massive destruction of Mosul also 
carries another underlying message: it is a symbolic act of the destruction of a past that 
is entangled with a painful history that began with the intervention of Western powers in 
the Middle East. The usage of the past by appropriating heritage for the promotion and 
legitimation of ideological concepts likely leads to its destruction or to the creation of 
future uncomfortable heritage. While institutions all over the world have already started 
planning for the future of the city, the question of the future of Mosul’s society remains 
open, and Iraq will soon be faced with the challenge of (hopefully collectively) deciding 
on how to deal with its traumatic past. Whichever way rebuilding and conservation 
practices are carried out in the future, this paper has shown that the entanglements of 
Iraq’s heritage with its history need to be carefully considered in order to avoid repeating 
past mistakes.
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Introduction 
Since the destruction of the two monumental Buddha statues in Afghanistan in 2001, the 
conservation process has become an international affair. UNESCO became involved and 
received the mandate to coordinate the preservation of the cultural sites in Afghanistan 
together with the support of international experts and various donor countries, which 
fi nanced the activities for the security and conservation of the site. Thus, UNESCO 
established an Expert Working Group to advise the Afghan authorities.
The objectives of this case study include the evaluation of the conservation ideologies 
and concepts proposed for the conservation of the Buddha statues, their relationships 
with the political intentions of the various nations involved in the conservation process, 
and the political and ideological forces that infl uenced this process. The evaluation of the 
decision-making process and the analysis of the conservation approaches will hopefully 
uncover some lessons that can be applied to future cases of post-confl ict situations and 
associated international conservation efforts.
Description of the site and historical background
The two monumental niches of the Buddha statues form a part of the World Heritage 
Site of the Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley, which 
The Buddha Statues of 
Bamiyan
Analysis of the conservation 
process and its political forces
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consists of eight separate component sites within the valley. The site is currently on the 
List of World Heritage in Danger and inscribed under criteria (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (vi).
The Bamiyan Valley is located 246km northwest of Kabul, Afghanistan. The valley is set 
within the mountains of the Hindu Kush in the central highlands of Afghanistan (World 
Heritage Centre, 2003, p.19). The Buddha statues were carved into the stone cliff s of 
Bamiyan Valley; their bodies and clothes were molded with stucco and colourfully painted, 
standing in niches and surrounded by mural paintings. One statue measured 38m and 
was carved into the eastern part of the cliff , while the taller 55m-high statue was located in 
the western part of the cliff . The cliff  also includes countless manmade caves and tunnels 
used as sanctuaries, council halls, and monk’s cells (World Heritage Centre, 2003, p.21).
The destroyed monuments had been the biggest Buddha statues worldwide, dating 
back to the sixth century BC. Through the discovery of pieces of wood and ropes within 
the destroyed fragments of the statues, the subsequent C14 analysis enabled a more 
precise dating. This analysis dated the small Buddha to AD 507, the taller Buddha to AD 
551, and the mural paintings surrounding the Buddhas were dated between the late fi fth 
and early ninth centuries AD (World Heritage Centre, 2010, p.67).
The statues had been part of a former important Buddhist center in central Asia and a 
destination for a Buddhist pilgrimage that formed one of the branches of the Silk Road. 
The valley, with its long history, shows Indian, Hellenistic, Roman, Sasanian, and Islamic 
infl uences (World Heritage Centre, 2003).
The fi rst excavation and research was conducted in 1922 by French archaeologist André 
Godard, who had been accompanied by Joseph Hackin and Jean Carl (World Heritage 
Centre, 2003, p.26). However, the most important contributions to the archaeological 
research and history of Bamiyan were delivered by Zemaryalai Tarzi, president of the 
Association for the Protection of Afghan Archaeology, along with Kosaku Maeda, Akira 
Miyaji, Takayasu Hugushi, and Deborah E. Klimburg-Salter.
Even 16 years after the destruction of the Buddha statues, the site is still on the List of 
World Heritage in Danger, threatened by the risk of collapse of the Giant Buddha niches, 
irreversible deterioration of the mural paintings, and anti-personnel mines within the caves of 
the cliff , as well as facing other threats such as civil unrest (World Heritage Centre, 2017a).
Political context and decision-making process 
In 1989, the Soviet troops lost the guerrilla war in Afghanistan and were pulled out 
after ten years of war. Thereafter a civil war broke out between various religious and 
fundamentalist groups. Finally, in 1996 the religious fundamentalist Taliban formed 
an Islamic state and took control of most parts of Afghanistan. However, the UN did 
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Figure 1. Bamiyan’s 
Budha before and 
after destruction. 
(UNESCO 2008; 
Montgomery 1963 
/ CC BY-SA 3.0) 
not recognise their government due to human rights violations 
(Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2014).
Increasingly, the Taliban became seen as the image of a radical 
Islamic enemy in the Western media (Falser, 2010, p.83). However, it 
is interesting to point out that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar 
used diplomatic language in 1999 to discuss the cultural heritage of 
Afghanistan:
All historical cultural heritage are regarded as an 
integral part of the heritage of Afghanistan and 
therefore belong to Afghanistan, but naturally also to 
the international community. Any excavation or trading 
in cultural heritage objects is strongly forbidden and 
will be punished in accordance with the law.
(…) The famous Buddhist statues at Bamiyan were 
made before the event of Islam in Afghanistan, and 
are amongst the largest of their kind in Afghanistan 
and in the world. In Afghanistan there are no 
Buddhist to worship the statues. Since Islam came 
to Afghanistan until the present period the statues 
have not been damaged. The government regards 
the statues with serious respect and considers the 
position of their protection today to be the same 
as always. The government further considers the 
Bamiyan statues as an example of a potential major 
source of income for Afghanistan from international 
visitors. (2000, cited in Falser, 2010, pp.83/84) 
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In 1999, the UN imposed strict trade sanctions on Afghanistan, which 
were followed by a serious famine in 2001 (Falser, 2010, p.84). The 
situation escalated when a representative of UNESCO offered the 
Taliban government money for the protection of the Buddha statues 
in Bamiyan, which had been threatened by nearby military actions. 
Members of the Taliban were outraged by the offer, as the Western 
world only offered money to save statues instead of seeking to aid the 
millions of starving Afghan people (Crosette, 2001).
In reaction, the Taliban destroyed the Buddha statues in March 2001 
using dynamite and artillery. Falser describes the act as performative 
iconoclasm, since it was long planned and enacted for the international 
media (2010, p.82). Even so, this was not the fi rst attack on the statues, 
as the area suffered from various religiously-motivated attacks over 
the previous centuries. The result of the 2001 demolition was the 
weakening of the walls of the niche and the loss of major parts of the 
statues (Tarzi, 2004).
After the terror attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, the USA 
and its allies started a NATO mission, building the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) to fi ght the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 
Soon, the Taliban regime was expelled from Afghanistan and a new 
government was put in place. However, the Taliban continued to 
operate in exile in Pakistan (Steinberg, 2011).
Two years after the destruction of the two Buddhas, in June 2003, the 
Bamiyan Valley was inscribed as a World Heritage Site. The statement 
of outstanding universal value in the site’s nomination fi le included the 
Figure 2. 
Landscape of the 
Bamiyan Valley with 
the empty niches of 
the Buddha statues 
(Scar 2012 / PD). 
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destruction as a “testimony to recurring reactions to iconic art, the most recent being the 
internationally condemned deliberate destruction of the two standing Buddha statues in 
March 2001” (World Heritage Centre, 2017b).
The Afghan Government entrusted UNESCO with the mandate of coordinating all 
cultural projects for the Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan 
Valley due to a lack of capacity within the responsible national institutions to create 
appropriate conservation and management plans for the destroyed cultural properties 
(World Heritage Centre, 2017c). Further efforts and coordination were also undertaken 
in Jam and Herat and at the destroyed National Museum in Kabul. UNESCO established 
a Bamiyan Expert Working Group in 2002. At annual meetings, further activities for 
the conservation and management of the Bamiyan Valley were coordinated and the 
Afghan government received advice for the implementation of decisions adopted by the 
World Heritage Committee for the World Heritage property of Bamiyan. Objectives of 
the Expert Working Group included the long-term stability of the Giant Buddha niches, 
capacity building, documentation, implementation of the World Heritage Convention, 
and ensured site security through demining and the prevention of illicit excavations and 
looting (Manhart, 2009, p.39).
The activities were funded by international donors, including, among others, Japan, Italy, 
and Switzerland. The conservation of the destroyed site was divided into different phases, 
starting with emergency operations like securing and documenting fragments, collecting 
data (as all fi les of the Afghan State Conservation Offi ce were lost), and creating a 3D model 
of the destroyed Buddha statues (ICOMOS, 2005). The National Research Institute for 
Cultural Properties, Tokyo developed a master plan for the conservation in 2004 and updated 
it in 2006. A Cultural Master Plan was later created by the Aachen Center for Documentation 
and Conservation in 2005 and approved by the Afghan Government in 2006.
In 2014, the mandate for the NATO mission ended and most of the foreign troops left the 
country, while a smaller NATO mission continued to support the Afghan security forces 
(Politische Bildung, 2017). In 2017 alone, more than ten terror attacks took place in 
Afghanistan. The country has yet to reach a state of stability and security, and the Taliban 
demonstrate an ongoing threat to the people and cultural property of Afghanistan (Polititische 
Bildung, 2017).
Conservation approaches
The destruction of a monument is a powerful symbolic act, but equally powerful is the 
symbolism of the re-erection of a monument. The step of reconstructing a monument 
needs in-depth analysis and consideration. In the aftermath of the destruction of the 
Buddha statues of Bamiyan, international experts and the international public debated 
many different approaches. The two main conservation philosophies discussed were to 
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either leave the space open or to conduct an anastylosis with preserved fragments of 
the statues. A more alternative approach proposed by Japanese artist Hiro Yamagata 
was to recreate the Buddha statues through a gigantic laser beam project (Schou, 
2005).
UNESCO aimed to leave the niches of the destructed monuments open as a memorial 
to the act of vandalism by the Taliban (Petzet, 2009, p.46 & Nordland, 2014). This 
conservation philosophy seeks to stop the process of deterioration and to undertake 
only activities aimed at preserving the current state of conservation. This practice 
corresponds with Alois Riegl’s conservation philosophy regarding the value of traces 
and age, wherein restoration would be an equally unjustifi ed intervention into the 
fabric of the monument as the initial destruction itself. For the Buddha statues, this 
would mean that the violent destruction became part of their history, so the traces 
of vandalism should not be erased. However, Riegl also stated that conservation 
measures may be undertaken to slow down the process of decay for outstanding 
works (Schmidt, 2008, pp.46-47).
The other approach was to conduct an anastylosis with the preserved fragments. 
For a long time, it was unclear whether the secured pieces would be suffi cient or 
whether enough data would be available to reconstruct the Buddhas. It was estimated 
that approximately 25% of the preserved fragments belong to the outer surface of 
the Buddhas and could be used for an anastylosis (Urbat and Aubel, 2006, p.89). 
The Venice Charter (1964) outlines that only anastylosis, or, in other words, “the 
reassembling of existing but dismembered parts”, is permitted on excavation sites, 
and that the additional material used must be visually distinct from the original 
fragments (Schmidt, 2008, p.73). Thus, it is questionable whether enough data and 
preserved fragments will be available for a future anastylosis, or whether such an 
endeavor would simply end up producing a copy of the former Buddha statues.
The Afghan government wanted at least one statue reconstructed as a symbolic 
victory over the still-threatening Taliban (Petzet, 2002, p.46). This would be a strong 
symbolic act for the Afghan community, which is an important factor and a political 
act, as it demonstrates the position of the Afghan government toward the religiously 
fundamentalist Taliban. The wish to reconstruct a monument that was not part of their 
religious background is a strong message in a strict Muslim context. It demonstrates 
that the Buddha statues became part of Afghan cultural identity and that they 
were valued and continue to be valued as such. Jan Assmann states that “Cultural 
memory works by reconstructing, that is, it always relates its knowledge to an actual 
and contemporary situation” (1995, p.130). In this way, the Taliban’s act of terror 
and destruction of the Buddhas added another layer of value to the site, and their 
reconstruction would foster the Afghan cultural identity after years of war and terror, 
which is an essential part of nation building and the rehabilitation of Afghanistan.
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In 2012, the German team from the Technical University of Munich (TU Munich) led by 
Michael Petzet began an unauthorised partial reconstruction of the “feet” and “legs” of the 
smaller of the two Buddhas without consulting UNESCO or the Expert Working Group. 
The team started the reconstruction with iron rods, reinforced concrete, and bricks. Petzet, 
a former president of ICOMOS Germany, claimed that they “just wanted to preserve what 
can be preserved”, and that everything they did was discussed with the Afghan authorities. 
The Afghan government requested the partial-reconstruction of one Buddha niche at the 
11th Expert Working Group meeting in 2012. The response of the experts was that, at that 
point, no suffi cient data was available to reconstruct one of the statues, nor were there 
enough fi nancial resources (Emmerling and Petzet, 2016, p.151).
Andrea Bruno, the architectural consultant to UNESCO for the past 40 years, confi rmed 
that the work was carried out “against UNESCO’s decision [taken in 2011] not to rebuild 
the Buddhas”, and said the organisation was not informed (Martini and Rivetti, 2014). 
Moreover, the World Heritage Centre and the Advisory Bodies commented on the incident 
in 2014, noting, “Concern has been expressed at the appropriateness of the intervention 
in the lower gallery of the Eastern Buddha niche” (World Heritage Centre, 2014).
The Expert Working Group explicitly expressed at its eighth and again at its eleventh 
Expert Meeting that no projects should be implemented unless the Expert Working 
Group had discussed them and received the Afghan authorities’ confi rmation, and that 
detailed proposals should be prepared in advance for review by the experts of the Expert 
Working Group. In the case of major interventions, a proposal for submission to the 
World Heritage Committee should be prepared, which is in line with the Operational 
Guidelines. Moreover, the decision should be based on a Heritage Impact Assessment, 
as well as on the project’s technical and fi nancial feasibility.
The unauthorised actions of the German team from TU Munich lead to various questions, 
such as whether enough scientifi c data had been available by the time the reconstruction 
began. Again, the Expert Meeting report from 2012 stated that at that moment, suffi cient 
scientifi c data was not available for an anastylosis (Emmerling and Petzet, 2016, p.151). 
It is also unclear how it was possible for an international team acting on its own authority 
to start the reconstruction without an overall agreed approach to the conservation and 
presentation of the property.
After the last meeting in 2013, no Expert Meeting took place until 2016, when the Government 
of Afghanistan offi cially requested the reconstruction of at least one statue on behalf of the 
people of Afghanistan. The current decision is that the western niche of the taller Buddha 
will be left empty as a testimony to the tragic act of destruction, while the eastern Buddha 
will be reconstructed using the preserved fragments. However, both approaches show 
the importance of the interpretation of the site either as an act of resistance or a place of 
memory, as these interpretation choices create different values for the site.
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Heritage conservation as a political instrument
The following section will critically evaluate the decision-making processes and will try to 
highlight weaknesses of the Expert Working Group as a mechanism to support destabilised 
governments and their cultural properties. These concerns are mostly related to the 
strong infl uence of the international community on the decisions made in the past years. 
It is essential to say at the beginning that the international preservation efforts were a 
huge success and that the Expert Working Group and the Afghan government made 
great improvements concerning the state of conservation, security, and research of the 
destructed Buddha statues. However, it is important to raise awareness about challenges 
in the decision-making process in order to effectively approach these problems in the 
future and to learn lessons for comparable cases in post-confl ict situations.
States in a confl ict or post-confl ict situation often face a lack of organisation and 
resources for taking care of their cultural properties in an adequate way. Therefore, it is 
a natural phenomenon that over such a long period of time, the power relations between 
the Afghan government and the international community have evolved and that countries 
might have overextended their duties. Moreover, international efforts to supply technical 
and fi nancial support to such an extent are not simply based on altruism, but they also 
have political motivations.
Institutional framework
The decisions for the management and conservation of the Bamiyan site fall under the 
authority of the Ministry of Information and Culture and under the direct supervision of 
the Deputy Minister for Culture. There is also a shared responsibility for cultural sites on 
an operational level between the Institute of Archaeology and the Department for the 
Protection and Rehabilitation of Historical Monuments within the Ministry of Information 
and Culture in Kabul (UNESCO, 2011).
The Expert Working Group is supposed to give recommendations, to encourage the 
Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture to carry out certain approved actions, and to 
help coordinate between UNESCO, donor countries, international experts, and Afghan 
authorities. Furthermore, the Expert Working Group conducts advisory missions. Baer 
and Snickars defi ne governance as: 
an operational mode according to which public or governmental and 
private actors – especially target groups, benefi ciaries, and third parties 
– cooperate in managing public policies that include program formulation 
and implementation. Such cooperation is achieved through activating, 
combining, and exchanging policy resources (e.g., law, money, political 
support, time, and consensus) within given or reshaped general 
institutional setting (e.g., decision-making rules for a given policy). Baer 
and Snickars. Baer and Snickars (2000, p.146)
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“The destruction 
of a  monument 
is a powerful 
symbolic act, but 
equally powerful 
is the symbolism 
of the re-erection 
of a monument.”
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The Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley presents a 
special form of governance of a cultural property, as the Afghan authorities are dependent 
on the fi nancial contributions and are morally bound to the conservation policies of the 
World Heritage Convention. UNESCO not only became a powerful interest group, but 
moreover the Afghan authorities agreed to a coalition with them for the production 
of conservation policies. The Expert Working Group offers an institutionalised forum 
that allows experts, together with representatives from Afghanistan and UNESCO, to 
develop strategies for the conservation of the statues. However, the responsibility for 
determining the conservation policies lies in the hands of a rather small group of experts 
and representatives. The Expert Working Group recommends the implementation of 
the agreed-on strategies, but through funding responsibilities and the lack of public 
participation, this form of cultural heritage governance presents a rather top-down 
approach.
Funding and fi nancial contributions
While the international monetary aid may seem altruistic, the reality shows that the 
donor countries have more control through fi nancial contributions. The efforts of 
the donor countries played a major role in the preservation of the Bamiyan Valley. 
From 2003 to 2017, the UNESCO/Japan Funds-in-Trust contributed USD 7,170,807, 
UNESCO/Switzerland Funds-in-Trust donated USD 159,000 from 2011 to 2012, the 
UNESCO/Italy Funds-in-Trust donated USD 900,000 in 2013 (World Heritage Centre, 
2017a), the Korean Funds-in-Trust donated USD 5,435,284 from 2013 to 2016 (World 
Heritage Centre, 2016), and the government of Germany granted approximately one 
million euros between 2002 and 2004 through ICOMOS Germany (UNESCO, 2011, 
p.84).
Each country has individual justifi cations for their investments in other countries, 
including, among others, prestige, economic partnership, and humanitarian aid. In the 
case of Germany’s contributions, nation-building and the stabilisation of Afghanistan 
were crucial factors.
From 2009 to 2016, Germany invested 3,17 billion euros in Afghanistan to strengthen the 
economy, government, power generation (energy), and infrastructure, but also culture 
(Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, 2016). The 
investment in specifi c areas such as these is a tool for stabilisation and nation-building 
in Afghanistan, which serves not only Afghanistan but also Germany itself. An offi cial 
paper from the German Foreign Offi ce states, “Frieden und Entwicklung in Afghanistan 
– Sicherheit für uns”, implying that peace and development in Afghanistan would lead 
to global security. As Afghanistan was the operational and training base for terrorism 
until 2001, the stabilisation process was meant to help erase the operational base of 
the Taliban and Al-Qaida (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2008).
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So in this case, the Bamiyan statues act as “a highly fertile environment 
for learning how to transform a destructive act into an opportunity 
to reinforce tolerance, peace and development through culture for 
future generations” (UNESCO, 2011, p.15).
Another dimension of funding is the aspect of control in the decision-
making process. An article from Lauren Bursey (2014) for the Center 
For Art Law describes the intervention of the reconstruction work of 
Michael Petzet on the feet of the eastern Buddha. The article states 
that:
Figure 3. The 
western Buddha 
statue before its 
destruction in 1963 
( UNESCO; A 
Lezine,1963 / CC 
BY-SA 3.0). 
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Afghan monument protection law requires Afghan Government approval 
for changes made to heritage sites, which ICOMOS acknowledges, but 
due to funding control, UNESCO is the body with the real authority. Work 
was halted, not because the Afghans had a problem with ICOMOS’ work 
and thus ordered it stopped, but because UNESCO felt that ICOMOS was 
rebuilding rather than only stabilizing the site. (Bursey 2014) 
This expresses that UNESCO and donor countries indeed had the power to control 
decisions, and even enforce them against the will of the Afghan authorities if the activities 
were not in line with their conservation philosophies.
The imbalance of power is also demonstrated by the lack of fi nancial investment by 
the Afghan government into the conservation of cultural heritage. Since the Afghan 
authorities were secure with a continuous fl ow of funds since its inscription on the World 
Heritage List, no priorities were set to provide fi nancial contributions of their own. This 
oversight will lead to major problems when the international funding comes to an end. 
Therefore, UNESCO says that it is “high time that the State Party allocate minimum 
funding to the property” (World Heritage Centre, 2017a).
Technical and expert support
The unauthorised reconstruction of the feet of the eastern statue by Michael Petzet’s 
team from TU Munich demonstrated that dominance not only appears through fi nancial 
control, but also through the enforcement of conservation ideologies.
A closer look at the host venue for Expert Meetings and the composition of participants 
might also reveal an imbalance of power and the dominance of certain countries. For 
example, seven of the thirteen meetings between 2002 and 2016 took place in Germany, 
while three took place in Japan, and only one in Kabul. The German infl uence is further 
highlighted by the fact that the scaffolding was sponsored by the German Messerschmitt 
Foundation and exclusively transported by the German Army in August 2003 (World 
Heritage Centre, 2010, p.28).
Capacity building
The last analysis and conclusion by the World Heritage Centre and the Advisory Bodies 
in 2017 supports the above implications. The report states that the continuous Expert 
Working Group meetings were generally welcome, but points out that the benefi ts of an 
Expert Working Group serve to coordinate between international experts and institutions, 
and is “not meant to function as a mechanism for the management of the property” (World 
Heritage Centre, 2017d). Furthermore, it states that no progress on capacity building has 
been reported and encourages the State Party to create a programme to strengthen local 
and national capacities with regard to heritage conservation and management. These 
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points demonstrate that, to a certain extent, the Expert Working Group 
has overstepped its bounds, and that the Afghan authorities currently 
lack self-reliance in the conservation and management process.
UNESCO has had the mandate for more than 16 years now. This leads 
to several questions, such as: When will this mandate and the help of 
the Expert Working Group come to an end? When will the Bamiyan 
Valley be removed from the List of World Heritage in Danger? And 
when will a degree of political stability and security be reached? It 
seems as if the Expert Working Group and the Afghan authorities have 
long settled for their role as a coalition in the decision-making process 
and do not take adequate actions to further Afghan autonomy. In order 
to empower the Afghan institutions, capacity building is of central 
importance. Even though a lot of improvement has been made in the 
conservation of the site without adequate national human resources, 
independence of the Afghan authorities has not yet been established.
Public participation
With The Kabul Charter for Sustainable Heritage Development: Bringing 
Afghan People and Their Heritage Together from 2010, UNESCO 
and the Afghan authorities explicitly note the importance of public 
participation for the conservation of the Buddha statues. However, 
there is no evidence that the Afghan authorities enabled or allowed 
for any form of community involvement. For example, they only state 
Figure 4. The site 
after destruction 
(WDVIDSHUB 
2012 / PD). 
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that it is the will of the Afghan people to reconstruct at least one statue, but there is no 
documentation of an actual survey or of any form of public outreach.
Conclusion and recommendations
In the case of the destructed Buddha statues of Bamiyan, UNESCO and the international 
community undertook a great effort through fi nancial and technical aid to support the 
Afghan government in times of war and terror. Since culture has been increasingly at the 
frontline of confl icts, UNESCO’s Expert Working Group and the conservation process of 
the Bamiyan Valley created some relevant lessons for comparable cases in post-confl ict 
situations. Some of these similar cases will also receive international assistance, such 
as, for example, the sites destroyed in Syria over the past years.
The evaluation of the conservation process and the role of UNESCO, the international 
experts, and donor countries in this crisis situation showed that:
The two main conservation approaches and the interpretation of the site were based on 
different conservation ideologies—the anastylosis as an act of resistance and the empty 
niche as a place of remembrance of the terror of the Taliban.
The unauthorised acts by the German team demonstrated that communication and 
reporting between all actors is essential, and that only activities that are in line with 
accepted guidelines and conventions and that are commonly agreed upon by the Afghan 
government, UNESCO, and international experts should be implemented.
The conservation process over the past fi fteen years also showed a tendency of the 
Expert Working Group to exceed their coordination function and increasingly take 
responsibility for the management of the Bamiyan Valley.
The generous funding from donor countries was an essential factor for the successful 
preservation of the destroyed niches. However, the fi nancial contributions should not be 
misused to impose infl uence in the decision-making process of the Bamiyan Valley.
The political ideology behind the funds from the German Federal Foreign Offi ce was 
to support the nation-building process and the rehabilitation of Afghanistan in order to 
secure peace in their own country.
Another crucial factor is reestablishing self-reliance through capacity building. Therefore, 
the Afghan authorities should be strengthened and the government should show initiative, 
including providing funds for their own cultural projects.
And lastly, the involvement of state and civil society is crucial in order to avoid a top- 
The Buddha Statues of Bamiyan | 41
down approach. In this case, steps have allegedly been taken in that direction. However, 
there is no evidence that the Afghan authorities actually involved the local community or 
other stakeholders in their decision-making process for the conservation of the Buddha 
statues.
Recently, UNESCO established a general strategy to reinforce UNESCO’s institutional 
and operational capacity to respond to threats to culture and heritage in the event of 
armed confl icts. The strategy builds on UNESCO’s standards, technical expertise, and 
operational experience in the fi eld of culture, and aims to “redu[ce] the vulnerability of 
cultural heritage and diversity before, during and in the aftermath of confl ict” (UNESCO, 
2015). The strategy is an important step, as it will provide operational guidelines that 
allow for a controllable, transparent, and inclusive approach for future missions.
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Figure 2: By Sgt. Ken Scar (U.S. Armed Forces) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons < https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:View_of_the_site_of_Buddahs_in_central_Afghanistan.jpg >
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org/wiki/File%3AFlickr_-_DVIDSHUB_-_Giant_standing_Buddhas_of_Bamiyan_still_cast_shadows_
(Image_2_of_8).jpg >
Image CC
(U
nk
no
w
n,
 a
pr
ox
.1
95
0)
 P
D
Heritage Conservation and Ideologies: a reader | 45
Arman Ebrahimi
The Destruction 
of Reza Shah’s 
Mausoleum
An effort to distort history
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the destruction of the mausoleum of Reza 
Shah, the fi rst king of Pahlavi dynasty, by exploring the reasons and motivational factors 
behind the phenomenon of destroying the tombs of famous fi gures in Iran, which include 
politicians, writers, poets, athletes, musicians, religious minorities, and others. It can 
be traced back to the eleventh century, when Rashid Eldin Fazl Allah Hamedani’s tomb 
was destroyed by Muslims ninety years after his death. As this phenomenon concerns 
the tombs of a variety of characters, or rather different rulers, the key questions that this 
paper aims to answer are: What role does a tomb as a commemorative building play 
and what is lost by destroying it? Also, what is gained by the destruction? What are the 
reasons, ideologies, or motivational factors for destroying commemorative buildings of 
renowned fi gures? By analysing the case of the destruction of the Mausoleum of Reza 
Shah, the paper will also address the wider question of the consequence of destroying 
such tombs or similar memorial buildings of renowned people in society.
Reza Shah’s mausoleum 
Reza Shah was the fi rst democratically-elected king in Iran and he was the founder of the 
Pahlavi dynasty. He reigned in Iran from 15 December 1925 until 16 September 1941, when 
he was sent into exile as part of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. Subsequently, he spent 
the rest of his life in exile and died of a heart attack in 1944 in Johannesburg (Afra, 2017).
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In May 1950, his body was sent to Iran for burial in Rey, a city to the south of Tehran, 
and a place of importance for religious people, as two important Shia leaders originated 
from there (Kavoshi, 2010). Reza Shah’s son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, commanded a 
group of three renowned Iranian architects to build a mausoleum in honour of his father. 
The construction of the mausoleum was subject to both admiration and criticism, mostly 
from the political point of view. However, by the time the mausoleum was completed, it 
was condemned by the Tudeh party, who claimed that too much money had been spent 
on the building that could have instead been used to help economically disadvantaged 
people. Construction started in 1947 and fi nished in 1950. The building covered 9000 
square meters, and it was 25 meters high. It was comprised of two fl oors, the upper one 
containing an entrance hall and an exhibition space, and the lower one dedicated to 
housing Reza Shah’s tombstone, a black stone with a golden crown carved on it (Devos 
& Werner, 2014).
The Reza Shah’s mausoleum was a unique building that, in terms of its style, refl ected 
all the architectural discourses of its time. It illustrated how modern architecture relates to 
not only contemporary history, but also to Pahlavi’s impression of Iran’s past and present 
eras. The architect’s aim was to build a structure that represented a modern king who had 
the desire to become an important fi gure in the list of great Iranians. The challenge was 
to build a structure that included all aspects of avant-gardism as well as historicism, with 
the aim of creating a building reserved for private, leisure, and technologically advanced 
purposes, and to simultaneously construct a building for funerary, religious, symbolic, 
and historical intentions (Babaie & Grigor, 2011).
In building the mausoleum, architects aimed to sanctify the memory of the buried person 
through the architectural language employed, whereas the location of the mausoleum 
in Rey directly connected it to the Shia religion. With its protruded facades, the building 
represented the quality of depth and three-dimensionality. Also, with a view to connecting 
with Iranian architectural history, the Chahar-Tagh prototype, as the basic form of 
Zoroastrian temples, was used in this structure. The Chahar-Tagh prototype consists of a 
dome sitting on a square room, which was the form used by Zoroastrians in their temple 
fi res and later used by Achaemenids, Parthians, and Sasanians (Fig.1). To represent a 
king who had a wish for modernity, the architects used the International Style in colour 
and materials (Devos & Werner, 2014).
It served as a place for celebration and commemoration of the modernity of a nation, as well 
as a place for honouring the memory of Reza Shah and his deeds during his reign. It was a 
place where court ministers and state offi cials gathered annually to commemorate the Reza 
Shah’s passing. Also, it served as a place for renewing the commitment to dynasty and a 
place for social occasions, such as Worker Days, when representatives of different guilds 
came together and declared their loyalty to the court. Along with Persepolis, for a long time 
it was a destination for foreign diplomats as well as foreign visitors (Devos & Werner, 2014).
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On 12 May 1980 by the order of Sadegh Khalkhali, the head of the revolutionary court, 
the project of the destruction of the Mausoleum began (Fig. 2). Sadegh Khalkhali 
explained that the destruction of the place was an act of demolishing all signs of the 
Pahlavi dynasty: “All signs of tyranny (Pahlavi dynasty) should be removed, we should 
do it so as to his son know that there is no place for him in Iran” (Keyhan, 1980, p. 3).
Theoretical framework
Tombstones dominate memorial scenes. Graveyards do double duty 
as a fi eld of remembrance for the living and repositories of the dead, 
whose place of burial loses consequences as they molder into dust or are 
removed to make way for others. (Lowenthal, 2015, p. 533)
Memorial buildings (in this case a Mausoleum) serve as memory storage. In addition, 
they play a strong role in creating a cultural identity. This essay will consider the role of 
tombstones of important fi gures in Iran, specifi cally the mausoleum of Reza Shah, in 
creating a cultural identity. The theory used for this investigation is Jan Assmann’s (1995) 
theory of cultural memory. He believes that cultural memory, as one of the components of 
cultural identity, is passed on over time through cultural artifacts like memorial buildings. 
The cultural memory has its fi xed point, which does not change with time. These fi xed 
points are fateful events of the past, the memories of which are maintained through 
cultural formations like texts, rites, and monuments, and we call them memory fi gures 
(Assmann & Czaplicka, 1995). In his theory, he argues that cultural formations like 
memorial buildings stabilise cultural memory and make it accessible across millennia, 
and that this objectifi cation and crystallisation of communicative and collectively-shared 
knowledge is a prerequisite for its transmission in the culturally-institutionalised heritage 
of a society. He believes that different societies derive their self-image from different 
sources; one derives it from holy books, one from ritual activities, and the other through 
the forms of an architectural language. He also argues that the reasons for remembering 
the past vary. One society remembers it so as to not be separated from its roots, while 
another might remember it out of a fear of repeating the past.
The other theory used in this paper is David Lowenthal’s (2015) theory on how we improve 
the past, as he described in his book The Past is Foreign Country. His theory could help us 
understand the ideological and motivational factors behind destroying memorial buildings 
as an approach to improve the past. According to Lowenthal, we hide or whitewash the 
past because it is distressing or distasteful (Lowenthal, 2015). One destroys the memorial 
building of one’s rival to immortalise oneself, to make people forget the rival’s name and 
remember one’s own name instead (Lowenthal, 2015). One believes that if one kills an 
illustrious man, that man’s glory will rebound to oneself (Lowenthal, 2015). We embellish the 
past by eradicating monuments that evoke some era’s glamor, or some person’s power. As 
relics, expunged memorials become the sole reminders of the past (Lowenthal, 2015).
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The methodology used in this essay consisted of fi nding suffi cient data that is relevant 
for defi ning memorial buildings and their function in creating a cultural identity, with a 
particular focus on Iran. In this regard, the essay fi rstly explores the general defi nition 
of cultural identity. To understand the reasons and motivations behind the destruction of 
memorial buildings, relevant literature defi ning the relation between memorial buildings 
and cultural identity will be investigated. This includes a review of archival material, such 
as newspapers published in the early days of the Islamic revolution, and relating this 
information to autobiographies and biographies of the actors concerned.
Pahlavi vs. Islamic Republic or nationalism vs. Islamism 
Andrew Vincent, (2010) in his book Modern Political Ideologies, defi ned nationalism as: 
An ideology (or a form of behaviour) which makes national self-
consciousness ethnic or linguistic identity into central plank of a doctrine 
which seeks political expression. (Vincent, 2010, p. 227) 
With this defi nition, national government is the result of an interaction between ideologies 
of nationalism and statism, which on the one hand has a tendency to consolidate and 
stabilise the government, and on the other hand tries to create an identity-maker and 
a unifying situation in order to direct all cultural elements towards obeying one offi cial 
dominant culture. Therefore, nationalism is a mental status, or a collective will that shows 
an individual’s loyalty to the national government (Kohn, 1995).
Nationalists believe that there should be a sacred effort to retrieve a golden past that has 
been lost in an unfair way. They are hoping for a revival of the past’s glorious civilisation 
by a future generation (Smith, 2004). Therefore, modern Iranian nationalism, which sought 
to establish a modern and powerful Iranian government, laid its foundation on Iranians’ 
consciousness about their national identity, which has its root in the pre-Islamic era. The 
era was defi ned in the nineteenth century by European philologist in its extremist manner 
and relied on a pure Iranianism, which was inevitably in confl ict with Islam as an alien 
religion and chose to either deny Islam or replace it with its ancient religion (Ashouri, 1998).
Iranianism resulted in the formation of anti-alienism, precisely an anti-Arabic culture and 
language attitude, in the Pahlavi government (Safaie, 1980). In the framework of national 
identity, each Iranian should identify with his fellow countrymen, while feeling a sense of 
alienation from others (Boshrieh, 2001).
During Reza Shah’s reign, this sense of nationalism was emphasised, the pre-Islamic 
civilisation was honoured, Islam was considered as an invading religion, and Islamic 
values became devaluated. By sanctifying ancient traditions and purging the Persian 
language of Arabic words, nationalists tried to replace Islamism with nationalism 
(Shahram Nia & Nazifi , 2013).
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Reza Shah’s cultural reformation consisted of three main lines: 
archaism, modernism, and secularism. To reach the fi rst objective, 
he tried to promote archaism by emphasising the uniqueness of the 
Aryan race, honouring the history of past monarchies, establishing the 
Academy of Persian Language and Literature, and restoring antique 
artifacts. In Reza Shah’s opinion, religion was the biggest obstacle 
to the process of modernism. Therefore, he tried to diminish the role 
of religion in society through the humiliation of religious institutions, 
banning the hijab, and changing the educational system (Zariri, 2011).
To create a new national identity, Reza Shah tried to create a new 
homogeneous ideology to substitute for Islamic ideology, and to use 
it to unify all Iranians under a single political ideology, which resulted 
in the emergence of the new concept of nation. The elements for the 
creation of   this new concept were the history and culture of ancient 
Iranians and the efforts to remove Shia from the Iranian identity (Zariri, 
2011).
Upon the emergence of these new concepts of nation, nationalism, 
and national identity, there was a transformation in people’s identities 
from objects to citizens. A new sense of patriotism also emerged that 
was defi ned by a loyalty to the nation that was devoid of religious 
sentiments (Ashraf, 2006).
Figure 1. Front 
view of the Reza 
Shah Mausoleum 
in 1950 (Unknown, 
ca. 1951 / PD)
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This new idea of the nation created by people who had political, commercial, or cultural 
contacts with the West during the constitutional revolution period of Iran later transformed 
into a form of ethno-nationalism supported by the state during the Pahlavi dynasty 
(Ashraf, 2006).
Reza Shah’s efforts to impose Western culture on Iran resulted in anti-Western and anti-
government trends emerging within the society. In Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power, 
Barry Rubin writes: in the introduction of Western culture in Iran the worst aspects 
of Western culture were represented, which was not tolerable for the religious and 
traditional society of Iran (Rubin, 2006). Moreover, Reza Shah’s ideology of emphasising 
the imperial and pre-Islamic culture resulted in the identifi cation of opposition, since the 
confl ict between pre-Islamic culture and Shia beliefs was one of the reasons for the 
Islamic revolution in Iran (Enayat, 1992).
The confl ict between Iranian identity and Islamic identity has existed since the Muslim 
Arabs conquered Iran in the seventh century AD. One of the acts of Muslim conquerors 
after conquering a country was to virtually erase their pre-Islamic history. Their purpose 
was not only a military conquest of the defeated nation but also to change their culture 
and identity. The ideology of Islam was to not only convert the defeated nations to Islam, 
but also to make them remember their pre-Islamic history as a time of darkness. To this 
end, one of the acts of Muslim invaders was to burn Iranian libraries containing books 
collected over centuries (Bassi, 2005).
Since the beginning of Islamic Republic, Shia religious ideology has been preferred over 
nationalism. Islam declares that it is a universal religion; hence it places the nation in a 
lower regard than itself. In Shia ideology, too, Islam has priority over the nation (Ahmadi 
Zadeh, 2015).
The ideology of the Islamic revolution to a large extent led to the denial of values cherished 
by previous regimes and of other points of view, and it sought to establish a new system 
based solely on Islamic values and principles (Beheshti & Saberi, 2014).
To this end, Iranian identity was redefi ned by three renowned religious fi gures: Ayatollah 
Morteza Motahhari, Ali Shariati, and Mehdi Bazargan. For Motahhari, an identity would 
be acceptable that was compatible with Iranian-Islamic national identity and that helped 
with cooperation and unifying Muslims in a moderate and peaceful way (Motahhari, 
n.d.). In Shariati’s views, nation and nationality are related to culture, and therefore are 
inseparable from religion (Shariati, 2013). Bazargan did not see Iranian nationalism and 
Islam as separate, and he believed that separating these two elements would lead to the 
destruction of society (Bazargan, 1985).
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“Memorialization is often 
a political process as 
memorials are often shaped 
by those in power. They 
represent a complicated 
relationship between 
politics, inconvenience 
and collective memory 
(Barsalou & Baxter, 2007).”
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Another person who redefi ned Iranian identity was Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of 
the Islamic Republic. He believed in two main features of the Iranian nation: Iranism 
(nationalism) and Islamism, though the latter had priority for him. He respected nationalism 
as long as it did not contradict Islamism (Shahram Nia & Nazifi , 2013).
Islamic identity was a reaction to various aspects of modernism, including nationalism. 
The European concept of nation and nationalism did not exist in Iranian culture, and 
since it conceived of itself as preceding Islam, it found itself in confl ict with Islamic 
culture. The desire to export the tenets of the Islamic revolution demonstrated the 
belief that that Islamic identity was a transnational identity, and it was in confl ict with 
nationalism, and thus within this concept Islamic identity has priority over national 
identity (Pour Ahmadi, 2007).
Destruction of Reza Shah’s mausoleum: revival of the tradition 
of breaking tombstones in Iran
Mausoleums are monuments or buildings with the function of memorialising a nation’s 
dead heroes. These sites convey strong political ideas and serve as part of the celebration 
of nationhood. As burial places for renowned fi gures, they are of political signifi cance. 
The reasons for visiting them are mostly connected to pilgrimage or sightseeing rather 
than grieving. These sites achieve a degree of permanence, as they have the quality of 
sanctity (Rugg, 2000).
Reza Shah’s mausoleum was an important and respectful place for the Pahlavi dynasty 
and its supporters and was used on various occasions for specifi c ceremonies. At the 
time of its existence, there was also a provision for placing fl owers on the Mausoleum on 
various occasions (Kavoshi, n.d.).
In his diary, Sadegh Khalkhali explained the reason for destroying the Mausoleum:
By destroying the Mausoleum we wanted the former king of Iran and 
his supporters to know that they do not have any root and place in Iran, 
thereby disappointing his supporters in Iran. Moreover, it served for the 
consolation of Pahlavi dynasty and its supporters. Apart from the fact that 
the location of the Mausoleum was a kind of disrespect to Abdol-Azim 
holy shrine as it had blocked the view of the shrine, but also destroying 
the Mausoleum made Muslims happy. There was still the possibility that 
over time the Mausoleum eventually became a holy place and a place of 
pilgrimage (Khalkhali, 2000, p. 350).
Khalkhali stated that in destroying the Mausoleum, the intention was to remove all 
signs of the previous regime. He further stated that since they had already changed 
the national fl ag and national currency, it was now time for removing the Mausoleum 
(Ettela’at, 1980).
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The tradition of insulting the dead by destroying their tombstones has not been limited to 
after the establishment of the Islamic Republic. One of the most famous cases happened 
in the eighteenth century when Agha Mohammad khan Ghajar, the founder of the Ghajar 
dynasty, ordered that the bones of Karim Khan Zand be dug up from his tomb and buried 
in his castle’s doorway so that he could step on them whenever he entered the castle 
(Noghreh Kar, 2013). Another example is the 1955 destruction of the clergy’s fatwa 
cemeteries of Baha’is, which was undertaken by Muslims (Nikoo Sefat, 2009).
By destroying Reza Shah’s mausoleum, Sadegh Khalkhali revived the Muslim tradition 
of destroying all cultural and ideological signs of conquered nations that was discussed 
earlier in this chapter. This then became a pattern of behaviour for Islamists. The issue is 
not just limited to destroying graves and gravesites, but also to banning the exercise of 
any ceremony for loss. Naturally, with the absence of tombstones, it is easier to prevent 
any rituals of memorialisation for the deceased (Mohammadi, 2016).
To illustrate how the destruction of gravesites and tombstones has been strategically 
employed in Iran, not only for political fi gures such as past rulers, but also for other 
prominent members of society, one has to look at the case of Imamzadeh Taher cemetery.
The cemetery, which is located near Karaj city, is a place where a huge number of 
tombstones have been vandalised. The cemetery has become very famous due to the 
many renowned artists and cultural fi gures that have been buried there, and it has also 
become a meeting point for political opponents. On various occasions, people gather 
at the cemetery and carry out different ceremonies. Lecturing, poem readings, and 
disseminating leafl ets are the main practices at these famous gravesites. It is therefore 
not surprising that this cemetery turned into a place of troublemaking in the eyes of the 
government (Bakhtiari, 2005).
Ahmad Shamlou, an Iranian poet, is one of the famous people buried in this cemetery 
whose tombstone has been broken four times so far. Ali Salehi (2006), a member of the 
poets Association of Iran, in response to a question about the reasons for destroying 
Shamlou’s tombstone said:
The actors believed that by destroying the tombstones they would be 
able to impose their ideology. In other words, they would be able to scare 
his sympathisers. They wanted no sign reminding people of a liberal 
person in Iran. His tombstone is a meeting point for his like-minded, 
where every Thursday people come together and memorialize him by 
reading his poems. By destroying the tombstones, the opponents imply 
that this could also happen to other liberal people and there is no place 
for them in Iran. (Salehi, 2006)
Sohrab Sepehri is another poet whose tombstone has suffered vandalism. In this case, 
it seems that there is one main issue that makes his grave problematic: it is the meeting 
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Figure 2. 
Destruction of Reza 
Shah’s tomb with 
a crane (Khalkhali, 
1980/PD)
point for his fans on his death anniversary and birthday and is a religious 
place. The authorities thus think it is problematic and they propose to 
change the location of his grave (Donya-e-Eghtesad, 2016).
Fereydoon Froughi, a famous musician, is another person whose 
tombstone has been broken twice so far. His tombstone, which has 
a picture of a broken guitar carved on it, was broken by people who 
wanted to prevent the gathering of his fans, who use drugs when 
coming together. This event was followed by preventing his family 
from holding a mourning ceremony on the anniversary of his death 
(Bakhtiari, 2005).
In some cases, the tombstones of dead opponents of the 2008 
election in Iran were broken. It is said that the reason for destroying 
the tombstones was that they referred to the deceased as martyrs. The 
relatives of the deceased always take these acts as acts of disrespect 
to the deceased and to themselves. The relatives are not yet allowed 
to mourn their loss in public and in a polite manner (Doostar, 2016).
These are just a few case studies to illustrate this phenomenon, but 
there have been numerous such cases reported by media outlets that 
include Tabnak, Deutsche Welle, BBC, VOA, etc. These cases include 
destroying numerous tombstones of people from various backgrounds, 
such as: Ali Sepanlou (Poet), Naser Hejazi (Athlete), Abbas Kiarostami 
(Film director), and Khavaran cemetery (the burial place of political 
opponents). All people whose tombstones have been broken have 
three points in common: 1) Their thoughts, ideas, and lifestyles were 
incompatible with the values of the Islamic government. 2) They 
appealed to a specifi c society that is not acceptable to the government. 
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3) During their lives, they were suppressed by the government through different means, 
such as not being granted permits to publish their works and being subject to censorship, 
arrest, and threats (Mohammadi, 2016).
Discussion
In order to have a collective identity, any social group needs to share a common 
interpretation of events and experiences that have shaped the group over time. It may 
include agreements about the origin of the group. In the case of a nation-state, this could 
include distinct points and symbolic moments that have created the self-image of a group 
(Tosh, 1991).
In his book The Spirit of Prague, Czech novelist Ivan Klima told us:
We will lose ourselves if we lose our diary and memories, forgetfulness 
is one of the signs of death, and without memories and diaries we are not 
any longer humans. (Klima, 1994, p. 37)
Memory is essential for creating a sense of self, identity, culture, and heritage. It contributes 
to the creation of culture and tradition and repressing other cultures through blending 
and embellishing memories (Lowenthal, 1985). All memories are inevitably connected 
to specifi c places. Hence, sites of cultural heritage such as mausoleums provoke our 
memories and encourage our connection to certain times and places (McDowell, 2008). 
Identities and monuments are selective, as they always serve particular interests and 
ideologies (Gillis, 1994). Individuals and groups always choose certain memories to fulfi ll 
their needs of identity. People look to the past to reinterpret new events and ideas in the 
present as time changes. They look for specifi c patterns and orders in the past to support 
constantly-changing social, economic, and cultural values (Foote, 2003).
Memorialisation is often a political process, as memorials are often shaped by those in 
power. They represent a complicated relationship between politics, inconvenience, and 
collective memory (Barsalou & Baxter, 2007). The concept of power is a prerequisite for the 
establishment of heritage and identity; in other words, heritage is made rather than given. 
Those who hold the power decide about what is remembered and what is forgotten (David, 
2001).
Monumental icons of identity, such as monuments, memorials, and buildings, contain 
and convey a certain message by transforming political messages into a public, visual 
presence (Whelan, 2003). Memorials serve as a reminder of the past. By selecting a 
specifi c narrative of an event and highlighting it, these political works of art make a 
certain version of history eternal in public consciousness (Cho, 2016). The government 
represents the mainstream values through memorials to feed the concept of national 
identity and create a framework for national ideas and history (McDowell, 2008).
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Monuments are more than aesthetic objects. In their deepest essence, 
they are about memories, memories that constitute the very marrow of a 
city’s identity, bestowing personality and character upon the city just as 
they do upon the individual. The form, shape, size, and way of making of 
a monument, the story of how it came to be there, the trials and tribulation 
of those who made it, the manner of its placement in its city, all of these 
contribute to crystallizing the workings of memory. For these purposes, 
it does not matter whether those memories are good or bad. But it does 
matter how they relate to their city, and which monuments survive to 
represent them. (Al-Khalil, 1991)
Referring back to the earlier section titled Pahlavi vs. Islamic Republic or nationalism vs. 
Islamism, during Reza Shah’s reign, nationalism was honoured, and the elements used 
to bolster this nationalism were the history and culture of ancient Iran. Therefore, Islam 
was considered an invading religion during this time, while after the Islamic revolution, 
Shia religious ideology was preferred over nationalism.
Milan Kundera, in his book Laughter and Forgetting, quoted Milan Hübl:
The fi rst step in liquidating of a people, said Hübl, is to erase its memory. 
Destroy its books, its culture, its history. Then have somebody write new 
books, manufacture a new culture, invent a new history. Before long the 
nation will begin to forget what it is and what it was. The world around it 
will forget even faster (Kundera, 1994).
Physical destruction of a community’s cultural materials can be conceived as a fi rst step 
in destroying its past and making it vulnerable to attacks (Varatharajah, 2013). As Robert 
Bevan says:
The link between erasing any physical reminder of a people and its 
collective memory and the killing of people themselves is ineluctable. 
(Bevan, 2016, p. 8)
This is the main purpose of the Islamic regime’s propaganda since its establishment: to 
create a fake history through the destruction of cultural monuments contributing to the 
creation of collective memory and broadcasting it through offi cial media and educational 
curriculum (Kazemian, 2017).
There is a dominant ideology that says any sign of unconformity with 
the governmental Islam should be demolished. One of these signs is 
the tombstone. Another reason is to impose the governmental historical 
narration by distorting the collective memories. (Sarkoohi, 2016)
Cemeteries are not just places for burial, but they also act as a kind of mnemonic device 
to help the living remember those who have passed (Fisher, n.d.). The cemetery is a 
place of confl ict between two groups: that which tries to preserve the memory of its 
loss, and that which strives to erase all traces of nonconformity (Amanat, 2012). The 
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tombstones investigated in this paper are meeting points where people come together 
and memorialise deceased persons. The same was true for Reza Shah’s mausoleum.
The Islamic regime is a totalitarian regime. It wants a public space with signs compatible 
with its values. Therefore, when it is not able to demolish unacceptable signs, it 
anonymously destroys them (Mohammadi, 2016).
In most of the cultures and religions of the world, the dead body of a human is respected 
and sacred. The burial ceremony is one of the most obvious aspects of each religion’s 
respect towards the dead. The burial ceremonies, on one hand, show the respect for a 
body that used to be the home of the soul. On the other hand, they show the respect 
towards the people who loved the deceased. The dead body reminds those who remain 
of feelings, emotions, and memories that they shared with the deceased (Doostar, 2016).
It seems that this is the main reason for the destruction of Reza Shah’s mausoleum, as 
Khalkhali mentioned in his diaries the role the mausoleum was playing for the consolation 
of the Pahlavi dynasty and its supporters.
The tendency to insult and violate corpses may be a refl ection of a suppressed compulsion 
that has persisted in Iran’s collective memory. Cemeteries as middle spaces between 
a living society and its dead can be an ideal place for attacking or insulting different 
religious ideologies (Amanat, 2012).
Conclusion
By examining the above-mentioned instances and theories, it can be seen that the 
contradictions of different ideologies have a signifi cant role in these acts of destruction. 
Regarding the destruction of the Reza Shah’s grave, it can be seen that the ideology 
of the Islamic Republic, which is Islamist ideology, is in confl ict with the nationalist 
ideology of the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah’s aim was to create a new identity based 
on nationalism, and as mentioned before, memory is essential for creating a sense of 
self, identity, culture, and heritage. Moreover, all memories are inevitably connected to 
specifi c places. The rival ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to eliminate the 
appearances and remains that are in the form of a statement of the previous ideology, 
including the graves of individuals.
On the other hand, the role that graves play in creating respect for the deceased and 
relieving the grief of their remaining relatives is worth discussion. As mentioned earlier, 
Khalkhali described one of the reasons for the destruction as removing the role of the 
tomb in the relief of Pahlavi’s family and supporters. Or, in regard to those who were 
killed in the 2008 protests, their relatives considered the destruction of the graves as an 
act of disrespect towards the deceased.
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Considering the reasons and motivations for destroying dissenters’ tombstones in Iran, 
it is probable that these actions are meant to: 1) humiliate relatives and supporters; 2) 
scare those who remain; 3) scare dissenters and send a message that we do not have 
mercy even for your loss; 4) erase all signs that remind the remaining and like-minded 
people of the deceased person; 5) prevent families and supporters from coming together 
(Noghreh Kar, 2013).
Another point that can be considered in terms of the destruction of graves is the Islamic 
Republic’s attempt to make a fake history by destroying the effective cultural monuments 
that contribute to the collective memory and by disseminating this fabricated history 
through its own media.
Today, the only thing remaining of Reza Shah’s mausoleum is an empty space and an 
unclear memory of a white structure. The road leading to the mausoleum is still called 
The Road of Mausoleum, but nobody knows whose mausoleum this name refers to, 
and perhaps this is the reason why the name of this road has not been changed by the 
regime. Without architectural narration of history, people are not able to remember their 
national identity and collective memory. Reza Shah, whether he was a bad or a good 
person, is a part of Iran’s modern national history.
The Islamic regime is the enemy of Iranian culture, a culture that should be passed from 
generation to generation, and one that consists of Iranian art, history, and tradition. The 
Islamic regime is trying to replace the Iranian culture with a fake Islamic- Arabic culture by 
interrupting and destroying it (Bahari, 2017). Although Islam fi nally became the dominant 
culture, Iranian people still seek their roots from their Zoroastrian past. The tension still 
remains today, for example, although there were many Iranian festivals condemned and 
banned by the Islamic regime as pagan rituals, they are still celebrated by Iranians. The 
memory of glorious Persia never left the Persian collective psyche since there are still 
ruins of places such as Persepolis (Khalkhali also tried to destroy Persepolis), which 
remind the people of their great history before Islam. The evidence is undeniable for the 
Islamic regime, as it is carved in stone (Bassi, 2005).
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Introduction
India is a large and extremely diverse nation that constantly has to face the challenge 
of maintaining unity. With such extreme diversity came ideologies, both inherited and 
imposed. The cultural and ideological struggles in this mighty state have been expressed 
through various socio-cultural movements. Today, the government of India claims to 
be a state with territorial unity, stable democracy, and religious impartiality. However, it 
is still a nation with various political parties and contrasting views from these parties. 
Heritage has always been a topic of conversation and a major victim of such confl icting 
political views. Although religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity co- 
exist all over India, the confl ict has never ceased. For the last two decades, The Hindu 
National Movement has been an infl uential factor in creating communal tension in 
parts of India. The current political movement, which has leveraged heritage to create 
such tension, has both short-term and long-term goals. One such major long-term goal 
was/is to establish a homogeneous Hindu State and gain a sense of supremacy as a 
religious community. The case study of Ramjanabhoomi / Babri Masjid in Ayodhya is an 
interesting one with layers of complexities involved. According to mythology, Ayodhya 
was home to one of the major Hindu kingdoms and the birthplace of Hindu Lord Rama. 
However, it was conquered by Mughals, which led to the construction of mausoleums 
and other Islamic religious structures at the site. The construction of mausoleums over 
Hindu religious structures fuelled a huge confl ict. The dispute, which began in 1853, is 
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still going on in one way or another. The major concern of this paper is to take a look at 
the situation and discuss the signifi cance of the site from the point of view of both local 
Hindu and Muslim communities, and to understand what people expect the site to be. 
This paper is not a solution, but more of an analysis to understand how political and 
religious ideologies can affect a historically-charged site like Ayodhya and how diffi  cult 
heritage can be managed.
The paper addresses the important issue of Hindu-Muslim rivalry in India, which is still 
the reason for many losses, both tangible and intangible. Today, it is a major threat for 
not just heritage, but also for India as a nation in general. The main aim of the paper 
will be to explore the case study of Ramjanmabhoomi/ Babri Masjid – Ayodhya as an 
example to analyse the broader topic of the political impact on heritage.
The paper will mainly draw its theoretical framework from Ernest Renan’s (1992) text 
What is a Nation? and Pradip K Datta’s (1996) article Reincarnation through Ideologies 
and Organisation. Other basic information about the site comes from local state tourism 
websites and the works of local authors. Due to the site being a source of communal 
tension, not a lot of offi cial data is available. However, plenty of data is available from 
sources that include online journals, newspaper articles, thesis papers, social media 
platforms, newspaper interviews, etc., and this data has been combined with the 
author’s own knowledge about the site.
The paper is divided into six different sections. The fi rst section will bring to light the 
general ideological theories that exist in India. This section is the base for understanding 
the setting and the political scenario in India, which plays a huge role in defi ning heritage. 
This part of the paper will also explore the relations between heritage and religion 
in the pre- and post-colonial contexts, and will mention events that affected heritage 
before and after the attainment of Independence in 1947. It also briefl y explains the 
current ideology of modern India. The second and third sections will provide the actual 
site details for the Ramjanmabhoomi/Babri Masjid, including the evolution, etymology, 
construction, and destruction of heritage, its architectural features, the signifi cance of 
Ayodhya and Babri Masjid, confl ict at the site, political interventions, current practices 
at the site, and recent archaeological explorations. The fourth section will explain the 
present scenario through a timeline of events. As the case is extremely complicated 
and has a long history, a simpler summary of this timeline is presented in this section. 
The section will draw its matter from the political and religious ideologies of different 
communities, which have led to the strategic deconstruction and deployment of cultural 
meanings pertaining to the site. The fi fth section will present views of both Hindu and 
Muslim communities about the site, discuss how the religious confl ict led to the brutal 
act of destruction of the Masjid, and describe the immediate aftermath. The section will 
serve as the link between the history, the present scenario, and the future of the site. The 
section will be comprised of actual interviews with local residents presenting different 
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local perspectives on the site. The sixth and the last section will be the conclusive 
part of the paper, which identifi es how the treatment of heritage is being dominated by 
ideologies. The section will refer to writings from international and national authors in 
order to analyse the matter.
The overall goal of the paper is to understand and analyse the impact of sociocultural 
beliefs on heritage, with the ideological transformation of India and the example of the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid forming the subject matter.
Historical and cultural background
India is a country with rich cultural, natural, social, political, and religious heritage. 
Religious beliefs, practices, and political ideologies have a great infl uence on public 
life in India. To understand the status of India today, it is important to study these past 
ideologies. Whether it is positive or negative, in the case of India, the rich artistic heritage 
owes a lot to religious symbolism and thoughts. Although studies and past fi ndings state 
that prior to modern India, Hinduism held a majority, the colonial era made the country 
more ethnically diverse. The civilisation of India, which is believed to be 5000 years 
old, has been enhanced by migrations. Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism, in 
particular, are homegrown religious identities. Islam and Christianity, although present 
earlier, majorly expanded during the British colonial period (Patnaik & Mudiam, 2014). 
The cultural past of each of these religions has affected the art, architecture, and heritage. 
Today, in a post-colonial setting, the preamble of the Government of India’s Constitution 
states that:
WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute 
India into a SOVEREIGN, SOCIALIST, SECULAR, and DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens (…). (Indiacode.nic.in, 2017) 
Although India claims to be a secular country, there has always been tension between 
the Hindu and Muslim communities. In this respect, it is a common misconception that 
most of the nationalist theories of India are indivisible and successful in fostering unity 
(Taylor and Francis, 2013). In fact, it seems that the extreme diversity has proved to be 
overpowering when it comes to believing in the idea of a united India.
Rabindranath Tagore describes the greatest problem of India as:
 (…) the problem of the world in miniature. India is too vast in its area and 
too diverse in its races. It is many countries packed in one geographical 
receptacle (…) India (…) being naturally many, yet adventitiously one has 
all along suff ered from the looseness of its diversity and the feebleness of 
its unity. A true unity is like a round globe; it rolls on, carrying its burden 
easily. However, diversity is a many-cornered thing, which has to be 
dragged and pushed with full force. (Tagore, 2003,p.30)
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As said earlier, religion is an integral part of daily life, affecting even factors as simple as 
food habits, sleeping schedules, etc. In the publication Religion as a Cultural System, 
Clifford Geertz describes religion as a system of symbols that has infl uence in establishing 
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations (Geertz, 1996). Geertz also 
states that religion affects the formulation of conceptions of a general order of existence, 
and lends these conceptions an aura of factuality (Geertz, 1966, p. 5). In the scenario 
of India, religion defi nes aspects such as education, business, and politics. In fact, 
one can say that a huge part of political ideologies are formed based on religious 
beliefs. For example, political support is greatly based on the religion with which the 
party sympathises. Indian politicians often make use of these religious sentiments, 
especially during election campaigns, for their political and personal gains (Gazette, 
2017).
The case of the Babri Masjid is similar. It held symbolism for the Mughal Empire until 
Hindu nationalists, with the support of a major Hindu political party, destroyed it in 1992 
in order to gain supremacy over other parties with different religious beliefs. Although 
there are layers of dispute as to whether this particular site was only a mosque built by 
the Muslim Emperor Babur or if it was fi rst the birthplace of the mythological Hindu hero 
Lord Rama, the destruction was carried out mostly for political gain. However, up until 
today, neither of the concerned communities have seen closure or gained anything 
from this situation (Patnaik and Mudiam, 2014).
Thus, politics is not just an infl uencing factor on the people of India; it is also a major 
driving force behind the formation of nation-building strategies that use religion as a 
tool. The impact of this in the name of nation-building is directly harmful to heritage 
(Datta, 1991).
Site Description
Ayodhya is located in Uttar Pradesh, a state in northern India. It is an ancient city that 
is signifi cant among Hindus, and it is mentioned in one of the greatest mythological 
Hindu texts, The Ramayana, as the birthplace of Lord Rama (Anon, 2017). Elements 
of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Islam are still evident in the city. It is also referred 
to as Saketa, meaning heaven where God resides (Cunningham, 2005, p. 405). The 
religious text of Atharvaveda describes Ayodhya as a mythical city of gods with eight 
circles and nine entrances (Dutta et al., 1996).
An additional, literal meaning of the word Ayodhya is to fi ght, or to wage war, which 
coincidentally also describes today’s situation at the site quite well. Ayodhya is known 
as an important place of socio-cultural exchange and has been of political signifi cance 
for centuries. Verses that indicate the previous presence of a Hindu empire have also 
been found (Cunningham, 2005), and the place is considered to be one of the seven 
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holy pilgrimage places for Hindus to visit. Texts state that it served as the capital for 
various Hindu dynasties, such as the Gupta Empire, Maurya Empire, and Shunga 
Empire. Hence, Ayodhya is thus politically and religiously important for Hindus all over 
India (Dutta et al., 1996).
Babri Masjid, the disputed site, is a mosque located in Ayodhya. It is spread over an 
area of 2.77 acres/ 1.22 ha and is currently owned by the government of India. The 
site is not open to the public and can only be used with permission from the state 
government. According to an inscription, the mosque was built on the order of Mughal 
emperor Babur in 1528-29 CE (Dutta et al., 1996). The matter of the controversy is 
based on the widely-spread assumption that the mosque was built on the land of a 
Hindu temple (Cunningham, 2005). Around 1526 AD, parts of India fell to the Mughal 
dynasty, which marked the beginning of a major religious battle between Muslims and 
Hindus who were both trying to overpower each other (Datta, 1991). However, at this 
particular site, the actual political, historical, and socio-cultural debate between Hindus 
and Muslims, which is widely known as the Ayodhya dispute, began long after the 
construction of a mosque (Datta, 1991).
The evidence supporting the different narratives at the site of Ramjanmabhoomi/ Babri 
Masjid is questionable from both points of view. Findings are contradictory and often 
weak. Most of the historic texts belonging to the Hindu and Islamic religions offer 
contradictory facts and support respective, opposing narratives. The matter of an earlier 
Hindu temple having ever existed at the place is therefore highly disputed, as different 
texts suggest different things (Datta, 1991; Ganguly, 2003; Elst, 1990). Meanwhile, the 
ASI reports complicate the situation further by not providing topographical features and 
by totally ignoring the details related to the construction of the mosque. The ASI reports 
solely argue the presence of the temple by the shape and material of pillar bases found 
during excavation (Sushil – the Hindu, 2003).
Art-culture-architecture
The city of Ayodhya contains many religious structures along the river Sarayu. The 
place is signifi cant, especially to Hindu communities, as it is an important pilgrimage 
site for them (Ganguly, 2003). The major Hindu festival of Diwali, New Year for some 
Hindus in India, is traced back to Ayodhya: as the city glittered in light with the return 
of Lord Rama to his birthplace and the festival was established (Ranjan et al., 2017). 
The place also contains many smaller temples built on the riverbank of the Sarayu, old 
palaces, and Islamic structures, such as mausoleums and Mughal gardens, amongst 
others (Ganguly, 2003).
The architecture of the Babri Masjid that once stood in Ayodhya is only partially 
documented. According to texts, the masjid followed a typical Mughal style, specifi cally 
68 | Heritage Conservation and Ideologies: a reader  
known as later Tughlaq style, named after Mughal ruler Tughlaq (Ranjan et al., 2017). 
The Mosque looked like a replica of some mosques found around other parts of northern 
India, with little alterations to match the weather conditions. The architectural style 
particularly followed the school of Jaunpur Sultanate, which was a kingdom in northern 
India that believed in great respect for art and architecture (Ganguly, 2003). Architect 
Graham Pickford, in his book Historic Structures of Oudhe, has described the special 
acoustic and cooling system of the mosque. He states that a high ceiling and six large 
grill windows kept the interior cool by allowing natural light and air in (Shankar, 2011).
Ayodhya is an eclectic mix when it comes to culture. The predominant religion is 
Hinduism, with Sikhism, Buddhism, Islam, and Jainism still existing (Ranjan et al., 
2017). The skyline of Ayodhya is a clear mirror of the evolution of city, with invasions 
from different communities having left their traces in terms of religious architecture.
At present, the site under controversy is more or less a barren land, with the ruins of 
the mosque serving both communities as a place for prayer (so long as permission is 
granted).
Timeline of controversy
The Babri Masjid dispute, or Ayodhya dispute, already began in 1528 and has been 
going on until today. For the sake of clarity, the events can be presented in the following 
timeline of events:
1528: Mosque constructed --- 1853: First dispute --- 1859: Site divided 
by fence --- 1885: First case fi led --- 1949: Encroachment by Hindus --- 
1984: Hindu group VHP (Viśva Hindū Pariṣada), formed ---1986: Babri 
Masjid Committee formed --- 1990: VHP(Viśva Hindū Pariṣada), a Hindu 
nationalist group tries to destroy mosque --- 1992: Babri Masjid brought 
down, Riots, 2000 deaths --- 2001: 10th anniversary of destructions, 
Tensions reoccur --- 2002: Attack on Hindu group, around 1000 deaths, 
ASI excavations ordered --- 2003: Temple traces found by ASI --- 2004: 
Case re-opens --- 2010: Court verdict – case continues 
As we can see on the timeline above, the mosque remained under dispute for several 
years before its actual destruction. Up to 1880, numerous attempts were made to take 
down the mosque, but none of them were successful. Post-independence in 1942, 
India was divided into India and Pakistan and a democratic system was introduced. 
The Hindu political party, which was now the face of independent India, had political 
control at this time. In 1964, the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad), a Hindu nationalist 
group, was formed with the intention to gain supreme power over Christianity and 
Islam and to make India a Hindu nation. With emerging political power, VHP gained 
new support for their endeavour to achieve religious leadership of the society. L.K. 
Advani, the leader of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), the major Hindu political party, 
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“The Ayodhya dispute is 
still the longest running 
political, historical and 
socio-religious debate 
in India, centred on 
a plot of land in the 
city of Ayodhya.”
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publically announced the so-called Ratha Yatra, a campaign aimed at making Ayodhya 
a purely Hindu region in order to gain broader religious and political support (Datta, 
1991). As justifi cation for Ratha Yatra, the BJP claimed that:
If Muslims are entitled to an Islamic atmosphere in  Mecca, and if 
Christians are entitled to a Christian atmosphere in the Vatican, why 
is it wrong for the Hindus to expect a Hindu atmosphere in Ayodhya? 
(Ganguly, 2003, p.366).
With that, a group of activists called Kar sevaks were trained. Finally, on 6 December 
1992, these activists, backed by politicians, entered the Islamic site of Babri Masjid and 
destroyed it (Indiatoday.intoday.in, 2017). What followed were riots across the country, 
leading to the death of around 2000 people (Ganguly, 2003). Neighbouring countries like 
Bangladesh and Pakistan joined the riots by destroying Hindu temples and houses on 
their territories.
The Ayodhya dispute is still the longest running political, historical, and socio-religious 
debate in India. The dispute did not end with the destruction of the mosque. The after 
effects were even bigger than the actual controversy. Even today, terrorist attacks 
in India are linked to this event. Muslim organisations also have openly expressed 
outrage against Hindus in this matter (Patnaik & Mudiam, 2014). The saddest part is 
the actual aftermath of the destruction and the recent improvements. The Wall Street 
Journal states:
On a political level, the demolition of the structure, variously called the 
Babri Masjid and the Ram birthplace temple, was a culmination of a 
sustained religious campaign by Hindu activists including many from 
the Bharatiya Janata Party that now rules India. The party had just two 
seats in the Parliament in 1989 when its national executive endorsed the 
demand to build a Ram temple at the site. After the endorsement, the 
BJP saw its seats in Parliament jump to 85, turning it into a major political 
force within Indian politics. (WSJ Staff, 2014)
The more sensible approach of the ASI excavation did not provide much of a solution 
either. As explained earlier, ASI reports came out with many confusing and misleading 
facts that worsened the situation. Furthermore, the matter spun out of control due to the 
involvement of major political forces, especially the BJP, backed by the VHP, pushing 
to establish the temple at any cost. The excavations conducted in 2002 and 2003 have 
revealed the presence of a temple-like structure, giving more ground to those in favour 
of the Hindu temple (Patnaik & Mudiam, 2014). There have been fi ndings of a stone 
pillar base, steps, and other inscriptions in stone relating to the temple. The matter is 
highly confi dential and believed to be infl uenced by some people. Finally, the court 
order based on this report from 2010 has not been a useful contribution to solving the 
confl ict either. The verdict on the case of the Babri Masjid stated on 30 September 
2010 that the property should be divided between the Hindu and Muslim communities 
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so that they have 1/7 and 1/3 of the area, respectively, but both parties rejected this 
compromise. The communal feud continues to date (Anon, 2017).
Communal views
The Ayodhya dispute is also extensively discussed on social media and in the news, 
which shows that the cultural signifi cance of the site for today’s society is at least partly 
connected to its contention value, with each party trying to use the site to legitimise its 
own superiority. This is particularly refl ected in the comments on social media, which are 
often fi lled with extreme hatred towards the other group and a strong belief that either the 
temple has to prevail or the mosque. 
In online news, Hindu leaders still say that: 
It would be better that the Muslims leave their claim as it will benefi t both 
the communities. This will also strengthen the unity of the country and 
end the bitterness between us. (Rai, 2017)
However, more sensible views have also been expressed with regard to this issue. For 
example, a local resident named Zafar Ahmad stated in an interview that:
As a Muslim, I may not question this judgment. But as an Indian, I do 
because ultimately this issue is about Constitutional guarantees, about 
the preamble, about how modern India views itself. What precedents 
are we setting at a time we are projecting ourselves as an emerging 
superpower moving into the era of science, technology and reason? Are 
we now going to start digging underneath each time an issue of faith is 
raised?. (Subramaniyam, 2017)
Another view by a local is stated as such:
The Moguls may have razed temples, but that was the character of those 
times. Kings put a stamp on their conquests by razing anything that 
was ‘foreign’. It’s quite stupid to justify fundamentalism of any sort today 
because of historical happenings. And it would be even more stupid 
to fritter away time in involving ourselves in such disputes rather than 
concentrating on building ourselves, our country. Is it a good idea to kill 
people to make a place for prayer? We as a nation should stay as far 
as possible from the likes of Mulayam Singh or Kalyan Singh. Let’s stop 
bringing religion into everything. (Français & Avadhani, 2017)
Mohammed Sharif, a local resident of the area, expresses his grief by stating:
Yes. But I want to mention that Muslims and Hindus have lived amicably 
in this region. No tension. We eat and live together. Even during the 1992 
demolition of the mosque, we refrained from violence with our Hindu 
brothers. It is the people outside, the politicians and power brokers who 
create tension. To get votes. To make money. (Français and Avadhani, 
2017)
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Even the former prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, expressed the need to 
close the issue by stating: 
Communal harmony needs to be strengthened. If we are divided in the 
name of religion, the country is in danger. To strengthen development, 
we have to create an environment of peace. (Français & Avadhani, 2017)
Conclusion
As we study the importance of the site for each community, the solution to a dispute 
like this becomes more and more complicated. Ernest Renan, in his text, What is 
Nation? says:
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly 
speaking, are really one and the same, constitute this soul, this spiritual 
principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the possession 
in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present consent, the 
desire to live together, the desire to continue to invest in the heritage that 
we have jointly received. (Renan, 1992, p.10)
Religion, the biggest strategic tool for nation-building, is supposed to bring people 
together with its views, not the other way around. Religion, as mentioned by Geertz 
(1966, p.05), creates meaning for life and makes pain endurable. Religion and symbolism 
is created to send us back to everyday life and convince us that our worldview and way 
of life are indeed true, good, and ultimately fulfi lling. However, in this case, a piece 
of land, which is supposed to be cherished and which is supposed to maintain the 
balance amongst people, has torn a nation apart.
In many cases, managing heritage is only meaningful when the approach is fair to 
all groups of people. For example, Indonesia, a predominantly Islamic nation, has 
promoted the Buddhist site of Borobudur as a part of its Islam-Buddhist bonding and 
cultural history. The Taj Mahal in India, which is a mausoleum built by a Muslim ruler, 
has survived under pressure, despite it being surrounded by Hindu communities, 
because of its economic benefi ts in terms of tourism (Chapagain and Silva, 2017, p. 
9). A religious solution to a controversy like this has absolutely no end. Considering 
such circumstances, the idea of converting a site as controversial as this into a neutral, 
functional space that could benefi t both confl icting parties seems like a viable option. 
One may think of a hospital or an offi ce space or other secular spaces.
The situation of the Ayodhya dispute, which I have actually grown up hearing about, 
makes me question the presence of humanity altogether. My observation with respect 
to this dispute is very close to home. However, I still fail to understand how in a 
country with a population of around 1.3 billion there is no initiation towards a peaceful 
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settlement. In my opinion, the idea that politics and religion can be used as a way to 
develop a nation does not seem to be true. In slight opposition to Renan, I would rather 
agree with the idea that a nation is built based on atrocities that take place in the name 
of religion and politics. Neither archaeologists, nor conservators, nor architects have 
any power over the situation—no matter what their fi ndings and abilities are—if politics 
do not follow a rational and secular line.
References
Adams, N., 1993. Architecture as the Target. Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 52(4), pp.389-
390.
Anon, A Many-Cornered Thing: The Role of Heritage in Indian Nation-Building. Taylor & Francis. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2012.714244 [Accessed August 5, 2017].
Anon, 2017. Ram Janmabhoomi. Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram_
Janmabhoomi#Babri_Masjid_site [Accessed August 5, 2017].
Bacchetta, P., 2000. Sacred space in confl ict in India: The Babri Masjid affair. Growth and Change, 31(2), 
pp.255-284.
Bernbeck, R. and Pollock, S., 1996. Ayodhya, archaeology, and identity. Current anthropology, 37(S1), 
pp.S138-S142.
Chapagain, N. and Silva, K. (2017). Asian Heritage Management. Taylor & Francis, pp.09-12.
C.P.S.E.A.S.C. et al., 2014. Religion and the Indian election. Harvard Gazette. Available at: http://news.
harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/05/religion-and-the-indian-election/ [Accessed August 5, 2017].
Cunningham, A., 2005. The ancient geography of India. I. The Buddhist period, including the campaigns 
of Alexander, and the travels of Hwen-Thsang., London: Adamant Media Corporation. Available at: https://
books.google.co.uk/books?id=yH9Xef_vm1EC&pg=PA405#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed August 5, 
2017].
Datta, P.K., (1991). VHP’s Ram at Ayodhya: Reincarnation through ideology and organisation. Economic and 
political weekly, pp.2517-2526.
Dutta, M., Agnes, F. and Adarkar, N. (1996). The nation, the state, and Indian identity. Calcutta: Samya.
Elst, K., 1990. Ram janmabhoomi vs. Babri masjid: A case study in Hindu-Muslim confl ict. Voice of India.
Français, R. and Avadhani, R. (2017). Hinduism and Islam: India’s biggest religious headache – the mosque-
temple dispute at Ayodhya. [online] Religioscope. Available at: http://english.religion.info/2010/10/27/
hinduism-and-islam-indias-biggest-religious-headache-the-mosque-temple-dispute-at-ayodhya/ [Accessed 5 
Aug. 2017].
Ganguly, S., 2003. The crisis of Indian secularism. Journal of Democracy, 14(4), pp.11-25.
Geertz, C. (2017). Religion as a cultural system. [ebook] University of Oxford, pp.01-40. Available at: http://
www.anthrocervone.org/PeoplesandCultures/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Geertz_Religon_as_a_Cultural_
System_.pdf [Accessed 11 Sep. 2017].
Indiacode.nic.in. (2017). PREAMBLE. [online] Available at: http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/coifi les/preamble.
htm [Accessed 15 Sep. 2017].
Indiatoday.intoday.in. (2017). Memoirs of a Mosque. [online] Available at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/
Memoirs+of+a+Mosque/1/113887.html [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017].
Patnaik, A. and Mudiam, P. (2014). Indian secularism, dialogue and the Ayodhya dispute. Religion, State and 
Society, 42(4), pp.374-388.
RAI, R. (2017). Hindi groups harden line in Ayodhya-Babri Mosque dispute. [online] Mail Online. Available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-4336614/Hindi-groups-harden-line-Ayodhya-Babri-
Mosque-dispute.html [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017].
Rao, N., (1997). 11 Interpreting silenres: symbol and history in the rase ofRamJanmabhoomi/Babri Masjid. 
Social Construction of the Past: representation as power, 24, pp.154.
74 | Heritage Conservation and Ideologies: a reader  
Ranjan, B., Duarte, M. and Garry, C. (2017). Religion and identity in India’s heritage tourism. [online] www.
researchgate.net. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222587807_Religion_and_identity_
in_India%27s_heritage_tourism [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017].
Renan, Ernest (Translated by Ethan Rundell), 1992, “What is a Nation?”, text of a conference delivered at the 
Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, Paris, Presses-Pocket,. 
WSJ Staff (2017). The Story of the Babri Masjid. [online] WSJ. Available at: https://blogs.wsj.com/
indiarealtime/2014/12/06/the-story-of-the-babri-masjid/ [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017].
Shrivatsav, s. (2003). The ASI Report - a review. [online] The Hindu. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/
news/national/other-states/The-ASI-Report-a-review/article16052925.ece [Accessed 15 Sep. 2017].
Subramaniyam, V. (2017). Young, Muslim and refl ecting on Ayodhya. [online] The Hindu. Available at: http://
www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Young-Muslim-and-refl ecting-on-Ayodhya/article15773141.ece [Accessed 5 
Aug. 2017].
Tagore, R., 2003. Complete works of Rabindranath Tagore, Shahdora, Delhi: Black Rose Publications.
VAN DER VEER, PETER. “Ayodhya and Somnath: Eternal Shrines, Contested Histores.” Social Research, 
vol. 59, no. 1, 1992, pp. 85–109. JSTOR, Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970685.
Figures
Figure p.63: By Bhatnagar [CC-BY-SA-3.0] via Wikimedia Commons 
< https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f7/Ayodhya_city.jpg >
Figure p.69: Courtsy of Wellcome Library, London. by William Hodges, 1785 [CC-BY-4.0] via Welcome 
Library < http://catalogue.wellcomelibrary.org/record=b1184647 >
(I
s
(
tv
an
 |
C
C
C
 B
Y
-SS
VVVVV
A
 VV
ia
 
ii
W
ik
m
e
m
e
m
ee
im
e
im
e
im
ee
m
e
m
e
m
e
m
e
mm
di
a
di
a
di
a
di
a
ddd
C
o
C
o
C
o
C
om
m
o
m
m
o
m
m
o
m
m
o
)
ns
)
ns
)
ns
)
 (
Z
ik
o 
20
16
 / 
C
C
 B
Y
-S
A
 3
.0
)
Heritage Conservation and Ideologies: a reader | 77
Eva Maas
The Palace of the 
Republic
When destruction creates myths
Introduction
It will be hard to forget me, now that I am no longer there. 
My presence in absence will echo. 
A colossus of concrete, history, and time doesn’t leave
Without leaving something disappearing
When everything is long over (Falkner, 2010, p.77).
This part of the poem The Last Day of the Republic by Gerhard Falkner (2010), which he 
wrote in response to the destruction of the Palace of the Republic, the former meeting 
place of the German Democratic Republic’s people’s chamber, highlights the lingering 
eff ects of a building that was as signifi cant for the state, its people, and its history as the 
Palace of the Republic, even after having been torn down. The building, which was created 
as a representation of the state’s government and power and as a place of culture for 
the country’s people, played a major role not only in times of the GDR’s existence, but 
crucially also after the end of the state. Within the process of the reunifi cation of the divided 
Germany and long afterwards, its existence fuelled emotional debates about whether to 
tear it down or to reuse it with a diff erent purpose. There was probably no other building 
in Berlin that became as loaded with diff erent meanings as the Palace of the Republic, 
and arguments came from various directions: whether East Germans, West Germans, 
politicians, historians, or young artists from the new experimental side of Berlin, everyone 
claimed to have a stake and tried to enforce their idea for the Schlossplatz in Berlin’s centre.
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This paper deals with the history and the meaning of the Palace of 
the Republic, with a focus on the debates surrounding its destruction, 
the eff ects of heritage politics, and further the destruction of heritage 
and how it aff ects communities and the building of their identities. To 
address these issues, the paper will consider the theories of David 
Lowenthal on history and heritage, as well as the ideas of Dacia Viejo-
Rose and Marie Louise Stig Sørensen on heritage and identity, aiming 
to get an overall impression through the example of the Palace of the 
Republic.
A new Palace for East-Berlin
When Erich Honecker became the General Secretary of the SED in 
1971, his new politics of openness led to the international acceptance 
of the GDR as a state. Even though his new concept of building focused 
on social projects, like hospitals or apartment buildings, he wanted to 
make the long-lasting idea of a representational building for the state 
in the centre of Berlin come true, and this would serve as a display of 
the newly gained sovereignty, power, and self-confi dence (Kuhrmann, 
2006).
The GDR’s building politics always followed representational or 
ideological purposes, or as Günter Mittag, a member of the Central 
Committee of the SED, said:
Figure 1. The 
Berlin Palace of the 
Republic. (Junge 
1986,Bundesarchiv 
/ CC BY-SA 3.0).
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Our party has always seen building not simply as 
a technological task, but as a great social process. 
Why buildings are constructed, what is built and how, 
is determined in no small extend by social conditions. 
Creating buildings - this means enabling collectives 
of people to produce high-quality work and organise 
this work in the most effective way possible. (cited in 
Holfelders, 2010, p.77).
The perfect place for Honecker’s constructional vision was the 
Schlossplatz in the middle of Berlin, a wasteland where the 
Hohenzollernschloss, the castle of the former Prussian emperor, used 
to be located. However, this former castle was blown up by the GDR’s 
government in 1950 as a result of both the damages it sustained 
during the Second World War and the new socialist ideology. The 
idea of Honecker was to create a political building that at the same 
time functioned as a cultural palace for the country’s people, as he 
promised them a new quality of life with his new economic and social 
politics (Kuhrmann, 2016).
As the new building needed to be ready by the ninth Party-meeting 
of the SED in 1976, Honecker and his building committee started an 
architectural competition, which was won by Heinz Graffunder, who 
became the leading architect, and architects of the Bauakademie: 
Christian Schulz, Bruno Flierl, Werner Roesler and Rolf-Rüdiger 
Eisentraut (Kuhrmann, 2016).
Figure 2 . 
Construction site 
of the new city 
castle, Humboldt 
Forum. (Ziko 2016 
/ CC BY-SA 4.0).
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Figure 3. Cultural 
event in the Palace 
of the Republic 
(Sindermann 1976, 
Bundesarchiv / 
CC BY-SA 3.0)
The construction started in August 1973 and cost the state an immense 
sum of money. To have the Palace represent the state’s power and 
competitiveness with the Western states, expensive construction 
materials such as marble, metal, and glass for the windows were 
imported from abroad. This, in turn, led to the construction process 
putting further pressure on the GDR’s resources, which were already 
lacking throughout the country (Kuhrmann, 2006; Rettig, 2016).
The Palace’s architecture was inspired by the International Style and 
consisted of three cubes: the northern cube with the meeting hall 
of the people’s chamber, the southern cube with the hall for cultural 
events, and a connecting lounge between the two with all gastronomic 
institutions. The cubes were covered in white marble and the slightly 
overhanging window façade imitated the internationally-popular Curtain 
Wall with bronze toned glass that was imported from Belgium, which 
made the building transparent, especially at night when the Palace 
was brightly lit and passersby could see everything that was going on 
inside the cubes (Kuhrmann, 2006).
The Palace was organised in six strictly designed stories and had 
around 1000 rooms, which held a club for the youth, a bowling alley, 
several bars and cafés, thirteen different restaurants (making the 
Palace the biggest gastronomic institution in East Berlin), a gallery that 
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showed over 300 artworks by male artists from the GDR with the overarching topic May 
communists dream?, the entrances to the cultural and people’s chamber hall, a theatre, 
interpreters cabins, a post offi ce, a cloak room, and on the outside wall a tribune for the 
highest political ranks for days of military demonstrations (Kuhrmann, 2006; Holfelders, 
2010).
As the Palace was supposed to be for the people, all cultural events or gastronomic 
institutions in the Palace were subsidised by up to 60%. Thus, in combination with the 
pricey materials that were used in its construction, running the Palace meant losing 
money on a regular basis, leading to the use of cheap asbestos as fi re prevention 
(Kuhrmann, 2006; Beetz, 2016). The material, which was considered affordable and 
effective at that time and of which no one yet knew of its cancer-causing effects, would 
lead to problems after reunifi cation.
In 1976, when the Palace was opened, Erich Honecker said in his opening speech:
The Palace impressively gives evidence of the effi ciency of our socialist 
society, of our national culture, of the sense of our work, which serves the 
well-being of the human being (cited in Wefi ng, 2016).
The new Palace for East Berlin did not only have a representational function aimed at the 
Western States and Russia, but it was also an ideological tool meant to capture the minds 
of the country’s people and bind them to the state’s idea. Some people surely avoided 
entering the Palace, as they knew exactly what kind of political system it represented. 
Still, in its thirteen-year existence as the cultural palace, it was the most visited building 
in all of East Germany.
With the changing political situation in 1989, fi rst Erich Honecker declared his retreat from 
power and shortly thereafter the GDR government resigned. This lead to the opening of 
the borders, the fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th of November, and the decision to have 
free and democratic elections in March 1990, which saw Lothar de Maiziére become 
the new minister of Berlin (Holfelders, 2010). The newly-elected parliament met in the 
exact same spot where the GDR’s people’s chamber used to meet and made the most 
important decisions for the divided Germany: in May 1990, they signed the contract for 
the currency-, economic- and social-union, and on the 23rd of August they decided that 
the GDR would join West Germany (Holfelders, 2010). Shortly after that, the Palace was 
closed down because of the asbestos and it awaited its fate.
A Political stage in cultural disguise
The Palace of the Republic was built to be a political symbol directed towards the West, 
proof that the GDR was internationally competitive and also a home for the country’s 
people, and a stage for the meetings of the allegedly important people’s chamber. 
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However, by now it is widely known that this was a hoax, as the people’s chamber did 
not have any say in politics and only performed a representative function, while all the 
power rested in the hands of the SED. Looking at the statistics, this becomes evident: 
the people’s chamber only met two to four times a year and the whole Palace was used 
for political purposes only 83 days out of its entire existence (Holfelders, 2010). Its main 
function was to be the cultural and people’s palace. The cultural palaces that served 
the purposes of political education and formation were crucial elements in the GDR’s 
nation-building program (Kuhrmann, 2006). A lot of the GDR’s inhabitants fl ocked to the 
Palace every evening or weekend to enjoy the cultural events with subsidised tickets 
and food. In an interview with Jan Bartknecht in 2007, Wilhelm von Boddien, who later 
became a proponent of the Palace’s destruction in favor of the City Castle, points out that 
there were few places outside of Berlin where the people could celebrate in as luxurious 
a place as the Palace, which gave them a glimpse into the big outside world that was 
otherwise inaccessible to them. Hence, for a lot of people, the Palace was something 
special. A witness, who was a student in East Berlin during the 1980s and worked as 
a dishwasher in the Palace’s restaurants, claims that the Palace was for everyone and 
therefore constituted a place of identity. Every time her parents and friends came to 
visit, they wanted to go to the Palace to eat in the subsidised restaurants and attend the 
cultural events, as it was something special and unique in the whole country.
In the end, the Palace was a political and cultural building for the people of the state, but 
the true intention of giving something to the people that they normally would never get 
and using this as a disguised political education left a bitter taste and understandably 
made some people dislike and avoid the Palace. Or, in Moritz Holfelders’ words, the 
Palace “became a mirror for a complex society that had learned to perfectly live in 
contradictions” (2010, p.118).
Experimental use after the reunifi cation
After the closing of the Palace due to asbestos, the selling and distribution of its furniture 
and materials to Berlin restaurants and museums, its deconstruction back to its shell, 
and the fi rst decision for its complete demolition by the Bundestag in 2002, the Palace 
got a new function: beginning in 2003 the Palace was made available for temporary use 
and several Berlin artists used the empty space for experimental exhibitions, events, and 
ideas. Beginning with the performance of the Wagnerkomplex by Christian von Borries, 
the Palace started to revitalise, and this continued with the play Berlin Alexanderplatz by 
Frank Castorf from the Berlin Volksbühne, and the large-scale installation Der Berg, or 
the fl ooding of the Palace for a boat trip (Holfelders, 2010; Kuhrmann, 2006). Even the 
famous director Wim Wenders used the Palace for recordings, and the Norwegian artist 
Lars Ø installed the illuminated letters Zweifel on the Palace’s roof, creating a new image 
of the Palace of Doubt, fostering resignation and new refl ective thoughts and discourses 
in Berlin’s diverse society.
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“The tale of the Palace, as 
it appears now in people’s 
minds, became a myth, 
making the Palace an 
architectural victim that 
had to fade away for the 
ideas of its opponents.” 
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The different temporary uses made people in Berlin think about the Palace’s future again, 
fuelling new open discourses. Finally, in 2005 the Union for the Palace was created and 
they began to fi ght for the Palace’s preservation (Kuhrmann, 2006). However, politicians 
insisted on continuing the deconstruction, meaning that the experimental phase had to 
end in 2005. Even though the artistic use of the Palace could not save it for the future, 
it still fostered a lot of changes. Crucially, it led to “the sensitization in the art scene for 
political questions so that things that seem impossible can still work out” (Rottmann & 
Deufl hard, 2006, p. 236).
The Palace supported the experimental, impulsive character that Berlin had in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, with empty spaces being used for creative ideas and actions. It therefore 
addressed the young generation that hadn’t been involved in the whole Palace debate 
in the fi rst place, as they didn’t have a stake in it, nor did they identify with it. But through 
the period of temporary uses, their perspective changed:
[…] The connection of the Palace with the memory of the GDR and the 
related ascriptions and projections will fade. In contrary to that another 
perspective could acquire meaning, which in case of the Palace reminds 
more of its use as an artistic experimental space in times after the 
reunifi cation. (Danyel, 2016, p.44)
Emotional debates over two lost buildings
After the closing of the Palace in 1990, there had already been some voices that 
demanded the building’s destruction, such as the author and historian Joachim Fest, 
who proclaimed the reconstruction of the Hohenzollern Castle as a symbol of the victory 
over communism (Mühlberg, 2001). In the newspapers, the future of the Palace was 
intensely discussed and it was sometimes referred to as a “socialist pilgrimage site” or 
“socialist open-air museum” (Schmid, 2007, p. 247).
At the beginning of the debate, the German authorities actually considered moving the 
new seat of the government into the Palace or to the Spree Island, but due to fi nancial 
restrictions and the asbestos in the Palace, this idea was quickly dropped (Kuhrmann, 
2006). From 1993 on, the Berlin Senate and private institutions opened architectural 
competitions on a regular basis with the aim of fi nding a new solution for the Schlossplatz, 
but this was always with the secret vision to tear the Palace down (Kuhrmann, 2006). 
In the end, none of the competitions lead to a solution. While throughout the 1990s the 
people of Berlin lost interest in the closed Palace in the centre of their city, Wilhelm von 
Boddien had the idea to recreate the old Prussian City Castle and intensively pushed 
his vision forward. Several surveys conducted by the opinion research institute Forsa 
showed that most of the people of Berlin were against the destruction of the Palace, 
or at least against the reconstruction of the City Castle (Taz archive, 1995). However, 
despite this and the fi nancial restrictions that existed, the German Bundestag decided in 
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favour of the Palace’s destruction in 2006. Following this decision, the 
destruction phase lasted until 2008 and left Berlin’s centre with a green, 
fl at meadow. In 2013, the construction of the new Humboldtforum 
began, which will be a place with the vision of cultural connection and 
remembrance planned by the Italian architect Francesco Stella. As of 
writing, we are still awaiting its completion.
While these occurrences seem quite linear, an emotional debate 
happened in the open that involved all kinds of people: proponents of 
the Palace, proponents of the City Castle, historians, artists that were 
in favour of the temporary uses, East and West Berlin citizens, East 
and West Germans, politicians, and time witnesses.
First of all, the debates seemed to approach the Eastern-Western-
confl ict. Tearing down the Palace as a symbol of socialist or 
communist power can be seen as a display of victory over the 
latter, demonstrating the feelings of superiority of the Western side 
over East Germans. Obviously, East Germans saw themselves 
being ruled by the West German powers and not incorporated into 
them. The Western perspective simply saw the Palace as residual 
waste, polluted, closed down, and bearing witness to the end of the 
dictatorship regime of the GDR. Although I refer to the Eastern and 
Western perspectives, this does not mean that the two German sides 
stood in unity against each other. In fact, there were people in favour 
of and against the Palace on both sides. Still, a lot of former GDR 
citizens saw the idea of the Palace’s destruction as a “symbol for the 
disregard of their life-historical experiences” (Prokasky, 2016, pp.7-8). 
Figure 4. 
Destruction of 
the Palace of 
the Republic. 
(Wolf 2008 / CC 
BY-SA 3.0)
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One can argue that the Palace, as appreciated by most GDR citizens, stood for a 
positive memory that just did not fi t into the picture that the West German politicians 
had of the socialist country (Sebrow, 2016). Despite that, the Palace transmitted broad 
historical information, not only about the GDR itself, but also about the reunifi cation. 
Hence, in the debates that were fuelled by Eastern and Western perspectives, each 
arguing about their right or wrong opinion, in this case, the Palace took on another role. 
Heinrich Wefi ng from Zeit-Magazine states, “So in the public perception the Palace 
did not become a symbol of the common, but of the dividing” (2016, p. 25). He further 
states that “the Palace is not a static, pacifi ed, uncontroversial place of memory, but 
an eclectic, associatively shimmering, controversial” place (Wefi ng, 2016, p. 28), thus 
emphasising the ambiguity of the place. On one side, the Palace was an important 
cultural space for the people of a country, a meeting point for networking, and a special 
architectural work, but on the other side it represented a dictatorship. Dealing with 
this entanglement of different meanings turned into an impossible task. Under these 
circumstances, the deconstruction and annihilation of the Palace and all of its various 
meanings was defi nitely the easy way out, or, as Moritz Holfelders states:
Not tearing down the Palace would have meant to dispute everything 
it represented in the thirteen years, fi ve months and 24 days of its 
opening as well as in the years of its slow disappearing since 1989: the 
oppressive atmosphere and the awakening spirit of the GDR, the attempt 
to coopate the people as well as the subtle anarchy in the system […], 
the diffi culty dealing with history and the catchy power of symbols, a 
globally celebrated awakening in the times of the Zwischennutzung from 
2003, and for the evidence that even a burdened building can invent itself 
newly. (Holfelders, 2010, p.120)
When Wilhelm von Boddien brought up the idea to rebuild the old Prussian City Castle on 
the exact spot of the Palace, the debates took another turn. The proponents of the City 
Castle acted quickly, creating a Castle-Lobby that consisted of high-ranking academics 
and politicians who were able to easily acquire money and power, while the proponents 
of the Palace did not manage to really unite and perform intensive actions (Wuigk & 
Raulien, 2006).
The main focus of the Castle’s proponents was giving back a piece of national identity 
to the people. Klaus Rüdiger Landowsky from the German CDU party stated on that 
matter: “If you don’t know where you come from, you don’t know where you want to 
go” (Riepe, 2007). While the Castle-proposition’s arguments emphasised the beauty of 
the Castle in comparison to the Palace and the desire to give back a piece of national 
identity to the people, the Palace-proposition saw the Castle as a meaningless shell 
in the facade of a long-lost building with no connection to its former self. While Anna-
Inés Hennet (2007, p. 59) emphasised that the reconstructed Castle would have the 
character of a sculpture or an object with no special function except for being beautiful 
and awakening or preserving memories, the former Palace’s architect, Bruno Flierl, 
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questioned the actual values of the new Castle, as originally they were the values of 
the Prussian Emperors and they lacked cultural and political viability in contemporary 
society (Dolata, 2007, p. 250-251).
Indeed, with the intention of reviving an identity from over one hundred years ago, one 
needs to ask the question of how this could be done. The new Castle will not be authentic, 
as its reconstructed façade and especially the modern, ahistoric interior will not remind 
one of long-lost times. Further, one could ask for whom can this building function as a 
memory marker of the former Prussian Empire? Young generations have no connection 
to the old Castle and will see it as something completely contemporary, not considering 
its symbolism. Creating the Humboldtforum with the new intention of remembering and 
including all kinds of historical perspectives seems like a humbler idea. This is how 
Dietrich Mühlbergs’ vision in a Zeit-Magazine article kind of became true:
In Berlin, it is indeed necessary to appreciate the contradicting memorial 
culture of both German divided societies and to somehow bring them 
together. At this symbolically loaded place of young political history, 
this could only work through one solution, which offers the collective 
memories of both sides possibilities of identifi cation. (Mühlberg 2001)
Still, the Humboldtforum’s outer shape will always be a reminder of the victory of the 
emotional nostalgia of older generations, and an attempt to go back in time by erasing 
four decades of people’s collective memories.
How to remember the ambiguous Palace
The virtue of letting go, which could have been demonstrated by the advocates of the 
City Castle, now could also be applied by those of the Palace. The Palace is gone 
physically and the Humboldtforum is being constructed. The next step is to fi gure out 
how to remember the Palace.
From 2019 on, the Humboldtforum will incorporate the exhibitions of several history and 
art museums, in cooperation with the museums of Museum Island, as well as a Museum 
des Ortes, which will focus on the evolving history of the area where the former Prussian 
Castle and the Palace of the Republic used to stand (now home to the Humboldtforum). 
As of writing, the experts working with the director of the museum, Dr. Judith Prokasky, 
are still debating about how to remember such an ambiguous site as the Palace in the 
museum. What has been decided thus far is that in the museum’s basement and ground 
fl oor, there will be space dedicated to discussing and remembering the Palace, whether 
through installations or the old furniture and materials, such as rescued photographs, 
that are currently stored either in the museum storage in Spandau or in the German 
Historical Museum (Prokasky, 2016).
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In 2016 the Humboldtforum held an expert meeting to discuss what is suitable for the 
Palace’s former interior decor and the installations. Some points of this discussion will 
be evaluated here. Of course, the furniture can’t simply be displayed, but has to be 
commented on, or, as Dr. Jürgen Danyel from the Time-Historical Research Potsdam 
said in the meeting: “The pieces have to be ‘displayed in the situation in which they are 
now, as a residue of history” (2016, p.73). The objects certainly hold symbolic meaning 
and even the missing of the objects transmits a message, as Philipp Oswalt (2016, p.81), 
professor of architecture, commented. The only way to handle those objects is to provide 
context and commentary, creating awareness of their history. The following problem is 
the authenticity of the objects and the picture that is provided of the Palace. As Herman 
Parzinger said, “The acceptance of the Humboldtforum depends on the adequate 
display of the Palace” (2016, p.55). As the Palace is gone, it should be remembered in 
a suffi cient manner, not by showing disconnected pieces but instead by trying to show 
the whole puzzle of the Palace’s meaning. Visitors to the Humboldtforum will mostly be 
tourists and future, younger generations with no personal connection to the GDR and 
no idea of the loaded meaning of the place. The ambiguity the Palace held is important 
here. Basic knowledge about the GDR’s political and social systems has to be generated 
for the visitors to be able to classify the objects and background stories. Dr. Prokasky 
questioned the notion of authenticity herself: “Are there possibilities to display or make 
accessible authentic objects without neutralizing them at the same time?” (2016, p. 81). 
The politician Lothar de Maiziére closed by arguing that the objects are not the important 
pieces, but it is the story of what happened in the Palace that has to be transferred (2016, 
p. 83). There is still time before the opening to fi nd an adequate way of remembering the 
Palace, but the important thing is that the ambiguous story must always be kept in mind.
Effects of heritage politics
Returning to the decision process of the German Bundestag regarding the Palace’s 
future, from a heritage preservation point of view, the whole scenario seems highly 
inadequate. Even though the Palace was not yet listed as a heritage site, it still held 
enough value to become one in the future:
As a government charged governmental and cultural building the Palace 
had an outstanding historical testimonial value, as it mirrored the political, 
social and cultural conditions in the GDR. It became a symbol of the 
forty year long division, the changing times and the reunifi cation process. 
(Kuhrmann,2016, p.23)
After the reunifi cation, the Palace became property of the united German state, making 
all decisions about it state-based. There are three heritage governance models, of which 
one is state-based. The others are owner-based and user-based. The problem with the 
state-based model is that “cultural policies are subject to politically motivated change 
[…]. There is also the possibility that the political opposition is not included in the model, 
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thereby making it vulnerable to corruption” (Siu et al., 2001, p. 147). In the case of 
the Palace, it seems like the politicians were biased and unable to make truly rational 
decisions. The user-based model would have been a better way to deal with the Palace. In 
this model, powerful groups form themselves and identify the benefi ciaries of the site with 
short and long term needs (Siu et al., 2001). Considering the public surveys conducted 
by Forsa in the 1990s, the outcome of a referendum would defi nitely have been different. 
In this case, the biggest mistake was not considering future generations and their stake 
in the situation. In the 1990s, there was an expert commission working on the case that 
advised the government to tear down the Palace. But when the temporary uses were 
installed in the early 2000s, the value of the place changed completely. Establishing 
another expert commission would have been the right action to take at that point. As Siu 
et. al. (2001) state, value is always a subjective element and its change cannot easily be 
predicted from the beginning. Therefore, every step has to be considered twice before 
taking action. In the case of the Palace, the future generations, those with a stake in its 
preservation, would have certainly benefi tted from the old Palace’s various, temporary 
uses. These liminal activities opened the Palace as a free space for creative ideas, 
changing the old meaning of the Palace itself to something for the good of the people. 
The shape of the new City Castle, on the contrary, refers back to the past, with no point 
of identifi cation for future generations.
The destruction as creation of a myth
It is well known that heritage sites act as anchors of symbolic meaning in 
urban and rural spaces, that they contribute to the construction of places, 
and that they are crucial to the relationship between people and their built 
environment. (Sørensen & Viejo-Rose, 2015)
This quote refers to the notion that communities build identity through their heritage. As 
heritage holds information of the past, tales, and myths, it shapes future generations 
and their sense of belonging. But as David Lowenthal writes, “Bias is the main point of 
heritage” (1996, p.122), and he further states, “Prejudiced pride in the past is not a sorry 
consequence of heritage; it is its essential purpose. Heritage thereby attests our identity 
and affi rms our worth” (1996, p. 122). Heritage that is created through stories of events 
and tales of time witnesses is always subjective and shaped by the mind of the storyteller. 
Lowenthal further states that “heritage exaggerates and omits, candidly invents and 
frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error,” (1996, p. 121), and that it “mandates 
misreading of the past [and] becomes cherished myths” (1996, p. 129). Especially in the 
event of confl ict, heritage and its meanings are challenged and different perspectives on 
the happenings or objects of that heritage appear, which are then passed on to future 
generations. As Dacia Viejo-Rose and Marie Louise Stig Sørensen write:
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[I]nterpretations of the destruction wrought by confl ict are cemented, and 
often follow the same essentialist of events and relationships promulgated 
during the war. Both victory and victimhood have their advantages, and 
so both groups and individual political entrepreneurs compete for the 
most advantageous positions within the confl ict narrative – of which the 
trope of “glorious martyr” becomes especially sought after […]. (2015, 
p.287)
The case of the Palace is not a result of confl ict or war, but the background of the story 
is clearly political, with two contesting sides emotionally fi ghting for what they think is 
the ethical and right way. Thus, applying those heritage theories to this case, one could 
argue that the tale of the Palace, as it appears now in the people’s minds and in a large 
section of public opinion, has become a myth, making the building an architectural martyr 
that had to fade away for the ideas of its opponents to prevail.
If the Palace was not closed down, or was simply cleared of asbestos and reopened 
with a different use (whether as a political stage for the new government or as a cultural 
centre), there most likely would not have been such emotional debates. People would 
not have questioned the decisions on such a big scale. It is likely that the Palace’s old 
meaning would have just subtly faded and then evolved into a new one, as a symbol of 
the newly united Germany. But in reality, by making such a big deal out of the case, having 
all kinds of people debate over the building’s future, even up to the point in which it was 
used for experimental art, involving another generation, and emotional demonstrations, 
the whole case turned into a drama that really started shaping people’s perspectives 
and opinions. Thinking about the Palace and its intense public demise now, the building 
seems like a martyr, the last symbol of its time. It is easy to condemn the new City Castle 
when, for the sake of its existence, another building with a lot of meaning for the people’s 
identity had to vanish into oblivion. In the sense of victory and victimhood, the Palace 
won the battle of mystifi cation. Although it is not physically present, it will still remain in 
people’s minds as part of their identity, telling the story of an ambiguous battle over a 
nation’s historical record. And therefore, it has become heritage in its absence, even 
though some politicians would have liked it to disappear from people’s consciousness. 
Or, to say it with Hermann Parzinger’s words, “When memorial sites cease to exist, they 
develop a much stronger culture of remembrance” (2016, p. 54).
Conclusion
Through the example of the Palace of the Republic, it can be seen that heritage, in this 
case a building with crucial historical and social signifi cance, can bear so much value 
that it can never completely disappear, even after its physical destruction. The debates 
about its future that were fuelled from all sides, from the proponents of the City Castle 
to members of the Berlin art scene and the younger generations, lasted over a decade, 
creating tales that are now part of the nation’s heritage and will remain so for future 
generations. The Humboldtforum, which bears the burden of representing this heritage 
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in its halls, is facing a diffi cult task, as the spirit of the Palace and its story has to be 
transmitted completely and must address people and generations that were not involved 
in the process. Transmitting the myth of the Palace can be diffi cult, but this is the only 
way that the Humboldtforum will be accepted and appreciated by all stakeholders.
In the case of the Palace, the way heritage works become further evident: because of its 
destruction and the intense debates about it, the Palace will never be forgotten and will 
continue to be signifi cant for the people’s identity.
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An Alternative to 
“Grand Narratives”
Artistic practice as preservation 
process
Introduction
If preservation is essentially alterations in the fabric of an object, then just as essentially 
is can be described as meaning-creation and interpretation. The starting point for 
examining the link between heritage preservation and ideology is therefore to think of 
tangible and intangible elements—fabric and meaning—as a complex fusion. If this is 
the core of preservation practice, then the scrutinisation of the very dynamics behind 
how we choose, use, and make meaning of heritage—especially with overtly ideological 
implications—is urgent. The interest of this paper is to go beyond what objects might 
represent in terms of ideology, although this is also important. A focus on what the object 
represents indicates a one-way fl ow of meaning from fabric to perceiver, where the 
object radiates a certain ideology. Rather, it is the intention of the paper to contribute 
knowledge on how such representations come into being and even more on how they 
can be contested.
Such an investigation can have many disciplinary departure points. The paper will 
especially draw on theories from the fi elds of aesthetics and experimental preservation, 
as this allows one to critically refl ect on the very nature of heritage and how we perceive 
it. It will be suggested that artistic practice, as a way of re-contextualizing heritage, can 
be seen both as a process of preservation as well as being capable of making signifi cant 
comments on how the meaning of heritage can be performed.
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 Thus, the paper will examine the following research questions: How can artistic practice 
contest conventional preservation practice, and through what means does it do so? 
What potential does it offer more broadly as preservation practice, especially in relation 
to ideologically connoted architecture?
More than using the questions to examine a specifi c case study, a case study 
will be used to examine the questions, as the interest lies in the potential of artistic 
practice itself. The case study used is Bungalow Germania, the German contribution 
to the 14th International Architecture Exhibition at the Venice Biennale 2014. It is an 
architectural montage of two historic buildings built for political purposes: a replica of 
the Kanzlerbungalow in Bonn and the original German Pavilion in Venice. The paper 
will create a theoretical foundation, introducing conventional preservation discourse 
and establishing experimental preservation as the counteraction. This is followed by a 
specifi c examination of artistic practice as used in the case study. Lastly, the broader 
potential of this as a voice in heritage preservation will be discussed.
The Authorised Heritage Discourse
If artistic practice is an alternative voice within heritage preservation, the discourse 
against which it positions itself must be established. There is not one position representing 
conventional preservation practice, but a dominant discourse can nevertheless be 
identifi ed. In her book Uses of Heritage, Laurajane Smith (2006) presents what she terms 
the Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD). It is a discourse driven by expert knowledge 
that naturalises and reinforces certain narratives, often connected to national identity 
(Smith, 2006, p.30). Smith states how this discourse:
 [...] frames heritage audiences as passive receptors of the authorized 
meaning of heritage, it also creates signifi cant barriers for active public 
negotiation about the meaning and nature of heritage[...] (2006, p.44)
It is exactly the room for negotiation about the meaning and nature of heritage that is the 
focus of this paper, something which the AHD actively devalues. It should be remarked 
how the AHD is not a fi xed set of parameters that experts draw on and it also varies in 
implementation. However, it surely is a power domination, which at times silently and 
invisibly leaves the visitor out of the process of negotiating meaning and interpretation of 
heritage. To be able to challenge the AHD, an awareness of its modus operandi is fi rst 
required.
Smith introduces some key consequences of the AHD, some of which will be touched 
upon in this paper, as the case study will also be examined in the light of these. Firstly, the 
AHD is a statement of a past that experts will look after. Thereby, “the very real emotional 
and cultural work that the past does as heritage for individuals” is disengaged, leaving 
the past as one singular entity (Smith, 2006, p.29). Secondly, it is a claim that heritage 
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should be saved for future generations, which thereby discourages active creation and 
alteration of meanings connected to heritage. Importantly, this decreases the option of 
using the past to defi ne and contest present cultural meanings and phenomena more 
broadly (Smith, 2006, p.29). Thirdly, the AHD upholds an idea of boundedness. It is the 
idea that the heritage in question is easily mapped and documented, making it promotable 
for the public as singular national treasures (Smith, 2006, p. 31).
Besides providing a contextual background for analysis, the introduction of the AHD 
also serves to distinguish the different attempts to criticise it. Here, the introduction of 
alternative narratives to the grand ones might not intrinsically be a critique of the AHD. 
Such alternative proposals might also be operating from the logics of the AHD, by way of 
imposing and authorising them. Thus, the question regarding experimental preservation 
is whether it has the ability to both criticise the AHD and simultaneously avoid operating 
from the same logic. It is for its ability to both offer alternative narratives and at the same 
time not authorise them that its usefulness and qualities should be measured.
Experimental preservation
After having identifi ed what could be called conventional preservation and communication 
of heritage, a proposal for a counter-logic will be presented. This serves two purposes: 
fi rst, to establish a position that both criticises but also presents alternative ways of 
dealing with heritage compared to the AHD. Secondly, it serves to clarify the concept of 
preservation that is employed in the remaining part of paper.
The book Experimental Preservation comprises viewpoints of a counter-logic to 
conventional preservation practice (Pailos, 2016). It is simultaneously a confi dent and 
vulnerable attempt to contest the very process with which something becomes heritage. 
The confi dence lies in the urgency of the need to experiment with and negotiate heritage 
in different and more democratic ways—the vulnerability of experimental preservation 
being the experiment itself. As Pailos states, “Experiment suggests the dangerous 
possibility of failure, something to avoid when working on valuable historical and cultural 
objects” (Pailos, 2016, p.11). Nevertheless, experimentation is proposed as the game 
changer. In its essence, experimental preservation questions the authority—often 
governmental—that preserves in the name of the common good (Pailos, 2016, p.15). 
Experimental preservation is intrinsically an interdisciplinary investigation of objects, 
since it wants to move away from the hierarchy of knowledge and disciplinary patents 
of objects (Pailos, 2016, p.11). With this in mind, an indication of how heritage value is 
ultimately a construct becomes apparent; does the historian possess inherent qualities 
to judge the meaning of historical documents? Or does meaning equally unfold through 
the artist’s recontextualisation of the same documents? More than right or wrong 
interpretations, they are different methodologies to reach interpretation. This points to 
experimental preservation not as a mere theoretical critique of a discourse, but as a 
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practicable alternative to conventional preservation. Experimental preservation is thus 
the call for methodologies normally discarded from preservation practice, fi rst and 
foremost insisting on experimentation as a key method.
This leaves us with an expanded conception of what preservation stands for. With the 
experimental approach, it has come to integrate and test the potential of the obsolete and 
unworthy as heritage, but also to use untraditional methods of intervention and framing of 
these objects. Just as importantly, this is a concept of preservation underlining its potential 
as a critical method, the critical nature of the preservation act crystallising through direct and 
visible intervention (Pailos, 2006, p. 17). This can be said to oppose the criticality attributed 
by academics to already authorised heritage. Experimental preservation is thus an act, 
often in which the choice and appropriation of the given object is obviously contested, as 
opposed to critical thinking kept at a distance.
Such a conception of preservation might seem vague, or even imprecise. However, a 
broader understanding of what preservation encompasses should not be equated with 
vagueness. What this understanding does very precisely is highlight preservation as an 
act of anti-essentialist meaning creation and not just physical maintenance or alteration. In 
the following section, the case study of Bungalow Germania will examine the potential of 
such experimental preservation and its practical dimension. In line with the interdisciplinary 
approach, the focus will be on the potential of artistic practice to communicate political 
architectural heritage.
Bungalow Germania
At the 14th International Architecture Exhibition – la Biennale di Venezia, all participating 
countries were asked to engage with their history of national architecture, responding to 
the motto Absorbing Modernity: 1914 – 2014. As a somewhat provocative hypothesis, 
artistic director of the Biennale Rem Koolhaas put forth the idea that national diversity 
has ceased to be refl ected in the modern-day language of global architectural. With this 
statement, Koolhaas pushed the buttons of national identity, memory, and representation. 
Bungalow Germania, commissioned by Savvas Ciriacidis and Alex Lehnerer, came to be 
Germany’s response (Bungalow, 2014, p. 1).
The German contribution is an architectural montage consisting of two historical buildings 
with overtly political pasts. One is the German Pavilion in the Giardini della Biennale in 
Venice itself, the other a partial replica of the Kanzlerbungalow (Chancellor’s Bungalow) 
in Bonn, and by crosscutting the German Pavilion, a montage of two architectural 
languages was created (Bungalow, 2014, p.3). Originally constructed as the Bavarian 
Pavilion in 1909 by Daniele Donghi, the German Pavilion was given its current name in 
1912. However, its architectural style and meaning has changed throughout history, and 
it was fundamentally remodelled in 1938 by the architect Ernst Haiger, whose design 
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language was that of the neoclassicism commonly used during Nazi Germany (Uncube, 
2014). With its massive pillars, symmetry, and clearly defi ned entrance, the building 
leaves little for the imagination. In line with national socialist aesthetics, it formulates a 
statement of power in stone, communicating a message of subordination to its visitor. 
In 1964, the pavilion went through its last signifi cant renovation, during which a wall 
and its dropped ceilings were removed in order to make a central space with more light 
(Bungalow, 2014, p. 2). To have a piece of architecture with such immense political 
connotations representing the German nation abroad is, to this day, a recurrent subject 
of much debate, with one side of the argument calling for demolition (Independent, 2010). 
The history of exhibitions in the Pavilion is worth noting. Here, exhibits have started to 
comment on the exhibition space itself, showing awareness of the space as a historical 
setting and not just as a backdrop for exhibitions (Zeller, 2009, p. 109).
Intersecting with the Pavilion is a partial replica of the Kanzlerbungalow in Bonn. The 
former German Chancellor’s offi cial residence and work place was built by architect 
Sep Ruf in 1964, when Bonn was the capital of West Germany (Stiftung). According to 
modernist American ideals, the building uses transparency, clarity, and simplicity as its 
architectural language, and it was built with massive glass windows to view the wide vistas 
of its surroundings.. Built to refl ect a new democratic beginning, the Kanzlerbungalow 
was raised on a political fundament. At the time of erection, West Germany was striving 
to integrate the idea of the European welfare state along the lines of growth and collective 
prosperity. Just as much as a governmental headquarters, the Bungalow was framed 
as “the living room of the nation” in its branding towards the public (Bungalow, 2014, 
pp. 1,2). The building became iconic through its circulation throughout different media. 
Regarding its history of function and preservation, however, it is worth noting how the 
building was “de-functionalised” and soon slipped into oblivion after Berlin became the 
capital of Germany in 1999 (Bungalow, 2014, p. 2). Originally built as the architectural 
answer to new ideals, the Bungalow has now entered a phase of the reformulation of its 
meaning.
Between citizenship and statelessness
Both the German Pavilion and the Bungalow were built to refl ect German national identity 
at two different points in history. Although different, both buildings have a history of political 
instrumentalisation. Today, both buildings lend themselves to the reformulation of what 
their signifi cances are as heritage in present society. This state of uncertainty is a key 
phase when entering a discussion of preservation status, and exactly the phase that the 
experimental preservationist wants to make visible. In this phase of preservation, there 
is a latent potential for negotiation If more attention is needed in the negotiation process 
of the value and meaning of the heritage, a defi nition of the very nature of this condition 
of uncertainty might be helpful to form a clearer platform from which to negotiate.
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Here, the concept of the liminal is helpful (Andrews, 2012, p. 24). It is a concept that is 
able to describe the seemingly unimportant and marginalised. Furthermore, it is a spatially 
oriented concept able to address the social aspects and power-relations of physical, 
tangible phenomena, like that of heritage. Here, the liminal defi nes the borderland, the 
state of in-between, the threshold refl ecting both cultural and temporal conditions, as 
exemplifi ed in rites or life phases. Or, one could say a transitional uncertainty (Andrews, 
2012, p.24). The liminal can be said to be an analogy for the condition of the stateless 
person. “They have physical but not social reality, hence they have to be hidden, since it 
is a paradox, a scandal, to see what ought not to be there” (Andrews, 2012, p. 27). The 
quote is not to be seen as a direct description of the condition of the Kanzlerbungalow 
or the German Pavilion—both of which are still accessible and visible to the public. To 
see the buildings through the lens of the liminal is, however, to spot their current state of 
physical reality and at the same time realising their shaky social reality. Should they be 
demolished, as suggested for the German Pavilion, since it is “a scandal, to see what 
ought not to be there”? Both buildings should intentionally represent German national 
identity, and here the liminal offers a perspective that directly questions their national 
belonging and signifi cance in the present: to what extent can they be incorporated as 
citizens, alive and forming a dynamic part of German heritage? Or do they instead have 
to become discarded and stateless? The important remark here is how both scenarios 
form a social reality for the buildings. To assign a non-social reality to heritage is also a 
form of social reality, just one of negativity. Ultimately, heritage placed at the margins of 
society is also the heritage that sometimes refl ects it the most.
When entering a discussion of preservation status, a building thus also enters a liminal 
condition. Instead of exhibiting answers to what national architecture looks like for Germany, 
it becomes clear how the German Exhibition with Bungalow Germania is exhibiting exactly 
the liminal condition of historical political architecture itself. It is an exhibition that ultimately 
exhibits the uncertainty of meaning connected to the buildings nowadays. It is exactly here 
that the experiment is able to facilitate negotiation. In the following section, the artistic 
strategy of montage will be examined as a strategy of such negotiation.
Montage as tool of negotiation 
As an artistic strategy, mostly known from the Avant-Garde and Modernist Art 
movements, the montage combines signifi cations into a collision (Druckrey, 1994, p. 
5). As suggested by architect and professor Luca Galofaro, montage entails certain 
operations: “multiplying signs, the exchange of scale, reversals, grafts, superimposition, 
and erasure” (3NTA, 2016). It is an artistic strategy that can be said to frame the signifi er 
as discursive or dialectical, “the dialectical mission is to fuse fragments as concentrated 
form; the discursive one is to create fi ssures or interruptions in the established order” 
(Druckrey, 1994, p. 5).
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“Through the artistic 
practice of montage, the 
Kanzlerbungalow and 
German Pavilion exceeded 
their representational 
meaning as historic and 
ideologically connoted 
architecture.”
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As an artistic practice, montage is experimental in nature—it wants to explore signifi ers 
through rupture and collision, thereby provoking the cognition and the convenience of 
reading signs as fi xed representations.
As montage is a strategy often applied to two-dimensional mediums like photography 
and fi lm, the installation of Bungalow Germania becomes a bold, large-scale, and three-
dimensional montage. In Bungalow Germania, the part of the Kanzlerbungalow is a partial 
replica of the original standing in Bonn. With its modernist simplicity and glass facades, 
it intersects with the bombastic white stone walls and high ceilings of the Pavilion. Going 
through the ten-meter-high portico of the Pavilion, visitors are suddenly met by the low 
and warm wooden ceiling of the Bungalow. With the Pavilion already placed on a podium, 
the Bungalow is now strangely raised from the ground in its integration into the Pavilion, 
disrupting the graphic and harmonious simplicity of the Kanzlerbungalow that was originally 
intended. Importantly, the montage results in a disruption of the function of the wide glass 
sections of the Bungalow, which before communicated the idea of transparency, but now 
offer a disrupted view of cold stone walls .
Thus, the montage positions the materiality in new contexts, which ultimately disrupts 
their former functions. The montage makes it clear how the different architectural 
parts are dependent on the totality of the building and even its surroundings to support 
their meaning and what they represent. In overlapping the two buildings, two national 
narratives are brought together. However, through the artistic practice of montage—with 
its “multiplying of signs, exchange of scale and erasure” (3NTA, 2016)—the chronology 
of the narratives are erased. Through the montage of two clear architectural and political 
languages, the buildings arrive at a third and new point, which exceeds the totality of 
the two together. The buildings no longer pose the question of what they specifi cally 
represent in German history and national identity. Through the strategy of montage, the 
buildings now arrive at a more fundamental question concerning the extent to which 
history and defi nitions of national identity can be accessed through heritage.
To clarify, this is not to say that the montage has the purpose of revealing the buildings as 
empty signifi ers. As described, the buildings are both loaded with meaning, representing 
political ideologies directly expressed through the choice and composition of their 
respective materiality. Rather than proving an emptiness of meaning, the result of the 
montage is a creation of awareness of the very dynamics with which we make sense 
of history and national identity; that we use heritage as fi xed signs of representation for 
our identity, and further, that speculations of demolition and preservation are attitudes 
expressing our like or dislike of these representations. The montage leads to a questioning 
of the assigned meanings of each building, thereby complicating the link between the 
material and its narrative. Through the architectural installation, the buildings are not 
purely exhibited—they exhibit each other. It is to take two outspokenly ideologically-
infused buildings, both in a liminal condition, and make a third space where refl ection 
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by the visitor is encouraged. It is to show the vulnerability of our interpretations and it 
points to the porous nature of heritage and the meaning assigned to it. Here, montage 
offers itself as a strategy of negotiation. It creates the aforementioned “fi ssures and 
interruptions in the established order” (Druckrey, 1994, p.5)—interruptions that do not 
resolve easily into grand narratives.
Heritage from representation to performativity
Until now, the paper has sought to establish the broader context of heritage as discourse, 
and experimentalism has been introduced as a strategy of heritage negotiation. The 
concrete examination of the artistic practice of montage has served to show the practical 
dimension of such experimentalism, and how it can contest conventional preservation. 
In the remaining part of the paper, the research question of the potential it offers more 
broadly as an alternative preservation discourse will be dealt with. As the aim of the paper 
is not to defi ne the essence of artistic practice—something that would require a paper 
in itself and could only take the form of investigation—the fi rst research question has 
been dealt with through a specifi c example. However, to be able to talk about a broader 
potential and avoid generalisations about what artistic practice essentially does, the 
fi ndings from the case study will be articulated through the concept of the performative.
In her book Uses of Heritage, Laurajane Smith iintroduces the concept of performativity 
in relation to heritage. She notes:
It reinforces the idea that heritage is not a passive subject of management 
and conservation or tourist visitation – but rather an active process engaged 
with the construction and negotiation of meaning through remembering . 
(2006, p.66)
This statement is hard to disagree with. However, what the statement emphasises is not 
how different aspects of heritage (the visitor, management, remembrance etc.) appear 
as more or less performative in their acts, but rather that performativity is a productive 
and intriguing paradigm through which one can think about different aspects of heritage 
in a more dynamic way.
The performative is an elastic concept and used within several disciplines, making it 
even more necessary to specify exactly how it applies to specifi c situations. The above 
statement links performativity to heritage as process and negotiation, which is the 
stepping-stone for extracting the outcomes of the case study of Bungalow Germania. 
However, instead of just thinking theoretically about all aspects of heritage as possible 
performative acts, I will ask more specifi cally wherein the performativity occurs. If one 
can be specifi c in answering this question, useful information might be derived that could 
be applicable to lines of thought when dealing with particularly diffi cult and ideologically-
imposed heritage.
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Architects Helle Juul and Flemming Frost (2011) defi ne the performative space as a space of 
activity, contrasting with what they call representational space. They sum up further that “the 
performative accordingly consists of getting something to happen, of providing the occasion 
for something to occur” (Juul, 2011, p. 144). As a dynamic space of activity, opposing the 
static representational space, the performative space is thus characterised by providing 
occasions for activity—activity here also taking the form of active refl ection.
This can be linked to some remarks about preservation and the negotiation of meaning 
intrinsic to this. The fi rst one concerns the materiality and boundedness of heritage. As 
Smith notes, the AHD upholds itself by linking heritage to the authenticity of material 
and clear boundaries of sites or objects (Smith, 2006, p. 31). This reduces heritage 
to something that can be tamed, clearly defi ned, managed, and communicated. One 
way to provide a space for negotiation is to test the boundaries and authenticity of the 
fabric as a means to defi ne the value. As the case study suggests, this testing can be 
done in a very physical way. Bungalow Germania points to how the partial replica of 
the Kanzlerbungalow is not about making a reconstruction in order to experience it as 
heritage. The testing of its boundaries by recontextualising it and letting it play a part in 
a montage provides for a situation in which the building has to perform new meaning.
The replica’s relation to the original bungalow in Bonn becomes less important—what 
matters is the dialogue it enters into with the German Pavilion as its new context. Thus, 
challenging the physical boundaries of heritage can also challenge the boundaries 
of meaning ascribed. In this situation, the heritage moves from forming a space of 
representation to a space of activity, where new meaning is performed in a dialectical 
relationship between visitor and object. In short, it can be said that there are latent 
performative qualities in this act of uprooting.
The second remark concerns the notion of the passive versus active visitor. Smith also 
notes how the AHD is a mode that frames the visitor as passively receiving authorised 
meaning (Smith, 2006, p. 44). To communicate heritage as mere symbolic representations 
of identity “[...] draws on too narrow a sense of experience of what heritage is” (Smith, 
2006, p. 30). If negotiation is desired, then the one experiencing the heritage has to be 
activated and encouraged to refl ect. There are a lot of communication tools with which 
to do so, and these are often used in modern museum communication and the like. 
However, this might just be a different mode of communicating the same authorised 
narrative. Here, the examination of Bungalow Germania showed how the artistic practice 
of montage could provide room not for communication, but for actively sensing the 
buildings differently. It is through the bodily experience of materials and contexts clashing 
while walking through the room of Bungalow Germania that meaning both dissolves and 
occurs. Such use of artistic practice to reframe heritage activates the visitor in such a 
way that a phenomenological experience is called forth of the heritage object itself—an 
experience very valid in the negotiation of its meaning.
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The last remark concerns an element of intervention as a way to bring forth performative 
qualities of a heritage object. Here, intervention can be understood broadly. A type of 
intervention could be to propose obsolete architecture or architecture in a liminal state 
as representative of national architecture. Bungalow Germania is both an answer to what 
“national architecture” looks like for Germany and, on a meta-level, is furthermore the 
representative work at the German Pavilion—a way of representing Germany abroad. 
It intervenes with the AHD and its more conventional choices of branding. Here, the 
choice can be said to become an intervention into the conventional. The performative 
qualities might seem more subtly provoked here. However, a certain element of choosing 
object has performative potential; namely when the choice plays with the expectations. 
The frictions occurring when expectations are not confi rmed can thus be said to have a 
performative quality.
Artistic practice as critical preservation practice
The last observation is more of a concluding one and deserves the fi nal attention. It 
also concerns the element of intervention in relation to preservation, but not as the one 
described above. It is the intervention into the object itself. The idea of intervention within 
conventional preservation often equals maintenance. In question here is the potential 
of interventions such as the play with boundaries, modifi cation, recontextualisation, and 
contrasting. The artistic practice of montage is a certain kind of intervention, which in 
this case has proved able to produce meaning that exceeds both the representational 
ones of each building as well as the sum of the buildings together. As artistic practice 
cannot be standardised, this paper has not tried to defi ne what artistic practice offers 
overall in relation to the preservation process. However, as artistic practices often frame 
materiality so as to produce added value and intangible qualities, it can be concluded 
that they are practices worth paying attention to when wanting to facilitate negotiation 
about meanings of heritage. What is now clear is how the artistic intervention into the 
heritage object provides an ambiguity for the interpretation of the object. Ambiguity in the 
meaning of the object is not inherently good, just as the heritage object as found is not. 
The quality of the ambiguity is the room it opens for critical thinking.
To talk of critical negotiation and preservation as the very same thing might, for some, 
be to stretch the concept of preservation. However, to talk of the exhibition of Bungalow 
Germania as a part of the preservation process of the buildings is to underline how 
the meaning negotiation attached to a building is a part of its preservation history. This 
way of thinking about preservation might especially prove itself productive when dealing 
with “diffi cult” or ideologically connoted heritage; in coming to terms with the past, either 
collectively or individually, active memory work needs to be done. As found in this paper, 
artistic practice and experimentation have the ability to activate refl ection and memory 
work.
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This conclusion points towards a related area, that of the public and civic negotiation 
of heritage as an alternative voice to the authorised discourse. However, an in-depth 
discussion of this topic is beyond the reach of this paper.
If critical thinking is the mode encouraged by Bungalow Germania, and possibly by 
artistic intervention in general, the exhibition must allow for a critical remark about itself. 
The limits of the space of heritage negotiation created through Bungalow Germania lie in 
the institutionalisation of the work itself. It is a work curated by experts, and highly visited 
by experts. This does not take away from the fi ndings regarding the potential of artistic 
practice that were unveiled in this paper. The remark simply serves to show awareness 
of the limitations of artistic practice in certain contexts. Thus, if performed in public and 
in less restricted space, artistic practice as a process of preservation might avoid the 
pitfall of becoming self-referential and might facilitate an even more spacious room for 
the negotiation of heritage and its meanings—something to be tackled in a further study.
Conclusion
Through the artistic practice of montage, the Kanzlerbungalow and German Pavilion 
exceeded their representational meaning as historic and ideologically connoted 
architecture. This contests conventional preservation practice—identifi ed as the 
Authorised Heritage Discourse—as it intervenes in the architecture in order to actively 
question its meaning rather than maintain it. The montage was a tool able to show the 
complicated link between material and the narrative. More than supporting or proposing 
a new narrative, the architectural montage was found to deconstruct the grand narratives 
implied in the architecture, leaving it up to the visitor to create new meaning. The case 
study’s fi ndings were reformulated through the concept of the performative, where three 
main strategies to negotiate heritage meaning were found: uprooting as a way to contest 
the link between material and meaning; encouragement to provide phenomenological 
experiences of heritage for the visitor; and lastly, intervention both through the choice 
of unexpected objects and intervention into the objects themselves. Lastly, it can be 
concluded that these are especially relevant strategies when discussing the preservation 
of political heritage, since they activate the memory work that is needed.
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Sara Akhlaq
From Church to 
Mosque to Museum 
The infl uence of religious ideologies 
on the monument
Introduction
Hagia Sophia is an architectural masterpiece of the late sixth century that still remains 
standing today. It was built in Constantinople, present day Istanbul in Turkey. Throughout 
its existence, Hagia Sophia has been a visual testimony of political and social 
developments of the region. Built as a cathedral, it was transformed into a mosque in the 
thirteenth century after the conquest of the Ottoman Empire (Isaacs, 2011). Currently, 
Hagia Sophia is a museum that symbolises the secularity of the Turkish Republic. This 
monument has been appropriated by all ruling regimes to further their political and 
religious narratives, which has also lead to an assortment of conservation strategies. 
These conservation approaches have been diverse due to the differences in the religious 
and national ideologies of the ruling parties.
Hagia Sophia has layers upon layers of history, with each layer representing attributes 
of the concerned ruling parties. From the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman Empire to 
the young Turkish Republic, the structure embodies the religious narratives of each of 
these ruling parties. In light of all the shifts of regimes that the region has been through, 
the subsequent effects on and alterations of Hagia Sophia have been a point of confl ict 
between the Christians and Muslims of Turkey. As happens in most cases in which two 
religious communities have an affi liation to a single monument, a small population of 
both Muslims and Christians of the state claim Hagia Sophia to be a mosque and a 
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church, respectively, and refuse to conform to the secular ideologies espoused by the 
state. Lowenthal, in his book The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, perfectly 
sums up the role of heritage in these scenarios and how it steers the general public 
outlook:
Heritage keeps outsiders at bay through claim of superiority that are 
unfathomable or offensive to others. Bonding within and exclusion beyond 
the group stem from faith, not reason: we exalt our own heritage not 
because it is demonstrably true but because it ought to be. (Lowenthal 
1999, p.128)
Hagia Sophia’s appropriation highlights the divisive character of cultural heritage, 
embodied in the way it has been conserved and treated as a central setting of the confl ict 
between the Christian and Muslim communities of Turkey, which are both striving for 
equality. Hagia Sophia is again at a turning point in its history, as Tayyip Erdogan, the 
current prime minister of Turkey, expressed the desire in his early political career to 
convert Hagia Sophia into a mosque again (A Monumental Struggle to Preserve Hagia 
Sophia, 2017). This angered the Christian communities of Turkey, who had already 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the current ruling authority due to its biases against 
religious freedom. This decision, if given a go-ahead, will contradict the secular political 
ideologies that Turkey boasts. It will also aff ect not only the national situation, but also 
the international ties that Turkey has with its allies abroad.
Architectural signifi cance of Hagia Sophia
Hagia Sophia is a prototype of the majestic Byzantine architecture, representing 
the value this empire placed on art and religion. For a monument of this proportion, 
the period of construction was incredibly short, lasting from 532 until 537 under the 
Byzantine Emperor Justinian I (Katipoğlu & Caner-Yüksel, 2010). The arduous task of 
designing the monument was undertaken by Anthemius and Isodore (V. Pentcheva, 
2016). Having expertise in architecture as well as geometry, these two men managed 
to translate a dream into reality by designing a building that, for nearly a millennium, 
was considered the largest cathedral in the world. The temple, upon completion, 
was so richly and artistically decorated that Justinian, comparing it to Solomon’s 
construction of fi rst temple in Jerusalem, proclaimed, “Solomon, I have outdone 
thee!” (Jarus, 2013).
The most prominent central feature of Hagia Sophia is the massive dome, which is 
supported by four semi-circular arches arranged in a square. Being constructed as a 
cathedral, both the interior and exterior of Hagia Sophia revolved around symbolism 
associated with Christianity. The architecture and religious symbolism, however, went 
through various phases of modifi cation with each ruling power.
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Figure 1. Exterior of 
Hagia Sophia 
Museum (Vågen 
2013 / CC BY 3.0)
When Hagia Sophia was constructed, its interior surfaces were 
covered with marble, murals, and golden mosaics of great artistic 
value. These golden mosaics, until today, are considered a primary 
feature of Byzantine Architecture and of the Hagia Sophia due to 
the elaborate details and the delicate choice of colour compositions. 
These mosaics covered various surfaces of the building, from the main 
entrance to a running mosaic in the upper gallery. The conservation 
measures taken for this feature of Hagia Sophia, in particular, have 
varied greatly with each ruling party. Each of the mosaics in Hagia 
Sophia has a unique signifi cance and could be translated into a 
historical event pertaining to Christianity (Teteriatnikov, 1998). Hagia 
Sophia was designed to serve as an imperial monument. Having two 
fl oors, the upper story was designed in the form of a gallery from 
where the vast hall on the ground fl oor could be viewed. It is believed 
to have served as a seating place for imperial fi gures, from where 
they could witness the various important events that the building 
hosted during the Byzantine Empire.
The fact that Hagia Sophia has gone through some major 
transformations over time but still stands as an epitome of Byzantine 
Architecture due to its unique features further reinforces the grandness 
of its architecture. The monument has become a landmark of Turkey 
and is the chief component of the Istanbul skyline, with its massive 
dome and four minarets protruding towards the heavens above and 
looming over the city.
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Conservation of Hagia Sophia and ideologies behind it during 
the Byzantine Empire
Hagia Sophia was a brainchild of Emperor Justinian of the Byzantine Empire. Justinian, 
during his 38-year-long reign, strived towards developing the region politically and 
religiously. He brought about tax reforms and also worked towards strengthening ties 
between religion and politics, as refl ected in his empire’s governmental framework. As 
usually happens, these developments faced harsh public opinions. In 532 AD, these 
ideological confl icts took the form of riots and lead to a famous uprising called the Nika 
riots (Katipoğlu & Caner-Yüksel, 2010). These riots lead to extreme unrest, with more 
than half of the city burnt down and several people killed. The main purpose of these 
riots was to de-throne Justinian and to besiege him in his palace. During these riots, the 
basilica that previously stood on the location of Hagia Sophia was burnt down. To put an 
end to the riots, Justinian decided to declare his divine authority and to reaffi  rm to the 
public his political strength by building a magnifi cent church on the location of the fallen 
basilica. However, Justinian’s decision to use the erection of a monument to re-establish 
his authority over his people was not unusual during that time. During the Byzantine 
era, emperors often employed the erection of majestic buildings and monuments to 
demonstrate their power.
Infl uence of iconoclasm on Hagia Sophia in the sixth and 
seventh centuries 
During the initial period of its existence, decorations inside Hagia Sophia were kept very 
simple, with just the images of crosses on various surfaces and none of the mosaics that 
are now a primary feature of the structure. This was due to a religious ideology known 
as Iconoclasm, which opposes the veneration of Jesus Christ and other divine fi gures 
in human form. These mosaics were, however, added by succeeding emperors, the 
iconodules, who worshipped these images.
During the second quarter of the sixth century and the fi rst quarter of seventh century, 
Constantinople experienced a rise in iconoclasm (En.wikipedia.org, 2017). The higher 
religious and political elites during these periods were against the representation of the 
divine fi gures in human form. This led to a huge iconoclastic movement all over the 
Byzantine Empire. Hagia Sophia, which was at the time fi lled with mosaics, was a primary 
target of this movement. Several of these mosaics were destroyed during that period. 
The imperial legislation also barred the production and use of these fi gural images. This 
was the fi rst time since its construction that Hagia Sophia’s physical fabric was affected 
by a religious ideology, but it was only the fi rst in a series of incidents to follow.
From Church to Mosque to Museum  | 113
Following the end of these two iconoclastic periods, the mosaics and fi gurines reappeared 
and accumulated in Hagia Sophia, with each ruling emperor moulding the interior 
according to his own religious and political ideologies.
Infl uence of Roman Catholicism on Hagia Sophia during the 
Fourth Crusade
Constantinople was captured during the fourth crusade from 1204 to 1261 (Isaacs, 
2011). Hagia Sophia, under the Latin occupation of Constantinople, was ransacked 
and plundered. This ruling party, following the extensive history of appropriation of the 
monument by preceding ruling parties, converted Hagia Sophia into a Roman Catholic 
church (Katipoğlu & Caner-Yüksel, 2010). The building was again used by a ruling party 
for propagating its religious ideologies by demonstrating the superiority of Catholic Rome 
over Orthodox Constantinople.
Upon the recapture of Constantinople by the Byzantine Empire in 1261, the status of 
Hagia Sophia was reversed to that of an Orthodox church. During that period, the church 
was in a dilapidated condition, indicating the lack of conservation measures employed 
by the previous ruling party. The Byzantine Empire, having been known for its acute 
acknowledgment of all factions of art, immediately dove into conservation efforts for 
the Hagia Sophia, which was entirely disregarded by the previous reign. The building 
continued fl ourishing as an Orthodox Christian church until the demise of the Byzantium 
reign in 1453.
Infl uence of religious ideologies on Hagia Sophia during the 
Ottoman Empire
The edifi ce that had been the fl ag bearer of the imperial majesty of the Byzantine Empire 
was almost immediately employed as a powerful political symbol by the Ottomans after 
they occupied Constantinople. When Sultan Mehmed ll, the third in the Ottoman Empire 
lineage, took over Constantinople, he took various crucial steps to fulfi l his forefathers’ 
dream of transforming the Ottoman State into a world empire. To achieve his ultimate 
goal, the Emperor made Constantinople the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and 
consequently, Hagia Sophia was made the Grand Mosque of the new imperial capital 
(Isaacs, 2011). This step was also taken to proclaim the triumph of Islam over Christianity 
and to demonstrate the accession of the Ottoman Empire to the world. Characteristically, 
these sudden shifts were met with strong opposition from the Christian population of 
the new Ottoman Empire because in their point of view, Hagia Sophia could represent 
nothing but Christianity. Nevertheless, a series of additions, alterations, and conservation 
measures were carried out by Ottoman rulers. These advances varied with each Emperor, 
depending on their respective perception and interpretation of Islamic ideologies.
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Upon the accession of the Ottoman Empire, consecutive sets of alterations were carried 
out on Hagia Sophia to convert the monument into a Grand Mosque.
Alterations during the initial years of the Ottoman Empire
Upon conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, the Ottoman Empire modifi ed the 
edifi ce and its interior in order to add the necessary features of a mosque. A mihrab was 
added, a necessary component of a mosque that signifi es the direction of Mecca. There 
were minarets added to the exterior of Hagia Sophia, which signifi ed that it was now a 
Sultan Mosque. Figure 1 illustrates the additions made to the façade, with the minarets 
protruding from four corners of the site (Fig, 1). Most of the symbols, imagery, and fi gures 
linked to Christianity were removed. The mosaics that constituted a primary feature of 
the interior of Hagia Sophia were left uncovered by Sultan Mehmet II, including the Virgin 
Mary and images of the seraphs, which he considered to be guardian spirits of the city. 
Bells and crosses were removed. The later sultans were, however, not this tolerant. 
Eventually, all of the mosaics inside the monument were plastered over, leaving just one 
uncovered (Jarus, 2013). A crescent took the place of the crucifi x on the dome of Hagia 
Sophia. Sultan Mehmet ll also established a madrassa inside the monument for the study 
of Muslim theology. With each succeeding Emperor, the Islamic symbolism continued to 
accumulate inside the monument, as well as in its immediate surroundings. The tombs 
of sultans Selim II, Murad III, and Mehmed III were also erected in the gardens of Hagia 
Sophia (Katipoğlu & Caner-Yüksel, 2010). Regardless of the changes, the monument 
was recognised by the Ottoman dynasty for its timeless architecture and religious value. 
There were continuous measures taken to protect the monument that followed best 
conservation practices.
These alterations naturally did not sit well with the Christian population of not just the 
Ottoman Empire, but of surrounding regions as well, since for centuries it had held an 
axial position in Orthodox Christianity. The moment of the occupation of Hagia Sophia 
was chronicled and recalled in gory details. Roger Crowley, in his book 1453: The Holy 
War for Constantinople and the Clash of Islam and the West, describes it as:
The church was meant to embody heaven on earth, and here were these 
aliens in turbans and robes, smashing tombs, scattering bones, hacking 
up icons for their golden frames. Imagine appalling mayhem, screaming 
wives being ripped from the arms of their husbands, children torn from 
parents, and then chained and sold into slavery. For the Byzantines, it 
was the end of the world. (2006, p.81)
Various myths and legends went on to be associated with the occupation of Hagia Sophia 
as well. Many clung to the fi ction tale of the worshipping priests disappearing into the 
walls of Hagia Sophia and would someday reappear to end resurrect the lost glory of the 
Greek empire (Gamm, 2014). 
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“Hagia Sophia has layers upon 
layers of history, with each 
layer representing attributes 
of the concerned ruling parties 
[...] the structure embodies the 
religious narratives of each 
of these ruling parties.”
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Impact of Westernisation on Hagia Sophia
In the mid-nineteenth century, Hagia Sophia was again swept up in a new wave of 
ideological transformation. Europe was in the process of rapid modernisation from 
the start of the eighteenth century and, likewise, the Empire, in its attempt towards 
Westernisation, was also trying to cope with it (Katipoğlu & Caner-Yüksel, 2010). This 
process was adopted by the state organisation and was later adopted by the general 
public into their social lives in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Emperor Abdülmecid 
is particularly known for the high regard in which he held the new Western way that 
was prevalent in Europe during his reign. He put forth a Tanzimat Fermanı [Edict of 
Reforms] in 1839, according to which the empire would proceed towards acquiring the 
status of a Westernising state (Isaacs, 2011). This was followed by an increase in the 
rights of non-Muslims in the Empire. These reforms in the organisational structure also 
triggered revolutions in the societal framework, accompanied by new interpretations 
of religious and cultural sites. These changes led to a different approach being used 
for the restoration and repair of Hagia Sophia. These conservation measures were 
commissioned by Abdulmücid and executed by two Swiss architects. During these 
repairs, the covered mosaics were accidentally discovered. The Sultan was awed by the 
mosaics and, appreciating their signifi cance, he ordered their repair. It was, however, not 
possible to keep any type of fi gurine exposed inside a mosque under Islamic ideology, 
so the Sultan ordered the mosaics to be covered with utmost care after their complete 
restoration and conservation.
The ideological impacts of the Ottoman Empire on Hagia Sophia were signifi cant, but 
its artistic and sublime values were well recognised by the dynasty, and the Ottomans 
further enhanced the attributes of this majestic monument. However, the fact still remains 
that it was an Orthodox church fi rst, and it is still considered a church and a place of 
worship by Turkish Christians.
Hagia Sophia under the secular Turkish Republic
Adhan—the Muslim call to prayer—resounded from the four minarets of Hagia Sophia 
from the time the structure was declared the Grand Mosque up until 1934. However, after 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the modern Turkish Republic came into being. In 1934, 
Turkey’s fi rst president, Kemal Atatürk, secularised the country and converted Hagia 
Sophia into a museum. Thus, it became the fi rst building to be converted into a museum 
from a mosque. The transformation lead to a reformed way of conserving Hagia Sophia. 
Under the direct order of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the authorities, in cooperation with the 
Byzantine Institute of America, carried out extensive conservation initiatives, uncovering 
the well-known mosaics and creating a space that represented the coexistence of Islam 
and Christianity. Thus, the space propagated secularism, with both Islamic calligraphy 
and Christian fi gurines equally represented. These reforms were lauded within both 
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national and international spheres and were time and again brought into the limelight 
by the print media. The New York Times (1932) published an article named Mosaics 
Uncovered in Famous Mosque, which stated:
Byzantine treasures long hidden in Saint Sophia stripped of plaster 
covering. Some Moslems object. Turkish Government, however, is 
cooperating in work with American Institute. The more liberal views now 
taken by Turkey’s rulers in all matters pertaining to religion will surely 
encourage others to help regardless of race or creed. (Katipoğlu & Caner-
Yüksel, 2010, p.212)
The unveiling of the mosaics in Hagia Sophia caused an outpouring of appreciation from 
all over the world. These measures were brought to fruition by the secular ideologies of 
the young republic. The Hagia Sophia museum no longer represented the superiority of 
Islam over Christianity or Christianity over Islam, but it rather took a stance of equality. 
It was neither an imperial church nor a grand mosque; it was a secular monument of a 
secular state where all religions and cultures gathered under one vast dome of science. 
The interior of Hagia Sophia propagates and boasts religious symbologies of both Islam 
and Christianity (Fig 2). Figure 2 shows Islamic calligraphy and mosaics pertaining to 
Christianity existing in harmony. Hagia Sophia became a visual testimony to the secular 
and modern discourse of Turkey. It promoted the ideology of secularism, not just in 
state affairs but also in all dimensions of the society. It exemplifi ed a nuanced approach 
towards cultural heritage sites while strengthening the national ideologies.
The conservation strategies in Hagia Sophia complied with the secular ideologies of the 
Turkish Republic. It propagated the idea of a place that represented religious impartiality. 
The mosaics and symbols pertaining to Christianity that had been added to the interior 
of Hagia Sophia and subsequently covered under Islamic jurisdiction were uncovered 
and preserved, and they thus became signifi cant aesthetic features of the Hagia Sophia 
Museum. By treading on the strategies favoured by preceding religious ruling parties, 
Hagia Sophia was used as a symbolic vehicle for the authorities’ ideological propagations 
for the public.
Hagia Sophia during the current ideological war in Turkey
The treatment of Hagia Sophia by ruling authorities has always embodied how said 
authorities envision the historical and religious values of the monument. Although Hagia 
Sophia was declared a museum, rendering it neither a church nor a mosque, this decision 
did not satisfy some sections of the Christian and Muslim communities. A small portion 
of both religious groups refused to accept the structure’s secular status, and ever since 
then, Hagia Sophia has been subjected to an ideological tug-of-war. Neither side wants 
to accept the idea of a shared religious place. Robert Ousterhout (2017), a historian at 
the University of Pennsylvania who has been working on Byzantine sites in Turkey since 
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Figure 2. Interior 
of Hagia Sophia 
with Islamic and 
Christian symbols 
(Day 2011 / 
CC BY 2.0). 
the 1980s, points out that:
The building has always been treated in a symbolic 
way—by Christians, Muslims, and by Ataturk and his 
secular followers, each group looks at Hagia Sophia 
and sees a totally different building. 
Ever since the designation of Hagia Sophia as a museum, performing 
prayer inside the monument has been banned. Nevertheless, small 
sections of the population, under the infl uence of extreme religious 
ideologies, are bent on reclaiming it as part of their respective faiths. 
On the other hand, there is also a huge part of the population that 
is holding fi rm in the belief that the monument should be retained as 
a national symbol of impartiality and secularism. Today, the current 
political authorities in Turkey are providing a favorable environment 
for the demands of Muslims who are following extreme ideologies. 
Re-consecration of Hagia Sophia as a mosque was a desire once 
expressed by Turkey’s current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
in the 1990s when he was still climbing up the political ladder. This 
caused a rising concern among secularists, because this desire was 
accompanied by a declaration of his support for integrating Islamic law 
into the legislative structure. Erdogan was elected prime minister in 
2003 and was then re-elected with an overpowering majority in 2007. 
He has since shed his past rhetoric regarding Hagia Sophia and 
has taken a moderate approach, supporting secularism and keeping 
religion and politics separate. However, this approach still does not 
satisfy secularists due to the shifting of social ideologies towards 
extreme Islamic principles. Ousterhout’s take on the matter is that:
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Hagia Sophia is a pawn in the game of intrigue between the secular 
and religious parties. There’s an alarmist response on both sides. They 
always assume the worst of each other. Secularists fear that religious 
groups are part of a conspiracy funded from Saudi Arabia, while religious 
people fear that the secularists want to take their mosques away from 
them. (Ousterhout, 2017)
A new turn of events came about in 2016, when an Imam was appointed for Hagia 
Sophia by the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs (Catholic Herald, 2016). This was 
followed by a call to prayer being chanted from the minarets of Hagia Sophia for the fi rst 
time since 1935. Although it is still a museum, the dominating and enhanced Islamic 
traits of the monument has put a damper on the secular characteristics that have been 
associated with it for decades. The situation has only persisted since then, with the 
secular ideologies of Hagia Sophia being sidelined and the Islamic attributes of the 
monument being conserved and augmented.
Impact of culture and religion as ideologies on Hagia Sophia
Hagia Sophia has been a visual testimony of Turkey in political, cultural, and religious 
contexts throughout the 1400 years that is has existed. The religious ideologies of 
each ruling authority could be understood from the way Hagia Sophia was treated 
during that particular era. The overall treatment of and conservation strategies used for 
Hagia Sophia could be linked directly to the shifting cultural and religious frameworks 
of the region. This cultural shuffl e, in turn, was immensely affected by the dominating 
religions during each period. Assessing the conservation strategies from the beginning, 
during the time of its construction, Constantinople had a ruling authority that strictly 
followed the tenets of Orthodox Christianity. This religious interest led to an inclination 
towards architectural features that were in accordance with religious beliefs. This 
meant that initially, the mosaics did not include any images or caricatures. However, 
as time passed, the bias towards orthodoxy and conservative religious ideologies 
gradually reduced and these features began to be added. During the iconoclastic 
period, Hagia Sophia saw a diverse and rather pernicious handling of its celebrated 
mosaics. However, these mosaics grew in number as time passed and the Byzantine 
Empire continued its rule over the region. The conservation of Hagia Sophia and its 
architectural features varied under different emperors, with each authority adding 
elements to the interior according to their own will. All of these additions could be linked 
to one religious ideology or the other.
The same practice fl owed into the cultural ideologies that existed under the Ottoman 
rule, during which religion steered every aspect of social and political situations. The 
cultural framework of the region took a turn with the new ruling authority, as Islamic 
culture gradually became an essential part of society. This change also affected Hagia 
Sophia. The additions made to Hagia Sophia under Ottoman rule conformed to Islamic 
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ideologies, which could be ascertained by the addition of minarets to the monument, 
new Islamic calligraphic interior design, the covering of mosaics, and several other 
features. As the culture of Constantinople became more Islamic, the shift affected Hagia 
Sophia immensely. The conservation strategies were more concentrated on the Islamic 
features of the building and less on those connected to the pre-Ottoman period. There 
were, however, a few exceptions, one of which occurred during the reign of the Ottoman 
Emperor Abdülmecid. Abdülmecid introduced the ideology of Westernisation to the region 
and consequently took it on a more modern course in which the rights of minority groups 
were enhanced. This was refl ected in the conservation strategies for Hagia Sophia, and 
it led to the uncovering of mosaics that pertained to Christianity and the pre-Ottoman 
ruling party.
The current cultural and political unrest is also refl ected directly in Hagia Sophia, as 
protests keep erupting amongst Muslims and Christians regarding what religion Hagia 
Sophia represents. Both groups refuse to accept the secular status of the monument. 
There is an absolute disregard of the fact that Hagia Sophia has layer upon layer of 
history and that labelling it as a monument to a particular religion or group only serves to 
limit its universal value.
Diversity in religious ideology as a dialogical resource
Since the period of the Byzantine Empire, the region of modern-day Turkey has been 
directly impacted by religious ideologies. Due to shifts in the religious ideologies of the 
ruling parties, the dominant and minority communities have varied. In the past, the 
dominant group was Christian, while in present times the Muslims hold majority status. 
In any region of the world where multiple cultural or religious groups share the same 
space and claim citizenship of the same region, these confl icts regarding inequality 
always arise. One of the reasons could be the fact that although the offi cial framework 
is not partial to any particular group, the minority group will still have fewer rights due to 
some aspects of the social framework that remain unaffected by the offi cial framework. 
Ideological diversity could be interpreted in two ways with regard to the impact it has on 
the social framework of a nation or the people that associate with it. It could bring the 
society together into one tight group, thus reducing intolerance among people. The fl ip 
side is what has been described in the case of Hagia Sophia: a cultural monument with 
which two religious groups affi liate has been made into an ideological battleground, a 
space over which both Muslims and Christians want to have complete control. Lowenthal, 
in his book The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, aptly sums this up as follows: 
Heritage reverts to tribal rules that makes each past an exclusive, secret 
possession. Created to generate and protect group interests, its benefi ts 
us only if withheld from others. Sharing or even showing legacy to 
outsiders vitiates its virtue and power. (1999, p.128)
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Rather than being a central source of confl ict, religious ideologies could 
be moulded into a dialogical resource that could be used to initiate a 
peaceful discourse among the clashing communities. Hagia Sophia, 
which is currently one of the main sources of confl ict for the religious 
groups, could instead be interpreted in a way that creates a sense of 
equality based on the secular ideologies. Rather than creating confl ict 
among the religious groups on the basis of religious differences, 
diversity in ideologies should be the ground upon which groups unite 
and engage in a healthy discussion.
Conclusion
Peace cannot be achieved through violence; it can 
only be attained through understanding. Ralph Waldo 
Emerson
Cultural monuments could play a primary role in peacebuilding. 
Ideological and cultural diversity often elicits a sense of fear in people, 
a fear of something alien. Culture, being a source of identity, could 
be used to minimise friction between and among different sections of 
a multicultural society. Hagia Sophia, which has evoked a sense of 
belonging for two major religions of the world, has always been a point 
of confl ict. All ruling parties have expressed their inclination towards 
a particular religion by conserving or enhancing features related to 
that religion while ignoring attributes pertaining to the other. Within 
the current political and religious ideologies of the Turkish Republic, 
secularism is claimed to be a primary attribute. However, the ideology 
of secularism needs to be further emphasised in the case of Hagia 
Figure 3. Interior 
of Hagia Sophia 
with Islamic and 
Christian symbols 
(Rabe! 2013, CC 
BY-SA 3.0)
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Sophia. The current Muslim ruling authority has shown an inclination towards converting 
the monument to a Mosque. This step, if taken, would alienate a major part of the 
population of a country that has already shown its dissatisfaction with the impartiality of 
the government. This act of overshadowing one aspect of a monument in favor of another, 
equally important feature is called the “dominant ideology thesis” in J.E Tunbridge’s book, 
Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Confl ict (1997, p. 
47). Tunbridge further explains that:
Heritage interpretation is endowed with messages which are deliberately 
framed by an existing or aspirant power elite to legitimize and existing 
dominant regime, or alternatively are developed by an opposition group 
with the objective of overthrowing the competitor. (1997, p. 47)
The peacebuilding role of Hagia Sophia can only be fulfi lled when it represents the whole 
population of the country and binds the people together under the fl ag of a shared and 
inclusive culture.
In all multicultural societies, the minority communities play a pivotal role, and the 
Christian population of Turkey is no exception. Not tackling the delicate situation of the 
Hagia Sophia in a thoughtful, appropriate manner could lead to the monument losing its 
universal value. Human beings are bound to fear what they don’t understand, but these 
apprehensions can be overcome by propagating the ideology of unity in diversity. Such 
unity could be accomplished by creating a shared space within a monument, in this case 
Hagia Sophia, that all citizens can connect with, irrespective of their religious identity. 
This cultural interchange and ideological reconciliation would be even more signifi cant 
in light of the current political turbulence in Turkey and the rise of religious extremism in 
the region. The revolutionary secular ideologies promoted by Kemal Ataturk need to be 
applied in full form by the current government. This would include condemning all factions 
of the social framework that show an inclination towards converting the monument into a 
mosque. Only then would Hagia Sophia stand as an emblem of a secular country.
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Mare Heimrāte
The Corner House 
Revisited
The future perspectives of 
uncomfortable heritage
There are numerous historical sites or monuments all over the world that deal with somber 
heritage left by various ideological movements. Initially, there were different approaches 
for dealing with these particular relics, depending on the viewpoint of the specifi c actors 
involved, as well as on factors related to the cultural, economic, or symbolic values of 
such relics. This paper will deal with the site named The Corner House (Latvian - Stūra 
māja) and will address the following pressing questions: What are the future perspectives 
of the Corner House as a site or monument of remembrance, and what are the best 
possible solutions for maintaining it?
The Corner House (Fig.1) is one of Latvia’s cultural monuments of historical signifi cance 
and is located in Riga’s center, which is a UNESCO World Heritage site. The six-story 
Neo-classical house complex was built in 1912 by the architect Aleksandrs Vanags 
(1873 - 1919) (OMB, 2016). The site is known by numerous names, including Teter’s 
house, the Corner House, Cheka House, and the KGB house. The most commonly used 
nickname, the Corner House, comes from the Soviet era, when the building was used by 
the secret state police of the former Soviet Republic. People would come to the Corner 
House to make accusations against those who allegedly committed treasonous acts. 
The entrance of the building was located right at the corner of two streets (Long, 2014).
The house was originally designed as a residential apartment building with exclusive shops 
and offi ces on the ground fl oor gallery (Fig. 2). During its more than one hundred years of 
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history, the building’s interior has changed drastically, but the exterior has remained largely 
the same. In the early 1930s, when the building housed the Latvian Interior Ministry, the 
ground fl oor gallery row was changed to a row of windows with grills. However, the biggest 
change the building experienced was during the Soviet occupation, when it was rebuilt 
for the needs of the State Security Committee (KGB). An internal prison was constructed 
on the ground fl oor and in the basement, along with a shooting range, detention cells, 
interrogation rooms, and the unsettling exercise yard (Cielava, 2015).
In just over a century of existence, the house has experienced major changes to its 
physical fabric and so much more. The building witnessed and played a part in major 
ideological movements, and it holds symbolic meanings for various stakeholders and 
inhabitants. Moreover, the building has housed key political players of different historical 
periods, and it “became the most vivid symbol of the totalitarian regime during fi ve 
decades of Latvia’s occupation” (Galfy, 2016).
Thus, since 2014, starting as a project of “Riga – The European Capital of Culture 
2014”, the Corner House has hosted several historical exhibitions. As these projects 
are supposed to terminate at the end of 2017, there is a deep uncertainty as to what will 
happen with the monument in the future. Recently, the city government reconstructed the 
facade and roof in anticipation of a future owner or new inhabitants. Nevertheless, there is 
a great deal of uncertainty regarding the future of the house. There haven’t been enough 
debates on to what extent it is necessary to preserve (or not) the Corner House as a site 
or monument of remembrance. Additionally, there should be more discussions involving 
different actors on how to preserve a monument with a dark history that also honours the 
memory of people subjected to Soviet repression. Consequently, the following text deals 
with the future perspectives of the Corner House as a site or monument of remembrance 
and with the solutions for conserving it.
This paper will discuss an urgent case of a historic monument and its future, examining 
the political and cultural history of the building, as well as the various actors’ opinions 
on the site’s maintenance. The paper builds off of the theories of the historian David 
Lowenthal and the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, as well as relevant documents, such as 
the Occupation Museum Association of Latvia’s resolution on preserving the testimony 
and memorial of the former Cheka’s house as authentic historical evidence and the Faro 
Convention. Taking into account the debates held about the Corner House, it will reveal 
two opposing opinions about the future of the monument.
The political and cultural history of the Corner House
In order to examine the situation today and discuss the several opinions about the future 
perspectives of the building, it is important to fi rst analyse the monument’s political and 
cultural history, which can be divided into four periods.
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During the fi rst period from 1910/12 to 1939, the building served different functions as a 
tenement house, a location of the Imperial Russian Music School, the Ministry of Finances, 
the Ministry of the Interior, the main offi ce of the Latvian Border Guard. It was a complex 
time in the history of the nation-state, including the years of the First World War, but during 
these almost three decades, the building complex was a symbol of the well-being of the 
society, as it was situated in the social and economic heart of the city (Rumbiņa, 2014).
The second period from 1940 to 1991 marks the time of the three occupations of Latvia—
the Soviet, Nazi, and Soviet again. Already in the beginning of 1940s, the Secret Soviet 
State Police took over the building and turned it into a KGB headquarters. During this 
period, people who were against the totalitarian regime were tortured and executed in 
different parts of the house. The former meaning of the house, therefore, changed from 
a symbol of well-being into a symbol of torture (Galfy, 2016).
The third period from 1991 to 2014 started with the restoration of the independent 
Republic of Latvia. In the beginning of 1990s, the Latvian State police took over the 
building and stayed until 2008, afterwhich the building was left completely abandoned for 
several years (Rumbiņa, 2014). Nevertheless, the house did not remain in total oblivion. 
There were continuous discussions between different stakeholders on the future of 
the complex. 2008 was also the year of the preparation of the Occupation Museum 
Association of Latvia’s resolution on the former KGB house as authentic historical 
evidence and commemoration.
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Initially, the fourth period starting from the year 2014 marked the 
revitalisation of the site (Odyssay, 2014). In this period, the government 
revealed the monument’s history to the public. According to the project 
of “Riga – European Capital of Culture 2014”, various exhibitions and 
guided tours related to the history of the house were organised in the 
building, opening the dialogue between the society and authorities, the 
past and the present (Long, 2014). Although the exhibition projects 
guided by the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia were so successful 
and the term of the project was extended until the end of 2017, there is 
still a great uncertainty about the future of the building, mainly because 
of economic circumstances.
Taking into consideration actors from different fi elds, the questions of 
the future perspectives of the Corner House as a site or monument 
of remembrance and the solutions for conserving it are rising anew. 
Furthermore, there is not a clear future management plan for the 
site, which is why the debates are urgent and pressing. Despite the 
successful museum and educational exhibition project (and the 
extention of the exhibition until the end of 2017), the future of the house 
is not yet set in stone.
Actors and their opinions 
There are several actors and stakeholders involved in the debates 
about the future perspectives of the Corner House. The biggest 
challenge is to bring the complex out of obscurity and try to fi nd a 
solution that harnesses its economic, social, and symbolic potentials. 
Figure 1. The 
Corner House after 
the reconstruction of 
the façade. 
(Heimrāte, 2017)
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However, while analysing the discussions about the future of the site, two opposing 
parties become apparent: the State Joint Stock Company State Real Estate and the 
Occupation Museum Association of Latvia. These two actors and their supporters have 
opinions based on the fi nancial and ideological situation of this Latvian state cultural 
monument of historical signifi cance. When the “Riga – European Capital of Culture 2014” 
project ended in October 2014, there were already wide discussions about the future of 
the site. The actors involved were academics, historians, experts in cultural heritage, 
architects, artists, entrepreneurs, and students, as well as representatives of the Ministry 
of Culture and the State Joint Stock Company State Real Estate. The opinions varied 
according to the symbolic meaning attributed to the building, as well as the economic 
and aesthetic values.
In the past few years, the State Joint Stock Company State Real Estate has invested 
thousands of euros trying to improve the market value of the Corner House and attract 
potential tenants. The renovation of the building’s facade was meant to maintain the 
authentic view of the building’s early appearance and to “enhance the architectural 
attractiveness of the urban environment, as well as to bring the economic value of the 
real estate market” (Cielava, 2015). The primary idea was to rent out the six fl oors of 
Teter’s house for bureaucratic purposes. The rental offers have already been made both 
to state institutions and to Latvian and foreign entrepreneurs. The possibility of adapting 
Teter’s house into a residential building has also been considered. Reconstructing the 
house in 2015 and painting it white based on the original vision of architect Aleksandrs 
Vanags can also be seen as an attempt to revert the house’s ideological and symbolic 
meanings. Additionally, there is an attempt to change the popular nickname from the 
Corner House to Teter’s House (which was the name of the building’s tenants in the 
early-twentieth century). However, there have been no responses from potential tenants 
(Cielava, 2015). Consequently, none of the state institutions have shown interest in 
moving into the Corner House and helping to realise the idea of fi lling the house with 
offi ces and stores. In the opinion of the State Real Estate, the fi nancial situation does 
not allow for keeping the Corner House as a museum, as they argue that the total 
reconstruction could cost millions of euros. Even just maintaining the building would cost 
additional money every year. In the opinion of Edgar’s Šīns (Chairman of the Latvian 
Real Estate Association and Chairman of the Board of the Real Estate Company Latio):
It would be more convenient to use the funds to organize already existing 
museums and to hire already recruited people in culture sphere. The 
market over time (within 5-10 years) will fi nd a rational use for this 
property. ( Kaže-Zumberga, 2014)
The Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, which played a signifi cant role in occupying the 
building in 2014 and turning it into a platform for discussions, has an opposing opinion 
to the State Joint Stock Company State Real Estate. As already mentioned, the “Riga 
– European Capital of Culture 2014” project Corner House. Case No. 1914/2014 was 
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one of the most successful events, and it started broad debates between the society and 
the authorities regarding the past and the future. Following this success, the Ministry of 
Culture expressed the wish to leave the exhibitions by the Museum of the Occupation 
of Latvia on the fi rst two fl oors of the building and to extend the project cycle. Many 
authorities have changed their opinion towards supporting the idea of keeping the original 
building as a museum or a center for historical education and developing projects on the 
house’s history. There are many who support the idea to preserve the status of a publicly 
accessible building that is fi lled with cultural and historical content like exhibitions and 
educational tours.
Uwe Hillmer, the Director of the Stasi Museum in Berlin, explained the following about the 
future of the Corner House: “It is a place for youth education; it is a place for history” (Kas 
notiks ar stūra māju?, 2014). The idea that the Corner House should stay as a museum 
and “repository of the society’s memory” is a central idea of Kaže- Zumberga’s interviews 
in 2014 about the future of the house with several authorities in Latvia representing 
various actors. Writer and publicist Marina Kosteņecka reminds us that the house:
is a record of the past and should generate the past events to the younger 
generation reminding the nation’s history. This house is a vivid relict of 
the past and can attract more and give more unforgettable experience 
than reading books or watching a fi lm about the totalitarian regime. The 
most necessary are to preserve the guided tours which outweigh any 
cinema séance. ( Kaže-Zumberga 2014)
In the opinion of the politician and former Latvian Minister of Culture Ints Dālderis, all the 
memorials and projects associated with the occupation of Latvia and resistance movements 
should be situated right in the Corner House (Kaže-Zumberga 2014). The architect Pēteris 
Blūms also supports the argument of keeping the building for museum purposes:
The building cannot be blamed for the fate of the people. There are 
thousands of buildings built above the graves; people live in former 
churches, prisons, fortresses. There are many ways to deal with old 
maladaptation: one version - ignore, allow the testimony to shed; The 
second way is to paint it black and regularly remind yourself of old pain, 
pouring ashes into the hair; The third option is to paint the house white and 
say that no night, even a night of horror, can be darker than dawn. The Riga 
Corner House is a house that warns about the dangers of short historical 
memory. In fact, the Occupation Museum’s place is in the Corner House, 
because there are the occupying power and our fears. And this is the place 
to talk about truths and the right to be true. (Kaže-Zumberga 2014)
Interestingly, architect Kristaps Ģelzis has a vision that consolidates the ideas of both 
parties—The State Real Estate and the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia. His idea is 
that the fi rst fl oor and basement should remain as a museum, but the upper fl oors should 
be fi lled with various public organisations whose content and work are appropriate to the 
historical context of the home. The second suggested version is to cut the house in half:
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“On one side, the Corner 
House was a symbol of the 
well- being of the society in the 
fi rst decades of the twentieth 
century. On the other side, as 
a former KGB headquarters, 
it symbolises the totalitarian 
regime during the period of 
the Soviet occupation.”
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The bottom fl oor should be blocked with a concrete, so it could divide 
Corner House emotionally in two parts - the history stays down like a 
silent monument, but at the top, there is a hotel. ( Kaže-Zumberga 2014)
Another idea of Kristaps Ģelzis was to paint the house black, so that the grand black 
mass on the corner of Stabu and Brīvības Street would never allow anyone to forget the 
events of recent history:
I like the idea of painting the house black, which is the vision of architect 
Kristaps Ģelzis. However it would be necessary to leave the cameras 
and the execution rooms how they are, which is 10% of the entire house, 
entrepreneur, real estate developer. (Kas notiks ar stūra māju, 2014)
The Occupation Museum Association of Latvia’s resolution and 
the Faro Convention
It is important to also take into account the opinions of locals in order to have an open, 
democratic discussion about the house’s future. For this, it is necessary to refer to 
central aspects of the Faro Convention (Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage 
for Society). As the aim of the convention is to strengthen civil society and democracy 
by emphasising every person’s right to engage with the cultural heritage of their choice, 
it is necessary to discuss its advantages. Furthermore, the convention encourages 
communities to work together for the good of their shared cultural heritage (CETS No. 
199, 2005). Latvia joined this convention in 2006. For developing a future management 
plan for the Corner House, there are several important messages in the convention that 
should be taken into consideration. For example:
The Parties to this Convention agree to: recognise that rights relating to 
cultural heritage are inherent in the right to participate in cultural life, as 
defi ned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; recognise individual 
and collective responsibility towards cultural heritage; emphasise that 
the conservation of cultural heritage and its sustainable use have human 
development and quality of life as their goal (CETS 199, Section 1, Article 1, 2). 
According to the convention, “The Parties recognize that: everyone, alone or collectively, 
has the right to benefi t from the cultural heritage and to contribute towards its enrichment” 
(CETS 199, Section 1, Article 4, 2). Additionally, after the Faro Convention:
The Parties undertake to: recognise the public interest associated with 
elements of the cultural heritage in accordance with their importance to 
society; enhance the value of the cultural heritage through its identifi cation, 
study, interpretation, protection, conservation and presentation; foster 
an economic and social climate which supports participation in cultural 
heritage activities; promote cultural heritage protection as a central factor 
in the mutually supporting objectives of sustainable development, cultural 
diversity and contemporary creativity (CETS 199, Section 1, Article 5, 3).
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In discussing the future perspectives of the Corner House, the Occupation 
Museum Association of Latvia’s resolution on the former KGB house as 
authentic historical evidence and commemoration should also be taken 
into consideration. In the 2008 meeting of the museums association, the 
members agreed that before the State Real Estate takes over the building, 
it is necessary for the Latvian state institutions to take responsibility for 
the building’s future conditions, which means:
Careful research and documentation of the 
architectural, historical, archaeological, artistic and 
engineering works of the building before the restoration 
or reconstruction of the building; maintenance of 
authentic testimonies in the building; an opportunity 
for the public to get acquainted with evidence of the 
activities of USSR repressive institutions throughout 
the Soviet Union’s occupation; the opportunity for 
the public and, in particular, the victims of the USSR 
repression to express their plans for further use of the 
building’. (LOM Resolution 2008)
The Occupation Museum has fulfi lled the conditions put forth in the 
resolution, which includes the development of the interior into an 
exhibition area for educational purposes, as well as the “development 
of a concept for a permanent exhibition in the historical part of the 
building with its historical materials and experience” (Latvijas 
Okupācijas muzeja biedrības rezolūcija par bijušā Čekas nama kā 
autentiskas vēstures liecības un piemiņas saglabāšanu, 2008).
The resolution was submitted to the President of Latvia, the Culture 
and Science Commission, the government, the Ministry of Culture, 
the State Inspection on Heritage Protection, the Latvian Political 
Repressed Association, the Riga Political Repression Society, the 
Figure 2. Postcard 
of the Teter’s 
House from the 
fi rst decades 
of 20th century 
(Latvijas Nacionālā 
bibliotēka/ PD).
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Latvian UNESCO Commission, and other interested parties, as well as to the media. The 
resolution states that it is totally unacceptable that the building could lose its testimony 
value, which is so obvious in the interior, cellars, and courtyards.
The theoretical framework
Starting from broader concepts, it is fi rst necessary to clarify the theories of Ideology 
and Symbolism in the context of the site. Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures 
(1973) serves as one of the main references. The problem of Ideology and Symbolism 
arises when different meanings can be declared through one symbol. The symbols 
are variable: they stand for several meanings, which may be complementary but also 
repeated. The problem is due to a variety of meanings or one overwhelmingly strong 
meaning that has even left a mark in the history of a particular time period of the nation-
state. Going through the different periods of the Corner House’s history, two particular 
time periods are revealed to be remarkable, as they show contradicting meanings of this 
heritage. On one side, the Corner House was a symbol of the well-being of the society 
in the fi rst decades of twentieth century. On the other side, the building symbolises the 
repression of the totalitarian regime during the period of the Soviet occupation.
The recent reconstruction of the house in 2015, and the painting of the house in white 
in accordance with the original vision of the architect Aleksandrs Vanags, is an attempt 
to revert the house’s symbolic meaning for society and to attract future tenants. The 
symbolic conversion of the meaning of the house also becomes clear in the attempt to 
rename the Corner House to Teter’s House, which was the name of the fi rst building’s 
customers and also the fi rst name of the building, historically (Cielava, 2015). In the 
interviews of Kaže-Zumberga, the actors also stressed the necessity to show the contrast 
between the elegant façade of the building and the somber interior.
Similarly, David Lowenthal, in his book Heritage Crusade and Spoils of History (1999), 
discusses the links between heritage and history, trying to answer the question of how 
heritage changes the history. Lowenthal proposes three modes of answers: updating, 
upgrading, and excluding, which describe the stages of the attempts to change the 
history or to forget it. In the case of the Corner House, the three modes can be seen in 
discussing the future of the site. First is the mode of updating, which means “to update 
the past by garbing its scenes and actors in present-day guise” (Lowenthal 1999, p. 148). 
The process of updating is adding modern viewpoints or modern concepts to the past 
events or phenomena. In the case of intangible heritage, which is passed from one 
generation to another, it is obvious that the core of the tradition will stay but the visible 
part will most likely change within a particular time and space, whether it is a folk tale, 
dance, or a song. Much more problematic is discussing tangible heritage, which has 
often been physically modifi ed following various ideologies that governed society over 
time. However, the mode of updating can be seen within the discussions of the different 
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stakeholders, who are keen to keep up with the times and with modern demands whether 
its the fi nancial perspective of the State Real Estate or the cultural and political viewpoint 
of the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia and its supporters.
The second mode of upgrading means “to highlight and enhance aspects of the past [that] 
now felt admirable” (Lowenthal, 1999, p. 148). Lowenthal emphasises that “we use the 
heritage to improve the past, making it better by modern lights” (Lowenthal, 1999, p. 153). 
In the case of the Corner House, the idealisation of the past and the attempt to safeguard 
and keep the best of the heritage can be clearly seen in the desire to convert the house into 
a castle of well-being, recalling the early twentieth century. This is the perspective of State 
Real Estate, which is imagining a past that suits us better.
The third mode of how heritage changes the history is that of of excluding. It means, 
“To expunge what seems shameful or harmful by consigning it to ridicule or oblivion” 
(Lowenthal 1999, p. 156). This would be the case if the management plan of the site 
would not consider the museum’s perspective, turning the building into a residential 
building or place for various offi ces, or even a hotel. This mode stands for forgetting as 
forgiving. By going through all the three modes—updating, upgrading, and excluding—
the future perspectives of the house can be analysed more scrupulously.
Conclusions
The educational exhibition and the guided tours about the complex history of the house 
will terminate at the end of this year. At the moment, there are no publications or any 
media overview depicting the actual situation of the Corner House as one of the Latvian 
state cultural monuments of historical signifi cance. The divided opinions about what to 
do with the Corner House shows that there is still an urgent need to have a debate about 
the diffi cult past. In the last few years, the building’s façade has been reconstructed with 
the hope to attract new inhabitants or tenants; moreover, there is interest in offi cially 
renaming the Corner House to Teter’s House in order to avoid the symbolic pressure 
of the name as a relic of a totalitarian regime. However, it is not clear which person or 
organisation will take over the building in the future. So far, the house retains the veil 
of uncomfortable heritage, making it diffi cult to fi nd a long-term manager and fi nancial 
support for the house. There must be urgent discussions and debates, not only involving 
the authorities but also the local population. According to the resolution plan of the 
Occupation Museum Association of Latvia and the Faro Convention, the local population 
also has the right to express their opinion. Time is running out and there is still no future 
management plan for the house. After analysing the interviews of different actors and 
stakeholders, the most likely possible scenario will be neither tearing down the building 
nor converting the site to an object of dark tourism or painting it black. Most likely, the 
future perspectives of the two mentioned parties will be consolidated. There is hope that 
sooner or later, the State Joint Stock Company State Real Estate will fi nd a tenant and 
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respectively a fi nancial backer that would support the idea of reserving at least the fi rst two 
fl oors for the museum and educational exhibition purposes. In conclusion, in this case, 
the management plan should make sure not to ignore the details of the site’s history. It 
is urgently necessary to have in depth discussions about the signifi cance of the building, 
as well as its symbolism, various interpretations, and the nation’s historical memory. All 
in all, only time will show what will happen with Riga’s uncomfortable heritage.
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Introduction
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s statues have attracted protests in the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, and South Africa. In 2016, Ghana became the latest 
country to witness yet another protest against a statue of Gandhi, which was located 
on the campus of the University of Ghana, Legon. The university has about 38,000 
students, 1,200 teaching staff, and 200 non-teaching staff (Univeristy of Ghana, n.d). As 
of September 2016, nearly two thousand Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians signed an online 
petition to the University Council with the emphatic title, “Gandhi’s statue on University 
of Ghana must come down” (Online Petition, 2016). It became apparent that the fall of 
Gandhi had to be both physical and mental. The protest was led in the media and on the 
Internet, mainly by two university professors, Dr. Obadele Kambon and Professor Akosua 
Adomako Ampofo, both from the University’s Institute of African Studies (Kambon, 2016). 
The image of Gandhi was projected during the pre-independence struggles in Ghana 
as a proponent of nonviolence. Ghanaian nationalists borrowed the political strategy of 
nonviolence, which Ghandi was known for, from India (Addo – Fenning, 1972). The image 
of nonviolence associated with Gandhi was reinforced through fi lms and documentaries 
that the Indian Government sponsored in 1982 (Roy, 2014). These audio-visuals were 
shown on Ghanaian televisions, forming a mental picture of a pacifi st Hindu saint whose 
humanity transcended his Hindu upper caste system to the rest of the world. Scholarly 
discussions and quotes of Gandhi were used to affi rm statements in newspapers and 
Gandhi in Ghana
Saint or racist?
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articles (Roy, 2014). Thus, when professor Kambon and Adomako raised their objections 
to the erection of the statue, they were up against this saintly mental image. The claim 
that Gandhi was racist was a rude awakening for most signatories to the petition (Online 
Petition, 2016). The focus of this paper therefore examines the Gandhi statue in Ghana 
through the following three questions: What is the role of ideologies in the erection and 
eventual removal of the statue? What is the role of historical interpretation in infl uencing 
the ideologies? What is the best way to conserve the ideologically-contested statue? The 
third question seeks to analyse and avert diplomatic strain between both countries and 
peoples. The paper is organised in several sections, starting with a detailed description 
of the case study and an explanation of the theoretical framework used for analysis, and 
moving on to a discussion and conclusion.
Recognising that any attempt to venture into the social situation of heritage should 
take on the view that heritage is a living part of culture—an active social context, tied 
to the daily experiences of a living society (Andrew, 2009)—the author designed the 
methodology accordingly and tapped into various media sources surrounding the on-
going debate. The society in question engages in value creation and the interpretation, 
re-interpretation, and meaning-making of its past, present, and possible future. The past 
of the society itself is not homogenous, and it is highly unlikely that all members of the 
same society will agree on what the actual past was or should have been. Given this 
hydra-headed context, a qualitative methodological approach is preferable for the case 
study at hand.
The various aspects of Gandhi’s heritage, as well as the protests and counter protests, 
have left both digital and analogue footprints. These became a valuable resource in 
conducting this research. The analogue sources are mainly books, journals, and 
Gandhi’s autobiography, and these form the core of primary material for insights on 
his views. The digital ones include fi lms, documentaries, recorded media interviews, 
and online news publications and blogs. These are a mixture of primary and secondary 
materials. The digital sources provide direct access to what each individual and group 
think about Gandhi and the statue in Ghana. The reasons behind their viewpoints and 
the ideological stock they come from were analysed through the heritage dissonance 
theoretical framework (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996), as explained after the introduction 
of the case study.
Description of the statue and location
The events leading up to the erection and the unveiling suggest how important and saintly 
the statue was to the Indian government, Ghanaian state offi cials, and the University 
authorities. The Indian president, Hon. Pranab Mukherjee, unveiled Gandhi’s statue on 
13 June 2016 at the University of Ghana (UG) during his state visit to the country. The 
president’s body language conveyed reverence and respect towards the statue during 
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the unveiling ceremony. The statue was erected in a relatively new garden just a few 
days before his visit. The three-metre-tall statue is situated on a rectangular platform that 
is about three metres wide. Though the statue is new, it bears a photograph of Gandhi 
in his old age with a piece of cloth over his torso, and he is wearing a pair of shorts and 
sandals, holding a walking stick in his right hand, and is in a walking posture with his right 
foot put forward.
After playing active roles in India’s independence from the British, Gandhi died in 1948, 
the very year the University of Ghana (UG) was founded. However, apart from this 
coincidence, there is no personal association with the University or with Ghana as a 
country since it became a nation in 1957. The only connection that can be made is related 
to Gandhi’s activism and supposed non-violence philosophy, which resonated with 
Ghanaian nationalists. Ghanaian ex-service men made contact with the independence 
movement in India, for which Ghandi was a fi gurehead during the Second World War 
(Amenumey, 2008).
A closer look at the choice to place the statue in the garden also reveals interesting 
facts. The three-kilometre-wide campus has many gardens that date back to the 1950s. 
However, before 2002, the garden where the statue is now located was an ordinary piece 
of land that was used as a car park. Professor Asenso-Okyere, Vice Chancellor of the 
University of Ghana from 2002 to 2005, ordered that beautifying measures be carried out 
on the campus as part of his tangible achievements (Ghanaweb, 2005), and the garden 
was commissioned as part of these measures. His intention in creating the garden, 
however, was for it to be used as a recreational area for the university community, and not 
to showcase a statue of Gandhi. The main library of UG shares the southern boundary 
with the garden. The west side of the garden has buildings for the School of Business. 
The north and east sides have lecture halls and other faculties. Thus, the garden is 
an open air and accessible place that is frequently crossed by the people working and 
studying at the UG, and these people are constantly being confronted with the statue of 
Gandhi and the ideas it represents.
The Dissonance 
Though the protest against the statue was non-violent, the UG authorities mounted a 
twenty-four-hour guard around the statue. In spite of that, it was reported that part of the 
statue was defaced (Ghana Plus, 2017).
In response to this, the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the act and 
announced that the statue will be removed. The University council, reacting to demands 
from the petition, also confi rmed that the statue would be removed (UG Council, 2017). 
Despite these offi cial confi rmations, the statue continues to stand on UG’s campus, with 
agitation simmering in the background.
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The Ghanaian Gandhi must come down movement differs from the South African 
“Rhodes must fall” movement in the sense that it is led by professors, and it in turn has 
awakened the consciousness of the student body, and there is also the potential for it to 
develop into an international uproar between Ghana and India (Oquaye, 2016). In South 
Africa, on the other hand, the students’ mass movement began with agitation against 
high school fees. At some point the students connected issues of high fees to colonial 
oppression and racist policies, a modern-day slavery condition they were subjected to. 
They thus began to call for the removal of memorials to persons associated with the 
oppression of Africans, such as Cecil Rhodes.
In Ghana, the arguments against the statue from the petitioners also exuded an ethos 
of Pan-Africanism, the ideological bulwark that Africans all over the world used to fi ght 
against racism, colonialism, and imperialism. There is, however, a latent shade of 
imperialism that India is pursuing among the circle of developing countries in Africa, 
and it is also competing with China for African resources (Desai, 2015). This could 
have been a possible rationale for the Indian president to donate the statue of Gandhi 
to the University, as well as funds for some academic programmes. It is evident that 
the donation of the statue, its acceptance, and the protests against it are all based on 
different ideological tides.
A basic defi nition of heritage is that it is the aspect of nature or culture people intend to 
save for future generations (Howard, 2012). An understanding of heritage in Ghanaian 
society is captured by an Anlo proverb, which says it is at the end of the old ropes that 
new ones are woven (Dzobo, 1997). The proverb suggests a necessary continuation, not 
a selection of aspects from the past or present. It also makes room for something new 
to be added to the already existing heritage in question, but it does not qualify whether 
the new addition has to be an exact reproduction of the old. That notwithstanding, there 
is a sense of anticipation for the future in that actions and inactions in the present must 
be aimed at conserving heritage for the future. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the 
Ghanaian post-independence intention of using heritage to create a concept of African 
personality as an identity form, contrary to what African identity was understood to be by 
the colonial powers during the era of Transatlantic slavery and colonialism.
The universally-acclaimed Western thinker who codifi ed false assumptions about 
Africans was Lucien Lévy Bruhl (Kebede, 2004). His two books, Primitive Mentality and 
How Natives Think, drew a line of distinction between Western people and non- Western 
people. This distinction, presented as pseudo-science, also served as justifi cation 
for slavery, colonialism, and eurocentrism (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Africans, as part 
of the category of non-Western people, were projected as a racial group that lacked 
“rationality” and was incapable of explaining causal connections. From the portraits of the 
historical novel King Leopold’s Ghost, the African environment was revealed as a hostile 
environment in which the white race laid the foundation for slavery and colonialism. Bruhl 
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forgot to ask himself how African people could lack “rationality” but manage to survive in 
a hostile environment for centuries, or how it was possible for someone to be incapable 
of explaining causal connections while at the same time relying on river currents to carry 
his canoe (Henri Bergson, quoted in Kebede, 2004). Bolstered by racial pseudo-science 
and the dehumanisation of African peoples, Bruhl and his mileau advocated for moral 
and religious tutelage drawn along lines of colour and nationality: a moral imperative 
for white Europeans to supposedly save black Africans. Across the Atlantic Ocean, W. 
E.B Du Bois assembled harrowing sociological evidence of slavery in his book, Souls 
of Black Folk. At the same time, Du Bois’ book posed a seminal question: is the world 
correct, are Africans less than human (Awoonor, 2006)? This question fi rst prompted a 
counter-ideological response, and later, strategic political responses were used to fi ght 
against slavery, colonialism, and racism, both on African soil and in the diaspora.
The ideological response of people of African descent against inequality was grounded 
in Pan Africanism. To date, African scholars still grapple with a common defi nition of Pan 
Africanism. The nature, place, and time of the different cases of African suppression 
produced variants of Pan Africanism (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Given that the focus is on 
Gandhi’s statue in Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah’s view on Pan Africanism becomes relevant. 
Kwame Nkrumah was a Ghanaian nationalist who led the country to attain independence 
from the British in 1957.
Nkrumah was emphatic that the independence of Ghana was meaningless unless it 
was linked to the liberation of the rest of the African countries under colonialism. This 
declaration is born out of the understanding of Pan Africanist Marcus Garvey, conceived 
as ‘Africa for Africans’ (Botwe- Asamoah, 2005). For Nkrumah, that meant Africans must 
have political and economic control of African resources. But Nkrumah was fully aware 
that the battle had to be won at the cognitive level. He therefore built upon the concept 
of African personality fi rst espoused by one of the founding fathers of Pan Africanism, 
Edward Wilmot Blyden (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). In essence, the African Personality idea 
is a revival of intrinsic values in African culture, where Africans would derive their self-
worth from their own culture, and draw on practical lessons to solve their own problems 
(Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Among many other policy responses, the Institute of African 
Studies in UG was established to realise the objectives of the African Personality concept 
in 1965 (ibid). The philosophy of the Institute was to conduct research and teach for the 
“reconstruction of the minds of the African youth” (Awoonor, 2006, p. 217).
Beyond academic and philosophical responses, Nkrumah also used Ghanaian tangible 
heritage and architecture to express the ideals of African culture, self-determination, 
and identity (Hess, n.d). On the very day Ghana became independent, 6 March 1957, a 
national museum was opened. Artifacts from the continent of Africa, representing major 
African civilisations such as Egypt, Sudan, and Komaland, were exhibited (Anquandah, 
1997). The museum was housed in a round-shaped building of the type common to the 
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indigenous people of Talensi in northern Ghana (Kankpeyeng, 2009). It would appear 
that the driving purpose of the museum and the exhibition was to make a statement that 
Africans had a history and civilisation,and to emphasise the connectedness of African 
cultures and peoples. The new nation was therefore set on the path of economic growth. 
However, after nine years in power, Nkrumah was removed through a military take-over. 
The country was plunged into series after series of military coups d’état. Economic fortunes 
dwindled, which badly defl ated the self-confi dence Ghanaians had in 1957. When the 
last military government (PNDC) was preparing the country for civilian government, they 
embarked on a restoration of the Pan African image of Nkrumah and W.E.B Du Bois (Du 
Bois died in 1965 and was buried in Ghana) (Hess, n.d). The mortal remains of Nkrumah 
were brought from his natal home in 1992 and reinterred in the park in which he stood 
to declare the independence of Ghana (Hess, n.d). The park is now known as Kwame 
Nkrumah Memorial Park. The park also has a bronze statue of Nkrumah dressed like 
a Ghanaian chief with his right arm pointing forward, as if to echo one of his favourite 
slogans: “forward ever, backwards never”. Nevertheless, it would seem as if the symbolic 
restoration of Nkrumah’s image was to rejuvenate the self-confi dence of Ghanaians and 
move them towards the new phase of civilian government and economic prosperity.
A decade later, a longer-term economic and diplomatic cooperation between Ghana and 
India began to emerge. India awarded a grant to Ghana that was used to construct 
the new presidential facility in Accra, the capital city of Ghana (Oquaye, 2016). The 
diplomatic, political, and economic support from India is viewed as sub-imperialism 
along the same trajectories as super powers, such as the EU and the US, and the 
world fi nancial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Desai, 2015). Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa form the acronym BRICS. The BRICS countries have 
relatively stable economies, and developing countries in Africa have turned to them for 
economic support. Especially in the case of India and China, their presence in Africa is 
seen as a South-South cooperation that offers policy alternatives that would bring better 
economic yields to African countries. Contrary to new hopes of economic salvation from 
neo-liberal capitalists, BRICS promote economic dependency in Africa (Luce, 2015). 
BRICS is sponsoring huge infrastructure development in Africa, and African countries 
will have to endlessly be paying off loans. In some cases, African countries have to 
offer their resources as collateral for such loans. These conditions are similar to colonial 
conditions (Luce, 2015). These sub-imperialist tendencies are perceived as a form of 
cultural imperialism. The donation of Gandhi’s statue to Ghana would therefore be part 
of India’s cultural sub-imperialism.
The ideological confl ict surrounding Gandhi
There are various groups and nationals who have confl icting views on Gandhi. They 
can roughly be divided into four groups: in India, there are pro-Gandhi and anti-Gandhi 
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“ The case of Gandhi’s statue in 
Ghana is about personal dissonance 
between individuals who believe 
Gandhi was a saint, and those who 
believe he was a racist. It has gone 
beyond personal internal confl icts, and 
has moved into groups, Africans and 
Asians, nationals who are championing 
different ideological positions, with a 
real possibility of creating diplomatic 
diffi culties between nations.”
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groups; in Ghana, there were initially a pro- and an anti-Gandhi group. However, it can be 
deduced from the reasons provided by some signatories of the petition and from public 
debate that the anti-Gandhi group produced more evidence to back their arguments, 
and as a result, the pro-Gandhi group either became quiet or switched camp to the anti-
Gandhi group (Kambon, 2016).
The key to understanding different views on Gandhi in India lies in the nature of the 
caste system and how the Hindu religion or philosophy has been used to keep this 
system in place for thousands of years. Essentially, there are upper castes and lower 
castes. The lower castes have been called different names, such as untouchables, 
depressed classes, scheduled castes, Harijans, and servile classes (Ambedkar, 1945, 
p.7). Gandhi belonged to one of the upper castes, the Bania caste (Gandhi, n.d). The 
Hindu religious text regards the upper castes as pure and holy, whereas the lower castes 
are considered to be “inferior and therefore in charge of performing duties for upper 
castes (Roy, 2014, 2014b, time 7.59 sec). Gandhi believed the deplorable status quo of 
the lower caste should be maintained, even at the end of his life (Roy, 2014b, time:12 
minutes). Therefore, to those in the lower caste, whose members have been fi ghting for 
equality, Gandhi is not considered a hero or a saint.
Roy (2014) observes that the caste system in India and global capitalism have formed a 
deadly alliance in that the owners of the big corporations in India come from the upper 
caste Hindus. Gandhi’s caste, Banias, own media houses, mines, petrol and chemical 
industries, and universities. They also form the majority of employees within the judiciary 
system and and of moneylenders in rural India. Though Banias are in the minority, 
globalisation and capitalism have shifted political power and economic power to the 
minority. It would appear that the Gandhi statue in Ghana would therefore be supported 
by the Bainas, but certainly not by all Indians. This assumption is supported by the fact 
that a group of 21 people of Indian descent posted a Youtube video in support of the 
removal of the statue (AIDAGG, 2016). They described Gandhi as a racist and increased 
pressure on the UG authorities to remove the statue.
The online petition that was addressed to the UG council members mentions fi ve 
reasons why the statue should be removed (Online Petition, 2016). First, Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi’s racist views; second, there are currently no statues of Ghanaian 
heroes and heroines on the UG campus; third, racist symbols were being removed 
from major universities and UG must not be left out; fourth, there is a protest against 
Gandhi’s statues throughout the world; and fi fth, UG had not consulted stakeholders 
of the university before erecting the statue. Of all the fi ve reasons, it is the fi rst and 
second that are the strongest and that cut to the core of Pan Africanism and the African 
Personality ideology.
One of the key questions that was debated within the movement to take down 
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Gandhi’s statue is whether or not Gandhi was a racist. An examination of Gandhi’s own 
autobiography and other publications, some of which form part of the petition, show that 
Gandhi did not think of the black race as equal to Indians nor to Europeans (GandhiServe 
Foundation). It was the argumentation for this very equality that made Du Bois produce 
his book, Souls of Black Folk, and made African thinkers develop Pan Africanism and 
African Personality ideologies. The views of Gandhi on racism and the fact that his statue 
is now on a territory that had seen a lot of Pan African rhetoric only serves to roll back the 
progress or reset the conditions under which these ideologies sprung. The conditions can 
be considered in terms of the developing economic status of Ghana and the economic 
status of India. From Roy’s observation, the upper caste of India holds the economic 
power (2014a, 2014b). It would suggest the upper caste wants the statue to represent 
their image abroad, similar to how British colonial masters put their names and images 
on landmarks during the British imperial era.
Finally, the third and fourth reasons present a growing negative perception of Gandhi’s 
image across the world. These two reasons also mirror the third research question 
raised in the introduction of this paper. In 2010, Gandhi’s statue was shipped from India 
and erected on the University of Michigan-Flint campus to mark his birth and an annual 
peace day celebration in the community (AlHajal, 2010). Dr. Marigowda sponsored and 
funded the statue with the motive of instilling the image of Gandhi in the heart of the 
community and the USA (ibid). It is not clear whether Dr. Marigowda was a member of 
the upper caste in India, but it is clear he believed in the sainthood of Gandhi and put 
his efforts into projecting Gandhi’s ideals. However, it was not long before protests arose 
in Canada and in the USA itself. Like in Ghana, the protesters in North America insisted 
Gandhi was not the right person to serve as a symbol of peace and equality. Similar views 
have been expressed about Cecil Rhodes and Gandhi himself in South Africa and in the 
UK (Chaudhuri, 2016; Langa, 2017). Rhodes championed British imperial interest and 
endorsed imperialist and racist views, making him, like Gandhi, a historical personality 
that falls short when it comes to promoting a principle of equality for all humans. But the 
approach that the Oxford University authorities adopted to resolve the issue suggested 
a means to resolve and accommodate a similar issue to the case of Gandhi’s statue 
(Rawlinson, 2016). In Oxford, consultations were conducted that showed that a majority 
of locals supported keeping the statue, but providing context for it and interpreting it 
through a critical lens that shows all of its historical facets.
Theoretical Framework
The ideologies of Pan Africanism, African Personality, and Indian cultural sub-imperialism 
have become the confl icting forces encompassing the statue of Gandhi in Ghana. Indeed, 
the views of Gandhi on the black race in South Africa links Gandhi with Trans-Atlantic 
and colonial masters. These thorny issues coalesced into heritage dissonance theory 
(Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996). This theory was espoused in 1957 in social psychology 
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and was borrowed to explain confl ict-ridden issues that are ever-present in heritage 
studies (Festinger, 1957). The theory simply states that dissonance is a negative state 
of being that a person feels when that person’s actions contradict his or her beliefs or 
opinions (Aronson, 2008).
The theory is situated on three fundamental propositions. First, it states that all humans 
are sensitive to contradiction between action and beliefs. That contradiction comes 
through self-recognition each time an individual’s action is inconsistent with personal 
beliefs. Second, the self-awareness of contradiction would cause dissonance and the 
person would be motivated to resolve it. Third, dissonance would be resolved in three 
basic steps: (a) change belief, (b) change action (c) change perception of action.
Based on this theory, personal dissonance can be easily handled, but in relation to 
heritage, and especially in the case of Gandhi’s statue in Ghana, it is about the personal 
dissonance of those individuals who believe Gandhi was a saint and those who believe he 
was a racist. It has gone beyond personal internal confl icts and has moved into groups, 
Africans and Asians, and nationals who are championing different ideological positions, 
and there is a real possibility of creating diplomatic diffi culties between the nations.
Discussion and Conclusion
In response to the fi rst question posed in the introduction, different ideologies have played 
a role in the erection and possible removal of the statue. As has been described above, all 
the different ideological shades are supported by people who believe in them. Respective 
ideologies are the source of their identity and self-worth. For some, a certain ideology would 
perpetuate their economic power, while this instantly means that others would be exploited. 
The exploited, on the other hand, would not sit still without protest. In light of the dissonance 
theory, Hindu upper castes would not have a problem if statues of Gandhi were spread 
across the world and he was revered as a saint. It would give those associated or connected 
with Ghandi a respectable image and identity. The image of Gandhi would eternalise their 
power and reign over the lower castes, since according to the Hindu religion, the lower caste 
cannot change their position on the caste hierarchy. The lower caste, however, would in all 
probability detest the statue wherever it was erected.
In the same vein, Ghanaians who believe in Pan Africanism and African Personality as their 
only ideological redemption from over fi ve hundred years of slavery, colonialism, and racism, 
would not be happy to know about Gandhi’s views but would unanimously be in favour of the 
statue’s erection on Ghanaian soil. Even the ex-service men and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who 
possibly knew about his views, appeared to have borrowed a pragmatic political strategy from 
the Indian Independence movement in which Gandhi was a leading personality. Elements 
of non-violence that Gandhi was associated with could be found in Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s 
declaration of positive action in 1950, which was part of the process to achieve Ghanaian 
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independence from the British. At a much deeper level, Chaudhuri (2016) attempted to 
refocus the issues surrounding the Gandhi and Rhodes statues by establishing a link to 
institutional racism that is still present on university campuses today. Rhodes was one of the 
originators of institutional racism. He believed the Anglo-Saxon race was superior and should 
therefore colonise others. He went further to establish scholarship schemes on university 
campuses in South Africa, America, and Europe to support his views (Rhodes, 1902). The 
same point has also been eloquently analysed by Langa (2017). From the point of view of 
the lower caste in India, the crux of the matter is the deep-seated levels of inequality that the 
fi gures represent. With regard to Gandhi, the confl ict about his statue has spanned three 
continents. Since this is about heritage, it underscores the suggestion that dissonant heritage 
is universal (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996). However, the solutions to resolve such confl icts 
around heritage cannot be universal. Issues of dissonance are saturated with complexities 
and are very often contingent on how individual groups of people perceive their heritage and 
want to interpret it.
As in Oxford, there were consultations held to develop a better understanding of the opinions 
of stakeholders. From the report, the majority agreed for the statue to remain. This view is 
not surprising given the fact that Rhodes was British and his foundation still supports Oxford. 
As a sign of compromise, the committee chose to interpret the statue in context as a clear 
attempt to distance the university from Rhode’s controversial views. In the case of UG, there 
is no evidence of any form of consultation prior to the erection of Gandhi’s statue. Judging by 
the nearly two thousand people who signed the petition, it seems obvious that there was and 
still is less community support for the statue. Another potential approach that could be applied 
is interpreting Gandhi’s statue on the UG campus in a way that is similar to how Rhodes’ 
statue was handled in Oxford. This solution would also need to go through a community 
consultation and approval process. However, some of the petitioners are already dismissive 
of this solution (Kambon, 2016). They suggest, instead, that the statue be repatriated to 
India, specifi cally to the Bania community. For now, it seems to be the only place the statue 
can fi nd acceptance.
The goal of this paper has been to understand the role that ideology plays in heritage 
conservation. The clear answer to the research question is that ideology does signifi cantly 
infl uence how heritage objects are interpreted. The example of Gandhi’s statue shows 
that a single heritage object can mean different things to different people. There is also an 
overwhelming undercurrent of economic survival and political power wrangling that can be 
connected to just a single heritage property. It is in this regard that all heritage must be 
considered in its contemporary context. That is to say, a heritage item may belong to the 
past, but it is essential to fi rst think of what the contemporary societies think of it before 
it is interpreted or displayed. Howard (2003) stressed the importance of this aspect of 
heritage work when he indicated that as a basic principle, a heritage manager must seek 
the disinherited. The disinherited could be those who disagree or are confl icted about the 
heritage in question.
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Certainly, the contemporary students and lecturers in Ghana would want to conserve heritage 
for future generations. If they are in favour of keeping and maintaining Gandhi’s statue, this 
could mean entrenching India’s sub-imperialism and the continuation of upper caste privilege. 
However, since equality principles that emerged from the Pan Africanism movement form 
part of the moral value system of the contemporary society, the majority of Ghanaians would 
most defi nitely engage in actions that would remove the symbols representing inequality. 
The best way to conserve the statue would be to seek a community where it would be 
accepted, and in this case it would be in India.
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Introduction
Germany has a past that for whatever reason will not pass away. The 
Nazi past has been seen by German politicians and theorists as an 
ineluctable burden, one beset by and working through the mystical force 
of taboo (Olick, 1997, p.921)
However, as inescapable as this unwanted inheritance may be to modern Germans, 
the historic and forceful taboo of the Nazi spell has had a powerful effect in shaping 
the modern identity of the nation that arose from the ashes to become a model society 
for the twenty-fi rst century and a beacon of freedom in the world. Since the creation 
of the German state, historians have talked about a German Sonderweg, meaning a 
special or separate path diverging from the Western historical norm. Originally, the term 
had positive connotations, indicating that Germany stood as a stable polity in relation 
to neighbours like France, which succumbed to revolutions and political upheaval 
throughout the nineteenth century. In the post-war period, this sense of Sonderweg has 
come to mean something different; it now indicates that the German identity must be 
continually regarded as “a patient in therapy” by its own people (Maier, 1988, p.101). A 
very thin margin is therefore left for a negotiation with its past.
The history of this turbulent time is engraved in the essence of a country that has chosen 
to prudently remember, while callously ignoring the imprint. Modern Germany seeks 
to replace its misrepresentative historic façade with one of a more suitable heritage 
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that refl ects the reality of a new era, a goal which erupts out of tragedy to create a 
collective memory that reconciles the nation with its history. Within this struggle to rebuild 
a shattered historic legacy, the remaining monuments of the National Socialist period 
defi antly keep getting in the picture of charming cities such as Nuremberg in Bavaria. 
Here, the carcasses and monolithic remnants of the depravation of nationalism are 
allowed to stand as resonant witnesses to the undesirable memory that Germany does 
not allow itself to forget. At the same time, however, they are heritage sites that few to 
no citizens of Nuremberg will call their own. The Nazi Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg 
have an inherent association with the crimes perpetrated by the National Socialist 
regime against humanity (Macdonald, 2009a). This was the place where this virulent 
and deadly ideology was broadcast to the world, and where the Holocaust was heralded 
in by the Party leaders in massive gatherings of the perpetrators. In other words, one 
cannot dissociate the most evident surviving site of this ideology’s legacy with the horror 
and trail of death left by this regime’s internment camps. It is this precise situation that 
creates the diffi cult task for the German government and public to agree upon a morally-
fi tting approach for the preservation and presentation of the place (Macdonald, 2009b).
The following case study explores this subject through the lens of the fi eld of studies termed 
diffi cult heritage, which theorises about how to deal with sites of historical importance 
whose shameful past blurs the understanding of the need for its conservation (Burström 
& Gelderblom, 2011). Conversely, the paper will seek to present an understanding of 
how Germany deals with this diffi cult heritage site from the perspective of the collective 
memory and new national identity it attempts to forge out of it.
Diffi cult heritage
There is a composite word in the German language that was crafted to subsume in itself 
a meaning for the attempt to adjust, examine, and learn to cope with the past, particularly 
the diffi  cult past of the National Socialist period; the word is Vergangenheitsbewältigung. 
Within Germany, there is a serious effort to learn about the past as a means to never 
allow it to be repeated. The term is usually used to describe the general compromise 
as well as the concrete responsibility of the state and society in general to create a 
comprehensive understanding of this past as a means to overcome it. However, the 
concept fails to describe how this could be achieved.
In relation to the Nuremberg Nazi Party Rally grounds, a question then emerges: should 
the remains be left to abandonment and neglect because of its origins? This question of 
how a national community deals with the remnants of a past that is currently despised 
forms the core of the concept we understand as diffi cult heritage. It is this uncomfortable 
situation that leads to the search for a rightful and truthful way to handle a historical 
monument or memory. When a historical site presents itself as a political liability due to 
its disgraceful origin, designating it an offi cial cultural heritage site and grating access to 
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the public can be a cause for concern. Nevertheless, in special cases, 
such as the Party Rally Grounds, there exists a historic necessity to 
preserve these monuments for posterity as protected memorials. On 
the other hand, the interests and sentiments of local residents should 
also be taken into consideration, as this heritage is primarily their own. 
Another important aspect to consider is the degree of responsibility that 
the public administration should have when regulating the presentation 
of the site to the public. In essence, these are all the features placed 
under the label of diffi  cult heritage that play a role in the discussion of 
sites such as the case study that is the focus of this paper (Burström & 
Gelderblom, 2011).
Description of the site
Nuremberg is a beautiful German city located in the scenic Bavarian 
region. The city is home to a little over 500,000 people and is situated 
along the Pegnitz River, which divides its old town into two districts.
Although more than 90% of its buildings were destroyed by bombs 
during the Second World War, its Old Town has been rebuilt according 
to the original prints and it is still surrounded by a medieval wall with 
its four towers and main gates. Nuremberg was chosen by Hitler to 
be the place for his Party Rallies due to its historical signifi cance as 
an imperial city, going as far as to call it, “The most German city in 
Germany” (Macdonald, 2009a). Between 1927 and 1938, hundreds of 
thousands of militants and sympathisers periodically fl ocked to the city 
to take part in elaborate parades and massive rallies. The sad legacy 
Figure 1. The 
Grandstand 2017, 
Zeppelin tribune 
(Barrientos, 2017).
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of those days sparks an interest in many who come to the city to explore the places that 
still stand as a reminder of the grandiosity and megalomania of this regime (Macdonald, 
2006a).
The huge complex of Nazi structures can be found just outside of the city centre, about 
four kilometers southeast of the Old Town between the fairgrounds and the Dutzendteich 
Lake. There, visitors can see the large Zeppelin fi eld with its enormous tribune inspired 
by the Altar of Pergamum and the Coliseum, designed by architect Albert Speer (Fig 1). 
The esplanade for rallies is a large space presided over by a broad stone tribune and 
staircase with a pulpit in its center. It was from this pulplit that the Führer addressed the 
250 thousand people who attended this gathering annually between 1933 and 1938. 
Close to the esplanade lies a monumental semicircular construction intended to be 
the Congress Center, which is reminiscent of the Roman Coliseum. The building was 
never completed, but nevertheless its remains stand as a massive example of fascist 
architecture (Hagen & Ostergren, 2006). During the war, after the French campaign in 
1940, the Nazis employed enslaved prisoners of war for its construction (Puvogel et 
al., 1996). Enormous quantities of granite from 80 different quarries were extracted and 
brought to Nuremberg by these concentration camp prisoners who were worked to death 
in order to supply materials for the Nazi building program in the city. When the war 
entered its course towards the end of 1942, the construction process was slowed down, 
but works were still being carried out up until March of 1945 (Dietzfelbinger & Liedtke, 
2004).
Between 1939 and 1945, the old barracks for the SA (Sturmabteilung) and the 
accommodations for the Hitler Youth were transformed into internment camps for 
the forced labourers and prisoners of war, who were liberated in mid-April 1945 by 
American forces. On 20 April 1945, after fi erce resistance, the city of Nuremberg was 
fi nally captured (Macdonald, 2009a). Three days later, a victory parade was held on the 
grounds of the Zeppelin fi eld. Not long thereafter, the famous Swastika at the top of the 
tribune was blown up, a moment that was recorded for history in iconic footage that has 
come to symbolise the fi nal defeat of Nazism. After the war ended, the internment camps 
were used to hold Nazi Party leaders and SS (Schutzstaffel) members captured by the 
Americans (Nürnberg, M. Documentation Center).
The Documentation Center, which includes an archive, museum, and research area, 
was developed within the unfi nished Congress Hall. It is here that the permanent 
exhibition, Fascination and Terror, is displayed. In 2001, the city of Nuremberg unveiled 
the permanent exhibition, which is concerned with the causes, the Hitlerian cult, and the 
consequences of National Socialism in Germany (Nürnberg, M. Documentation Center). 
Through this, Nuremberg makes amends with its past as a fi nal way to overcome and 
condemn this dark episode (Macdonald, 2006b).
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Ideological symbolism
Ever since the construction of the monuments and the subsequent vanquishing of 
the Third Reich, there has been speculation about the symbolic power projected by 
the architecture of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds. Can architecture have an ideology? 
(The Wall Street Journal, 2013) Indeed, there is a collective opinion that some historic 
guilt is being reserved for the structures that served as a stage for the crimes. These 
monuments have retained an unbreakable association with their origins, as they are 
considered a kind of receptacle that remained polluted after containing the essence of all 
that represented the regime. They were designed to do just that.
Since its conception in the minds of Albert Speer and Adolf Hitler himself, the strokes 
that delineated the grounds and edifi cations were conceived to be a materialisation of 
the fascist ideology. To Hitler and the National Socialists, the buildings themselves were 
symbols of the Germanic identity being forged. This creationist vision placed Nuremberg 
at the epicenter of this process, and the Rally Grounds were to be the cradle for the 
rebirth of the nation. “We are erecting”, Hitler said, “the shrines and symbols of a new 
and noble culture” (Taylor, 1974, p.14).
To provide an example of how the design holds the archetypes of the ideology, one only 
needs to understand how they manifest themselves even in the smallest of details. The 
researcher Birkholz (2015) takes a close look at the composition of the Great Road 
(Große Straße) on the Rally Grounds in her paper Granite on the Ground: Former Nazi 
Party Rally Grounds. She describes how the whole concept and design of the road was 
meant to have a powerful symbolic effect, from the location and direction of the road 
down to the material used for the pavement and the technique used for placing it. The 
sixty-meter-wide and two-kilometer-long pathway leads from the heart of the Imperial 
Castle in Nuremberg, which was a seat to the medieval German Emperors, to Hitler’s 
Luitpoldarena in the Rally Grounds. The Luitpoldarena was one of the holy spaces in 
the National Socialist cult, where the highly symbolic ceremony of the consecration of 
fl ags by the Blood Flag took place. The general concept behind the placement of the 
Great Road was to create a symbolic link between the historic First Reich and the new 
Third Reich, thus serving as a legitimising physical display for the ideology of National 
Socialism. The road was built using 60,000 massive (40kg), handcrafted granite slabs. 
They were crafted using a special technique for sharpening the edges that allowed for 
a particularly fl at and homogenous surface. The design therefore also created in the 
stonework an acoustic amplifi er for the thunderous sounds of the Prussian Goose-step 
of the troops.
On the other hand, granite is an expensive construction material that was chosen because 
of its high durability and its properties, as it has been associated since antiquity with the 
monuments deemed to last for eternity. If the Reich was to last a thousand years, its 
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legacy in stone was to be a refl ection of the National Socialist epoch for generations 
to come. “Our architectural works”, said Speer, “should speak to the conscience of a 
future Germany” (Speer, 1969, p.77). However, it was Speer himself who would later, 
in his own memoirs, refuse to acknowledge that his architecture was impregnated 
with the ideology he pretended to preserve for posterity. He claims that architecture 
is incapable of transmitting specifi c meanings because it is not a language in itself, 
therefore it cannot convey an ideology. This represents a reversal from the idea that 
his architecture would be corresponding to “words in stone” speaking to the centuries. 
Speer claims that architecture is essentially art, and thus it has no political connotation 
within it. It can be employed only as an “enhancing” tool for the political ideology; being 
a mere instrument of “aestheticisation”, it cannot be considered a direct vehicle for the 
transmission of the political ideas of those who built it (Macdonald, 2009a, p.28). The 
controversial architectural theorist Leon Krier seems to agree with this: “I think it is really 
great architecture”, he stated, referring to the Nazi Rally Grounds in Nuremberg during a 
conference at Yale University, “you take off the swastikas, and you can admire it without 
feeling guilty” (The Wall Street Journal, 2013).
However, despite Speer’s attempt at rehabilitating his architecture in Nuremberg, the 
purpose behind the design remains loud and defi ant, attesting the original political 
intention of infusing it with the National Socialist ideology. In her research, Birkholz 
(2015, p.11) asks herself, when referring to the Great Road, “what makes a pavement 
design in the broadest sense political?” The answer to her question is to point out all the 
components that make up the architecture of this site: the structures, the size, and the 
design. She concludes that “there is no fascist granite, but there is an arrangement which 
mirrors fascist ideals” (Birkholz, 2015, p. 11).
Present state
A fi eld visit to the location of the surviving structures around the Dutzendteich Lake 
allows the visitor to undertake a rather inconclusive historical wandering after visiting the 
Documentation Center. Those who embark on the educational journey propelled by the 
museum are confronted with a disturbance in the nature of the historical vestiges of the 
park. Far from being a “somber memorial” or an archaeological site of modern remains, 
it is a set of structures abandoned to the elements and surrounded by sports facilities 
(Fig 2). Some baffl ed visitors from Spain were appalled by the state of the structures 
and wondered why there would be an American Football team holding their practices 
in the middle of the historic Zeppelin fi eld. They claimed that this robbed the visitor of 
the experience of being immersed in the meaning of a place that should be reserved 
for refl ection (Interview in June 2017). A sign on a wall leading up the stairs towards the 
Zeppelin Tribune Grandstand warns the visitors of the perils of moving forward due to the 
risk of the unstable structure. It was from this place that the powerful rants that changed 
the course of human history were delivered. Now it stands as a crumbling ruin, used to 
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“The legacy of the dark 
period is the backbone of 
a modern historical façade 
that cannot be renounced, 
however, it is cast apart in 
the hopes that the world 
stops staring at this scar.”
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store the tires and equipment for the car races that periodically take 
place on the site.
The irony is not lost on the sightseer, of course. It is an odd destiny that 
befell this place that was once consecrated as the beating heart of a 
tyrannical empire, as it is now a recreational area used to practice the 
national sport of America. However, the irony goes beyond this and into 
the weeds growing on the staircases of the stadium and the crackling 
slabs of marble in the towers. After a mere 70 years of existence, 
the decaying ruins are not able to withstand the trials of time. This is 
despite the fact that the structures were conceived by Albert Speer to 
be megalithic structures that would remain imposing for all eternity, 
even as ruins (Speer, 1969). He explained this in his memoirs when 
recalling the ideas for the design of the future site. Speer tells of how 
Hitler was determined in his vision to create a physical legacy for future 
generations of Germans, an inheritance on par with the monumental 
heirlooms left by the Roman Emperors that Mussolini and the Italian 
fascists could link back to. The architect of the Reich proposed using 
durable materials and techniques in what he later would call the “Theory 
of Ruin Value” (1969). This concept was allegedly fi rst employed in the 
construction of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg and would 
allow the structures to retain their integrity without facing signifi cant 
decay, even as ruins. However, by 1967 parts of the Zeppelin Tribune 
had already become a hazard for visitors because of instability and had 
to be demolished (Macdonald, 2006b). This failure to last even a short 
Figure 2. 
Deteriorating 
structures still 
standing at the Rally 
Grounds, 
Nuremberg. 
(Barrientos, 2017)
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span of time was perhaps the result of the short deadlines for the construction given to 
Speer by the organisers of the Party Rally. As he mentions in his memoirs, in the case 
of the Zeppelin Tribune, he was pressed to fi nish the works hastily and with low-quality 
materials.
Nevertheless, the damage from time and neglect is a predominating sight throughout the 
surviving structures at the Rally Grounds. The cracks on the monuments are a constant 
reminder to visitors that this is not a cherished memorial that is being preserved for 
the awe of the tourists who fl ock every year to see them. The museum and site are 
visited by tourists as well as by students and researchers by the thousands, moved 
either by their historical curiosity or by the morbid fascination it inspires (Fig 3). Many 
seek to understand the events that led to the Holocaust or just to have a glimpse into 
this gloomy period (Macdonald, 2006a). According to the Documentation Center, since 
it was opened in 2001 the Nazi Rally Party Grounds have hosted more than 1.2 million 
visitors (Nürnberg, M. Documentation Center). The place is indeed a historical site of 
great importance for many people beyond the borders of Germany. As was pointed out 
by an American visitor, this is a heritage site that has transcended national boundaries 
to belong to all of humanity because of the signifi cant events that derived from what 
happened there (Interview in June 2017). But can this diffi cult heritage be sequestered 
from the people who actually live in Nuremberg?
New German identity
Societies that have evolved from tragedy in the way that Germany has usually have a 
complicated approach to dealing with history (Alexander, 2010). Their history emerged 
from the ruins of trauma. The shock of Stunde Null (hour zero) had to be suppressed 
in the face of a reality that demanded a resilient reaction from the survivors. The hour 
zero was the silent moment of reckoning that sent millions into a distressful realisation 
that a new world was about to be unleashed upon them. But after this harrowing and 
cathartic experience, what was to become of the old world? How can the material relics 
from the past be absorbed without challenging the foundations of the reconstructed 
present? Times of historical upheaval and transcendence are the origins of what Pierre 
Nora calls Lieux de memoire, or sites of memory, created in the imagery of the people 
surrounding the material legacy that keeps those events alive. These are “sites where 
memory crystallises and secretes itself from a particular historical moment” (Nora, 1989, 
p. 7). This concept of a site of memory then exists inherently in a physical structure when 
the footprint of a historical happening engulfs it without the possibility of dissociation. 
However, this identity has to be consciously and subconsciously agreed upon by the 
community in which the place stands. For the people of Nuremberg and the rest of the 
world, the Nazi Party Rally Grounds are without a doubt a place of historical memory. To 
the Germans, however, this particular memory is intertwined with the traumatic imprint 
left on their collective memory by the shock of Stunde Null.
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Figure 3. Tourist 
read the information 
slabs at the 
Zeppelin Tribune. 
(Barrientos 2017)
This turning point in the nation’s history is, for them, the focus of solemn 
historical refl ection and the impetus for pondering about the past and 
the future. It was a thundering shake-up of the whole structure of the 
nation, which uprooted the base and turned over its self-image. After 
this moment of purging, the shattered identity had to be rebuilt using 
new bricks for its construction in order not to recreate the now despised 
pathway that led to the catastrophe of hour zero. Within the creation 
of this new self-image, questions regarding the material legacy of the 
past eventually began emerging. In the case of the Rally Grounds, 
the question of what to do with the place was more urgent, since the 
sheer size of the monuments and the strong association with the past 
made it impossible for Nuremberg to ignore them. The emergence of 
a new Germany demanded an assimilation of the past (with a cautious 
interpretation) into what remained of it.
“Collective memory like an autobiography must seem our own” 
(Lowenthal, 2015, p. 503). For post-war Germany, the arrival of a new 
era meant a rebirth of an identity. A revision of the past was at hand, 
and there was a clear need to present a different face to the world, 
one that acknowledged a diffi cult heritage that was being overcome 
with a reconstructed collective memory. In this new collective memory, 
the past is a distant stranger that the present has divorced, and its 
traces are treated like a cured disease that must be advertised against 
in order to avoid contracting it again. The best approach has been 
decided to be callous distance with a strong component of educational 
guidance that allows the past to be fully understood but never fl irted 
with. In this sense, all the associations of glory with this period of 
empire and conquest had to be removed from the remains if they 
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were to be preserved. This heritage was not to be highlighted, it 
was to be excluded and overwritten with the shame of the crimes it 
inspired (Lowenthal, 1998). The way Nuremberg dealt with this task 
was to inaugurate the permanent exhibition Fascination and Terror in 
the Documentation Center in the Congress Hall building in 2001. In 
this exhibition, the visitor can take a stroll through the history of the 
National Socialist period. The origins of the ideology are discussed 
within the context of understanding what led the German society of 
the time to be fascinated by the tenets of a voracious ideology that 
completely devoured the essence of a generation. It also details the 
crimes perpetrated in the name of the nation and the dire consequences 
of the war upon the people of Germany, especially through the videos 
of personal accounts being related by actual survivors. In regard to 
the structures themselves, Nuremberg has decided upon another 
approach for engaging with this diffi cult heritage, which they call 
Profanierung. This approach strips the monuments of any signifi cance 
its builder intended. 
Profanation
As mentioned before, the foreign visitor to the Rally Grounds is often 
startled to learn that there is an apparent indifference shown towards the 
upkeep of the structures and the site by the administrative authorities. 
A lack of any visible form of maintenance is not the only kind of neglect 
the guest notices upon exploration of the Grounds. There is also a 
disconnect between the educational and historical experiences at the 
Documentation Center, with the secular or dissonant use given to the 
areas by the citizens and the city of Nuremberg. This is not, however, a 
Figure 4. The Rally 
grounds re today a 
recreational area 
for the citizens 
of Nuremberg 
(Barrientos 2017).
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random act of unfounded contempt on the part of the authorities towards this protected site. 
It is the result of a deliberate and premeditated policy that was put forth in the 1980s by 
the city’s culture minister, the renowned social historian Dr. Hermann Glaser. This strategy 
for dealing with the Nazi heritage consists of profaning it with banal or everyday activities, 
which is therefore simply referred to as Profanierung or profanation (Macdonald, 2009a). 
Although this term has been employed since the 1980s to describe the banal interactions 
between the citizens of Nuremberg and their site of diffi cult heritage, the practice certainly 
precedes it. The exhibition at the Documentation Center provides evidence of all kinds 
of profane activities being encouraged at the site, not only as a means of demystifying 
and stripping the ruins of their ritualistic associations, but also simply to make practical 
use of those spaces. Before the land around the Dutzendteich Lake was taken over 
by the Nazis, the whole area had been a recreational space enjoyed by the families of 
Nuremberg since the late nineteenth century. The land was the venue for a park around 
the lake with a public bathhouse and even a Zoo (Information Stations, Documentation 
Center, Nuremberg). Hence, the population felt it was, in a way, a civic duty and an act of 
reassertion to take back the Grounds and return them to the state they were in before the 
days of the Reichsparteitag. In a way, the profanation of the legacy of the Rally Grounds 
has been, for the local citizens, a Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or a strategy for coping with 
the past (Fig 4).
Conclusion
“Remembering great evil saddles descendants with ancestral guilt”, said David 
Lowenthal (2015, p. 544). This assertion couldn’t be more truthful and close to the 
German consciousness, as, history still casts a shadow upon the modern nation today. 
This shadow, however, is mostly cast by the German’s own sense of guilt and the 
collective self-imposed atonement. A desire to forget coexists in Germany with a zeal 
to commemorate the victims of the crimes of the perpetrators (Lowenthal, 1985). The 
legacy of the dark period is the backbone of a modern historical façade that cannot be 
renounced, but it is still cast apart in the hopes that the world will stop staring at this 
scar. It is this past that shaped the present ideology that the nation embraces, including 
its state policies and educational agenda. Nevertheless, it is engraved in the modern 
ideological arrangement of the new national identity that this past is to be set apart as a 
despised memory of an unspeakable time. The contrasting views often inspire opposing 
reactions to the preservation of sites of memory like the Nazi Party Rally Grounds in 
Nuremberg. Some are of the view that if the present is to be remade, the past must also 
be reimagined, and therefore the remnants should be altered (i.e. erased) (Lowenthal, 
1985). But cleansing Nuremberg’s past by demolishing the monuments would constitute 
a terrible crime against the memory of the nation and also against the common shared 
history of humanity. Nuremberg understands this despite its citizens’ contempt towards 
this permanent reminder of an unwanted past. They have learned to overcome it with a 
stronger identity that spans centuries before the period that those structures represent. 
Analysis of a Diffi cult Heritage from an Ideology of Violence | 165
The city of Nuremberg is determined to restore its image as the cradle for the idealised 
Germanic civilisation of yore, while also accepting their duty to create space (a museum) 
devoted to educating the world about the evils of the National Socialist legacy.
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Estibaliz Sienra Iracheta
The Valley of the Fallen
Confl icts with ideology, collective 
memory, and the conservation of 
heritage
Introduction
The landscape at the Valle de los Caídos, or Valley of the Fallen, is dominated by an 
imposing concrete cross—the biggest Catholic cross in the world—which can be seen from 
32 kilometres away, protruding with its 152 meters over the forests of the Cuelgamuros 
Valley in the Sierra de Guadarrama, near Madrid, Spain (Fig.1). Considered as Spain’s 
third most visited site (ABC, 2015) the monumental ensemble is comprised of a Catholic 
basilica, a Benedictine abbey, and a memorial.
However, almost 60 years after its construction—and 40 years after the death of its 
creator—what could at fi rst be considered an innocuous example of Spanish cultural 
heritage remains a central subject of national discomfort among the majority of the 
population. Fuelled by confl icting positions and intense discussions involving the civil 
society and members of the academic and political world, the Valley of the Fallen has 
become a recurrent topic of national and international debates regarding the conservation 
and interpretation of cultural heritage. The popular landmark, visited by over 254,059 
people a year, is currently considered “the only monument of exaltation of fascism that 
remains in Europe” (Robledo, 2010).
Through an extensive analysis of news reports and articles, as well as specialised 
literature, this case study aims to present and examine the major focal points for 
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gaining a holistic understanding of different aspects of heritage and 
their relationship with ideologies and the construction of collective 
memory. Furthermore, this essay will describe the social and political 
implications of a prominent landmark in a country that, unlike Germany 
or Italy, transitioned from a totalitarian dictatorship into a democracy 
through pacifi c means. The current controversies that have arisen and 
the possibilities that have been considered to fi nd a general consensus 
are also presented.
Background
The turn of the twentieth century was characterised by a generalised 
sense of social unrest. Led by the major cultural and philosophical 
transformations of the fi n-de-siècle, the fallout from the First World 
War, and the intensifi ed economic hardships of the Great Depression 
(Payne, 1995), the beginning of the Epoch was marked by major socio-
political and economic changes that altered world orders and further 
divided society and politics into divergent ideological factions. These 
tumultuous conceptual stances, growing simultaneously in opposition 
and strength, began to permeate the cultural systems and emphasise 
a sense of turmoil.
By 1905, the world had seen the rise of communism and socialism 
as major political ideologies, which directed workers against the 
bourgeoisie, capitalism, and all of its perceived threats. The Russian 
Revolution culminated with the abdication of the Czar and the end of 
centuries of imperial rule in the country. With the later formation of 
Figure 1. Aerial 
view of the Valley 
of the Fallen 
(Diaz 2012 / CC 
BY-SA 3.0).
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the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922, these ideologies would begin to be 
perceived as a major threat to European powers and the economic and socio-political 
conventions of the West.
The international preamble to disaster had also driven the world into a major catastrophic 
confl ict. Known as the Great War, the transnational confrontation concluded in 1918 with 
the downfall of some of the major powers in Europe (the German Empire, the Austria- 
Hungary Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria). The 
dynastic principles of rule—which had shaped European politics over millennia—collapsed 
and were replaced by the ideals of democracy and of popular sovereignty (Snyder, 2011).
The overall instability of the new political systems, worsened by the harsh effects of the 
economic recession of 1920 and the generalised discontent with what the First World War 
had infl icted upon the defeated, began to exacerbate social dissatisfaction. The growing 
discontent led to the rise of Fascism in Italy, of Salazarism in Portugal, and of National 
Socialism in Germany. The increased global tensions and the confl icting political and social 
ideologies that divided Europe and its main powers began to spread around the world. By 
1931, Spain had been equally radicalised and divided into different factions. These groups, 
known as the Republicans and the Nationalists, would ultimately steer the country into a 
Civil War. This was also the preface to what would, eight years later, become the biggest 
and most destructive War in all of recorded human history (Snyder, 2011).
Ideologies leading to war
Over the past decades, historians have described the Spanish Civil War as “a struggle 
between leftist revolution and rightist counter-revolution” (Payne, 2012, p. 231), as the 
fi ghting groups had different interests and dissimilar ideological dimensions that could 
be conveniently paired into the opposing political spectrums. The confl icting factions can 
be separated as follows:
The Republicans—pejoratively referred to as leftists or the reds—were formed by the 
Popular Front, which was in turn was formed by the coalition of republican parties: the 
Republican Left and the Republican Union. The alliance was also supported by the 
Spanish Socialist Labour Party, the Marxist-Leninists of the Communist Party of Spain, 
the Marxist Unifi cation Labour Party, the Syndicalist Party, the Catalonia Left Nationalists, 
and the Nationalist Basque Party, all of which had communist, socialist, or anarchic 
origins. The Republicans were also supported by several groups and civilian and trade 
union leaders, who at the time were fi ghting for the labour movement and looking for 
social revolution in Spain. Altogether, the group’s main objective was to replace the 
monarchical and religious systems in an attempt to modernise the country and overthrow 
centuries of conservative rule in Spain.
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On the other hand, the Nationalists, referred to as the right counter-revolutionaries, 
and also known as rightists or fascists, were sustained by a group of high military 
commanders, in coalition with the fascist Spanish Falange (Phalanx) and the Carlists, a 
monarchical-religious group who was fi ghting against the advances of liberalism in Spain. 
Furthermore, the Nationalist faction was also supported by monarchical, religious, and 
conservative groups, as well as innumerable civilians, who feared, amongst other things, 
religious persecution, the destruction of their religious convictions, and the communist 
ideals of ‘proletarian revolution’, which would have threatened their social and economic 
positions (Payne, 2012).
This concoction of dissimilar political ideologies began to affect innumerable facets of 
Spanish cultural and social life. The governmental and social systems began to fracture, 
issues arose among social classes, religious supporters began to divide, and political 
antagonism grew. These aggravated ideological positions encouraged a radicalised view 
on reality, and thus the contest between opposing notions, such as dictatorship versus 
democracy, revolution versus counterrevolution, and fascism versus communism, 
commenced (Juliá , 1999).
In April 1931, the Spanish Second Republic was proclaimed by the Republican coalition 
after a democratic election. But after four years of destabilisation and governmental 
changes, which had been worsened by political persecution and crimes against the 
conservative opposition, a proclamation was made by the board of Nationalist generals 
against the Popular Front. The pronunciamento, published on 17 July 1936, turned 
into a coup. The failed attempt to take over the government was met with hostility from 
organised civil Republican militias (Payne, 2012), and thus a civil war erupted.
The confl ict, which had been characterised by strong international ideological components 
from the beginning, quickly intensifi ed and had immediate responses from all of the major 
powers of Europe. The fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, as well as the Salazaristas 
of Portugal, sent military assistance and soldiers to support the Nationalists, while the 
Republicans received aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and what was known 
as the International Brigades: thousands of foreign volunteers who went to the country to 
fi ght the war “against fascism”. In an attempt to avoid further complications in the already 
complex political situation on the continent, Great Britain and France maintained a policy of 
Non-Intervention. The course of the Civil War divided all of Spain and Europe (Aróstegui, 
1996). The number and severity of atrocities committed by both factions, which included 
executions and forced disappearances, are still widely discussed today.
Lastly, after almost four years of fi ghting, on 1 April 1939, General Francisco Franco 
declared the end of the confl ict and the victory of the Nationalists. The report from 
Franco’s headquarters stated: “On this day, the Red Army (being) captive and disarmed, 
the National troops have reached their last military objectives. The war is over” (1939).
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The signing of the document by Franco—a military general who had advanced through 
the ranks throughout the war—would be followed by years of death and destruction in 
Spain: the document established Franco’s power as a totalitarian dictator who would rule 
the country with an iron fi st until the day of his death on 20 November 1975.
Collective memory and the reconstruction of a new Spain
Since the beginning of the war, the eradication of the opponents and their ideologies was 
encouraged by both fi ghting factions. But as the Francoist forces seized more and more 
localities around the country, their leader began to put into action an ambitious plan to 
construct the symbols and reconstruct the memories that would legitimise his regime 
and of all of his supporters in the future. The process through which a different collective 
memory began to be created aimed to change the way in which the past, the present, 
and the future were narrated, and to transform everything that related to society, culture, 
and the identity of Spain (Sanz, 2014).
The construction of these new collective principles was originally initiated during the 
confl ict, as the exaltation of Franco as an all-mighty military leader and saviour of Spain 
was used to attract supporters and fi ghters. His fi gure became attached to objective 
manifestations and appeared in posters, pamphlets, and the media all over Spain 
(Assman, 1995). These propagandistic tactics were used to defi ne and determine 
affi liation with him and the Nationalist cause. Along the same line, the destruction of 
the symbolic and memorial presence of the Republicans in every town or village under 
Franco’s control was encouraged by removing every statue, building name, or street sign 
that related to the Republican opposition (Sanz, 2014). Both private and public life began 
to slowly be shaped and defi ned by the creation of a normative self-image on which the 
country and its society could be united and identifi ed (Assman, 1995). This included the 
usage of uniforms, the practice of saluting with the right arm, and the adoption of “Cara 
al Sol” as an anthem, among other things (Sanz, 2014, p.9). But as the war came to an 
end, the victors were faced with a bigger and more complex challenge: the attempt to 
rewrite history and secure their power all across Spain.
Just as the beginning of the twentieth century would be evoked as a period of rapid socio-
political and economic transformations, its second decade would later be remembered 
for the creation and adoption of a new and devastating model of engaging in war. 
Originated during the First World War and referred to as “total war”, this new approach to 
armed confl ict no longer confi ned the aggressions to rural trenches, or to the objectives 
of attacking the enemy’s armies, their industrial zones, or their communication facilities. 
In an attempt to weaken morale, deteriorate labour forces, and increase general and 
massive destruction, “total war” irrupted into domestic life and placed civilians in the 
middle of the armed confl ict (Hobsbawm, 2013).
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As the level of infl ictions that these assaults produced on the enemy were noticeable, the 
different factions of the Civil War engaged in the model and began to target towns like 
Brunete or Belchite (Ortuño, 2014). Furthermore, the entire confl ict had been used as a 
testing ground for the war machinery of Germany and Italy, who had both been involved 
in the confl ict to support the Nationalist cause. The bombings of civilian populations—
such as Guernica in April 1937—were reinforced by the powers of the Axis, as they 
served as models for the development of technological and strategic tactics, which they 
would eventually put into action during the Second World War (Ortuño, 2014). By April 
1939, Spain had been devastated.
In an attempt to exalt and annihilate the different memories of what had really happened, 
the evolutionary and symbolic processes in which history and memory interacted had 
to be conveniently distorted (Nora, 2010). Shattered by combat and depleted of its 
infrastructure and of its human capital, the country had to be urgently reconstructed 
under a novel lieux de mémoire. As the triumphant Nationalists were faced with entire 
cities and towns in ruins, the creation of a new and more powerful Spain became a moral 
obligation, equally as important as the material reconstruction of the country. Therefore, 
in his fi rst meeting as Head of State, Francisco Franco exhorted the Spanish population 
“to work!” as “peace, far from resting, meant waging the last and defi nitive battles, those 
on which raising the country and putting it back on the tracks depend” (Box, 2012).
Reconstruction would not only serve as a legitimising tool for the regime, but also as 
a transcendental tool that would save morale and provide “the physical support of the 
spiritual” (Renan, 1992, p. 10). The idea of a New Spain was based on a sentiment, 
and the common grief that the war had infl icted on all of its population. Franco’s 
demagogic purposes included the rebuilding of Spain into a superpower, one that would 
equal the imperial reign of the Catholic Monarchs of yore in strength and glory (Lynn, 
2007). Architecture represented the medium through which the different political and 
social groups that made up the victorious side could see their ideologies and values 
represented, materialised, and legitimised (Ortuño, 2014).
The Valley of the Fallen: an undeniable allegory to Fascism
Franco viewed art and especially architecture as political instruments with military and 
propaganda value that would serve him and the State in all of its purposes (Lynn, 2007). 
By objectivising the war and his victory with material culture, the leader would be able 
to change collective memory and transform history (Assman, 1995). The architectural 
endeavour began by prioritising the building of monuments for the commemoration of 
his victory and the remembrance of those who died during what he called “his Glorious 
Crusade” (Lynn, 2007).
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“Architecture represented 
the medium through which 
the different political and 
social groups that made 
up the victorious could see 
their ideologies and values 
represented, materialised and 
legitimised (Ortuño, 2014).”
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After presiding over a victory parade to celebrate the fi rst anniversary of his triumph, 
Franco led a select group of guests—including the ambassadors from Germany, Italy, 
and Portugal, as well as the main leaders of the Phalanx and the Minister of the Army—
to the Sierra de Guadarrama, where the construction of the Valley of the Fallen was 
ordered in an offi cial decree (Sanz, 2014):
The dimension of our Crusade, the heroic sacrifi ces that our victory 
holds and the transcendence that it holds for the future of Spain are 
epic and cannot be perpetuated by the simple monuments with which 
they usually commemorate in towns and cities the salient facts of our 
History and the glorious episodes of their children. It is necessary that 
the stones that rise have the greatness of ancient monuments, that defy 
time and oblivion, and which constitute a place for meditation and rest 
in which future generations will pay tribute and admiration to those who 
bequeathed for a better Spain. (Cuelgamuros, 2017)
The project for the Valley of the Fallen had been developed by the Director of Architecture, 
Pedro Muguruza, and was later completed by Diego Méndez in a Classicist style, which 
was infl uenced by the Fascist and Nazi architecture of the time. This style favoured the 
construction of immense complexes for the organisation of mass acts, public rituals, 
and martial ceremonies, and this served the purpose of solemnising demonstrations, 
displaying the regime’s power, and further legitimising their political causes among the 
population (Ortuño, 2014). For this reason, the monumentality of the Valley of the Fallen 
had to be overwhelming, and thus the dimensions and numbers that make up the site 
are very impressive.
The total area in which the Valley of the Fallen was constructed covers more than 1,300 
hectares of land, surrounded by over 25 kilometres of wall. It included the construction 
of a 150-meter-high cross that weighs more than 200,000 tons, under which a Catholic 
basilica was erected. Cut into the southern part of the mountain side, the religious 
building—currently standing at an average size of 206 meters long by 40 meters high—
had to be reduced in size in order to avoid competing with Saint Peter’s Basilica, which is 
located in the Holy See in Vatican City (Robledo, 2017). The esplanade, which led directly 
to the entrance surrounded by a semi-circular portico of arches, sits over 130,000 cubic 
metres of rubble obtained from the excavations in the mountain. The esplanade totals 
an area of 30,000 square metres. The complex also includes a Benedictine monastery, 
a residential area for friars, a large library, and a funicular (Sanz, 2014). Altogether, its 
construction would take more than ten years to complete.
A couple of days before the offi cial inauguration of the site on 1 April 1959, Franco wrote 
a letter to the family of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Spanish Phalanx 
who had been executed by the Republicans during the Civil War. In the letter, Franco 
offered a space within the new basilica for the reburial of Rivera. According to the dictator, 
the place corresponded “to him among our glorious Fallen” (Zavala, 2013, p. 40). On the 
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morning of the 30th of March, members of the Phalanx and Franco’s 
private guard transferred the coffi n, originally buried in the Escorial, to 
the Valley of the Fallen. The leader was deposited in front of the main 
altar of the crypt, under a granite tomb marked with the inscription Jose 
Antonio (Casanova, 2017).
20 years after the offi cial inauguration of the Valley of the Fallen, on 20 
November 1975, Francisco Franco died. The recently proclaimed King, 
Juan Carlos I, decreed that he should be buried in the complex, right 
behind the altar of the basilica (Sueiro, 1976). This event would mark 
the end of one of the longest dictatorships of the twentieth century, one 
which resulted in more than 350,000 executions (Mir & Luque, 2014) 
and over 30,000 forced disappearances (Macé, 2012). After almost 40 
years in command, Franco and his fascist regime had turned Spain 
into the country with the second highest rate of forced disappearances 
and mass graves in the world (elplural.com, 2017).
Controversies and proposals
The controversies surrounding the Valley of the Fallen relate to its 
enormous symbolic burdens, and they present a series of issues that 
have been debated about during the past decades. In the 1950s, 
the Francoist propaganda machine had tried to appropriate the term 
reconciliation to modify the symbolism of the site (Moreno Garrido, 
2010). To do so, from 1959 to 1983, the corpses of 33,847 victims 
Figure 2. The tomb 
of Francisco Franco 
(Svensson 2005 
/ CC BY-SA 3.0)
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from both sides of the confl ict were transferred from provinces all across Spain into the 
Valley of the Fallen. The thousands of bodies were deposited in individual and collective 
columbarium and buried within the cruise and chapel of the basilica (derechos.org, 
2011). According to other sources, the bodies were transferred to the site with the sole 
intention of fi lling the colossal crypts and not as an attempt to make amends with the past 
(Junquera, 2017).
According to 19 data sheets kept at the site, the following massive transfers took place: 
in 1959, 11,329 corpses were transported before the offi cial opening; in 1961, 6,607 
corpses were transferred; and in 1968, 2,919 corpses were transferred. The venture was 
carried out on the orders of the Minister of the Interior and the President of the Council of 
National Monuments, who requested the collaboration of the civil government authorities 
for the removal of the bodies. Altogether, the transfers amounted to 491 removals and 
reburials between the year of its inauguration and 1983. According to the records, out 
of these numbers, 21,423 are identifi ed and 12,410 are unknown victims (derechos.org, 
2011), making the Valley of the Fallen “the biggest mass grave of Spain” (Fernandez 
Ferrá ndiz, 2011).
But the controversies don’t only revolve around the high number of victims buried at 
the site; they are also related to the origins of their remains. Recent investigations 
have revealed that more than 22,000 of those victims were Republicans or victims of 
repression, executed by orders of the dictator and his regime. A family member of one 
of the victims buried in the Valley famously stated: “Uncle Pepe was taken away from 
home and shot. That’s not a fallen. That’s a murder” (Felis, 2016). Equally, the majority of 
the relatives of the victims consider the fact that the victims are buried next to Francisco 
Franco to be a major insult to their memory. Eventually, an investigation led by Catalan 
Professor Joan Pinyol revealed that at least 500 of the corpses were transferred without 
consent from their relatives (Barcala, 2009). This led to a series of legal contests to 
exhume the bodies.
However, the removal of the corpses presents conservation-related problems for the 
structure of the site. First, regarding the claims for the return of the remains, a commission 
of experts deemed the individual identifi cation, exhumation, and devolution of bodies 
to their relatives impossible due to the deterioration of the crypts and the quantity of 
remains located within the crypts (derechos.org, 2011). Secondly, according to Professor 
Francisco Ferrá ndiz from the Universidad Complutense in Madrid:
The exhumation of corpses would be impossible since they would have 
ended up forming part of the very structure of the building, since they 
were used to fi ll the cavities of the crypts... (Additionally) Thanks to the 
effect of humidity, they would have become an “indissoluble collective 
corpse. (2001, p.15)
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But as the legal issues regarding the burial of the victims are addressed 
and resolved, the Valley of the Fallen presents an even bigger issue: 
the majority of the population still believes that the Valley of the Fallen is 
a monument for the victors and a representative landmark of Franco’s 
regime and of fascism in Spain (Robledo, 2017). As the location of 
Franco’s and Jose Antonio’s mausoleums, the Valley has become a 
centre of pilgrimage for the nostalgic followers of the dictatorship and 
the growing number of right-wing supporters living in Spain and the 
rest of Europe. Each year on the 20th of November, in celebration 
of Franco’s death, religious acts and political ceremonies are held in 
the esplanade, and at night, the monumental cross that oversees the 
Valley is ceremoniously lit (Sanz, 2014).
The Valley of the Fallen has been rendered an anomaly by heritage 
experts, fi rstly because in no other country in the world are fascist 
leaders being publicly mourned and their regimes symbolically 
celebrated or remembered with monumental heritage. This incongruity 
can be explained by the fact that unlike other previous dictatorships—
either defeated in war or toppled through internal confl icts—Spain 
went through a process of democratic transition right after Franco died. 
This gave rise to several delicate issues relating to the preservation of 
collective memories, ideologies, and the conservation of built heritage. 
When dictatorships do not fall in a precipitate manner, priorities such 
as the reconstruction, destruction, or reinventing of history or heritage 
are not immediately addressed. Professor Jesús de Andrés Sanz, 
Figure 3. Esplanade 
of the Valley of the 
Fallen (Dubiel 2008 
/ CC BY-SA 3.0)
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an expert in Spanish heritage, has highlighted the fact that “the postponed problems 
(of dealing with heritage and ideologies) remain unresolved, and, once the convulsive 
waters of democratic transition and consolidation have been reassured, they reappear 
over time” (2014, p.9). Furthermore, the site is considered the only one in the world 
where members of both sides of an armed confl ict are buried, raising even more issues 
among the relatives of the victims and the supporters of the monument who want to keep 
it intact.
Thus, on 27 May 2011, a Commission of Experts for the Future of the Valley of the Fallen 
was created to analyse and address some of these issues, and to develop a report 
containing proposals for the resignifi cation of the monument. Among their suggestions, 
the Committee advised to remove the remains of Francisco Franco from the Valley, and 
to transfer those of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera from his privileged position next to 
the altar to one of the crypts. This proposal was delivered in order to ensure that the 
mausoleum becomes a space for memory, and that the corpse of the dictator stops 
tormenting the relatives of the Republicans who were buried there (Martin, 2017). But 
until today, the proposal has not been applied, since authorisation of the Church is 
necessary to remove the bodies. According to canon law, the state has no authority over 
the basilica, and thus, since 2011, every subsequent legal attempt to remove Franco 
from the Valley of the Fallen has failed. The removal of the hundreds of Republicans who 
were also buried in the Valley without permission has also been deemed economically 
impossible, especially since the country has been suffering a massive fi nancial crisis. 
Some have even suggested that the lack of lobbying and support from the political parties 
in charge to remove the dictator is connected to the fact that according to the National 
Heritage Offi ce of Spain, the monument receives more than two million euros of income 
every year (Martin, 2017). But perhaps the inability and powerlessness to change the 
overall meaning and symbolism of the Valley of the Fallen, until now, is due to larger and 
more deeply rooted matters.
Conclusion
The Valley of the Fallen, with all of its meanings and relationships to ideologies and 
collective memory, will remain a fundamental challenge as long as the site maintains 
its current status as a representative landmark of Franco’s regime. In order to modify 
its symbolic meaning and its current use, the Valley of the Fallen has to go through a 
complete process of resignifi cation.
First of all, it would be essential to strip the place of any ideological or political connotations. 
This would allow the complex to be converted it into a centre for meditation. A site “of 
affi rmation of coexistence, democracy and human right… (and) of rejection of war, 
violence and dictatorship” (Agencia Estatal Boletín Ofi cial del Estado, 2011). To do so, 
other actions could be implemented, including the creation of a Research Centre and a 
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permanent exhibition that could collect and display the testimonies and original records 
that testify to the thousands of deaths contained within the monument.
This centre should also explain the history of the site—from its creation to the present—
and expose the reasons and ideologies behind its construction. In this regard, it would be 
necessary to promote and maintain an objective and impartial view of the entire range of 
meanings and symbolisms that surround the Valley: the Civil War, its ideological forces, 
the victory of Franco, the years of dictatorship, and the creation of a collective memory 
that generated heroes and ignored the vanquished. These explanations should also 
include one for the pre-eminent place that Jose Antonio and Francisco Franco were 
given within the basilica.
Furthermore, a civic environment could be encouraged through the promotion of artistic 
installations or performances that could help to re-signify the monument as a place of 
remembrance for all of the victims of violence. By objectively re-signifying the Valley of 
the Fallen, the centrality of the victims would be highlighted, and thus, the visitors would 
be able to refl ect on the site and how this landmark has related and still relates to the 
history of Spain.
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Marina Freckmann
The Soviet War 
Memorial, Treptower 
Park, Berlin
How the ideology and propaganda 
of a memorial helped shape public 
memory of East Germans during the 
German Democratic Republic
Introduction
Monuments and memorials play a signifi cant role in shaping historical narratives and 
discourse surrounding past events. They are inherently entrenched in ideology and 
symbols, and are intended by the creators to infl uence public interpretation of the event 
being recorded. Memorials thus serve as physical representations of history that are 
fabricated by a limited viewpoint. Yet, through their presence in open and public spaces, 
they give the illusion that they may be interpreted openly and freely by those viewing 
them. Without explicitly promoting critical interpretation, if memorials are complemented 
by a matching political discourse, they can be used as tools to contribute to producing 
and even changing a certain public memory. Public memory can be defi ned as “how 
society remembers, what it remembers, and who it remembers” (Cohen, 2008, p.547). 
The Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, Berlin, is one such emblem that dictated 
the how, what, and who of East German public memory during the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). The specifi c and unique position of this ideologically laced memorial 
within a sociopolitical climate that was forming a new identity under the GDR is one that 
would nurture and promote the narrative of liberation by the Soviets from Nazi fascism.
As Ignatieff wrote in his essay on Soviet War Memorials, “War memorials function not 
only to make the past bearable again; they function to make it usable for the future” 
(1984, p.161). This tactic is apparent in the Treptower memorial, whose symbols and 
images, although they did not explicitly name East Germans, were universal enough to:
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Afford later leaders the opportunity to use the visuals to support 
the argument that the East German populace had been part of 
the Soviet resistance effort, and thus its version of homeland 
(Crimmins, 2011, p.57). 
Perhaps it was in preparing for the future relationship with citizens of Germany as well 
as the German nation that the design of the Soviet memorial was chosen to focus on the 
villain of Hitler without grouping in the German people. As Stangl elaborated, “By omitting 
the German people entirely, the memorial avoided making a statement regarding the 
link between the German state and assigning guilt to the German people” (2003, p.225). 
This fact is tantamount in contributing to and even initiating a certain memory in East 
Berlin, where German observers would not be forced to group themselves together with 
Nazism, and instead could partake in the shared memory of resistance to Hitler’s fascism 
and the liberation by the Soviets, as is depicted symbolically and literally throughout the 
site. I would argue that this contributed to a collective memory of those East Germans, as 
it is defi ned by Assmann. Assmann’s theoretical work describes a group who “conceives 
their unity and peculiarity through a common image of their past” (1995, p.127).
Understanding the context of the creation of this memorial and the meaning of the symbols 
of which it is made up is crucial to further understanding the effect its presence had on the 
East German people under the GDR, and the ideology that may have transformed public 
and collective memory. Equally as signifi cant for understanding the political ideology of 
the site and its infl uence is interpreting the preservation of the memorial post-German 
reunifi cation, and the installation of informational signs around the site. What follows will 
be an attempt to contextualise and bring into focus the political propagandistic ideology 
of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, Berlin, and its effect on East German 
memory, as well as the more recent preservation and reevaluation of the site as an 
element of the historical past.
Context and description of the site
In April of 1945, for nearly one month, the fi nal battle of the Second World War, the 
Battle of Berlin, was fought. The battle not only resulted in the surrender of the Nazis 
to the Soviets and Allied powers, but also in the death of approximately 250 thousand 
people, 70,000 of whom were Soviet soldiers (Remme, 2011). In the aftermath of war, 
shock was felt around the world, and in Europe—particularly Germany—a “far-reaching 
legacy - of loss, of mourning, of disorientation, of bitterness and of hatred hung in 
the air” (Bessel, 2005, p. 195). Berlin was in ruins, both physically and emotionally. 
Refugees wandered without food and without anywhere to go (Remme, 2011). The 
social and political landscape was unrecognisable and the stage had been set for 
a complete remolding of the German nation. At this time, the division of Germany 
and the city of Berlin was being put into effect by the different Allied powers. This 
agreement on the division of Germany, as well as the city of Berlin, had already been 
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established during the London Protocol of autumn 1944, and it would 
split the jurisdiction and control between the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union (GHDI, 1959), and eventually France. The 
Soviets would have control over the districts of northeastern Berlin, 
wherein the neighbourhood of Treptow and Treptower Park lie. It 
is within this broader picture that the foundation for the Soviet War 
Memorial in Treptower Park emerged.
In the months following the end of the war, the Soviet Military 
Administration (SMAD) in Berlin commissioned three Soviet 
memorial and burial sites “to commemorate victory and honor the 
dead” (Stangl, 2003, p. 217). Among them, the one in Treptower 
Park would be the largest and would house the remains of between 
5,000 and 7,000 Soviet soldiers (Crimmins, 2011). As the Soviets 
were the acclaimed defeaters of Hitler who would remain in charge 
of at least part of Berlin, and due to the huge amount of deceased 
Soviet soldiers needing burial, the plans for these memorials were 
not questioned. A design competition for the Treptower memorial was 
held in 1946, and a “Russian team of architect Jakow Borissowitsch 
Belopolski, sculptor Jewgeni Wiktorowitsch Witschetish, engineer 
Sarra Samuilowna Walerius, and painter Alexander Andrejewitsch 
Gorpenko” were selected to carry out the initiative (Crimmins, 2011, 
p. 55). The location of the site was strategic in that it should not only 
be placed in an area that would be under Soviet control, but it should 
also be removed from other “historic structures testifying to Prussian 
and German history”, which would have taken away from the Soviet’s 
“efforts to appear as liberators” (Stangl, 2003, p. 217). Removing the 
Figure 1. View 
of the Soviet 
War Memorial in 
Treptower Park, 
Berlin
( © Andreas 
Steinhoff 2005)
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Soviet site from the surrounding memorialisation of a prior era of German history would 
be to ensure a clear focus on the message that was intended to be conveyed.
The vast nine hectare layout of the memorial complex, which is situated between 
“Puschkinallee to the north and the street Am Treptower Park to the south” (Berlin.de, 
n.d.), is intricately detailed, with each aspect containing symbols that help visitors to 
read the structures and remember the events in a certain light. An emphasis is clearly 
placed on the heroic efforts and sacrifi ces of the Red Army to defeat National Socialism. 
There are no references to the German nation or the German people as a whole, but 
rather exclusively to Nazism. The tone of the memorial is somber in its function as 
a burial ground for 5,000 to 7,000 of the 70,000 Soviet soldiers who died during the 
Battle of Berlin, but also strongly nationalistic in promoting the Soviet’s victory and all-
mightiness (Jirá sek, 2017). The site itself was designed within the wooded Treptower 
Park so that it is not visible from the busy parallel roads. From either adjacent road, 
one enters the memorial grounds through a grand archway, each with “an inscription 
acknowledging the heroes who died liberating the ‘socialist homeland’” (Stangl, 2003, 
p. 218), and with these arches the journey to experience the memorial begins (Fig 1).
The main elements of the monument include four statues and sixteen sarcophagi with 
script and bas-reliefs, and each is meant to be read, both symbolically and literally, 
with a certain ideological understanding of the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World 
War and in defeating Hitler’s Fascism. As one enters the memorial complex, the view 
of a statue of a weeping mother, motherland, comes into view. This is a statue of a 
traditionally dressed Russian woman with her head bent who appears to be mourning 
over a lost son. However, the symbolism here allows one to interpret the subject of her 
mourning—for one lost soldier, for all Russians, for the motherland, for the innocence 
of European youth etc.—for themselves, and it is thus relatable to myriad visitors. 
This motherland sculpture is quite modest in stature, and while the entrance archways 
evoke a feeling of victory, she elicits a feeling of loss—but a loss that must be suffered 
in order to overcome the enemy. After viewing the motherland statue, if one turns 90 
degrees, the rest of the memorial comes into view. Continuing up a pathway surrounded 
on either side by many birch trees—the Russian national tree—one approaches two 
“massive granite pylons representing lowered Soviet fl ags” (Stangl, 2003, p. 218). Two 
bronze statues of Soviet soldiers kneel in front of the pylons, facing each other, their 
heads bowing low. Already, these grand symbols evoke a deep sense of national pride 
and mourning of those lost during the war.
Continuing southeast down the steps and onto a vast lawn under which the soldiers 
remains lie, and which is bordered on either side by eight sarcophagi, each covered in 
etched bas-reliefs of wartime scenes and wartime quotes by Stalin, the symbolism further 
unfolds. On either side of the lawn, the sarcophagi retain mirroring depictions that follow 
the wartime story to which the Soviets referred as the Great Patriotic War. On the north 
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“Given the context in 
which the Soviet War 
Memorial, Treptower 
Park, Berlin, was 
created, as well as the 
altered history that it 
offered its viewers in the 
newly formed German 
Democratic Republic, 
I would argue that it 
served as a tool to 
change and solidify the 
collective identity and 
public memory of the 
East German people.”
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side the text is in Russian, and on the south side the text is in German (Stangl, 2003), 
which further shows the foreseen and intended dual audience. All eight bas-reliefs are 
different, but they evoke similar sentiments of Soviet civilian victimhood in the face of Nazi 
aggression and violence, before a triumph in their fi ght for liberation. For example, one of 
the fi rst bas-relief depictions is of “airplanes bombing the Soviet countryside and cities, and 
people running from their homes to the woods and taking up weapons” (Jirá sek, 2017). 
Another sarcophagus portrays “a row of soldiers with raised rifl es...behind them a fl ag with 
the image of Lenin and the Kremlin represents the state and/or the party, depending on 
one’s interpretation” (Stangl, 2003, p. 223). On another sarcophagus (Fig 2), there is a 
scene depicting several women and an older man in traditional dress giving thanks to the 
Soviet soldiers through handshakes and by offering them bouquets of fl owers. Thus, the 
message is conveyed—the Soviet soldiers were heroes and perhaps the whole of Europe 
should be committed to remembering their legacy as liberators from the vicious tragedies 
that were infl icted upon humanity by German National Socialism. The coupling of the bas-
reliefs with quotes from Stalin on the sarcophagi further contributes to the Stalinist vision 
of the liberation of the whole of Europe. Although the Soviet perception of Stalin may 
have altered throughout more recent history, these quotes can be seen as relevant to the 
specifi c time and in particular to the war discourse during the Second World War. In the 
selection of quotations on the sarcophagi, Stalin is recorded as referring explicitly to Hitler 
and Hitler’s Germany as the source of war and oppression (Stangl, 2003, p. 224). Once 
again, the German citizens are excluded from the explicit condemnation of evil.
Passing the sarcophagi and the vast lawn, the symbolism continues through to its focal 
point of a gigantic, 11-meter tall bronze statue of a Soviet soldier on a pedestal (Fig 3). 
The statue sits on top of a mound of earth, known as a kurgan—an ancient Russian burial 
mound (Stangl, 2003, p. 219). The soldier is clutching a small child in one arm, and with the 
other arm he holds an enormous sword, which is resting atop a crushed swastika at his feet. 
Again, the symbols used here allow for a malleable interpretation within the specifi c message 
of Soviet liberation. The child’s specifi c symbolic meaning is open for interpretation—does 
it represent Soviet children, German children, or all future generations? It is noteworthy 
that the giant fi gure is portrayed crushing a swastika, which was the defi ned symbol of 
Nazi Germany. It reiterates the narrative that the Soviets were liberators from Nazism, and 
completely separates this from the notion that they were defeaters of the German nation 
or the German people. This element is crucial in the memorial’s location in Berlin, with an 
audience of German people who could then also cultivate an identity of also having been 
liberated by the Soviets from Nazi fascism. The signifi cance and importance of this focal 
point structure is such that it became “an icon of Soviet victory in WWII” (Stangl, 2003, 
p.215) and was used repeatedly as propaganda throughout the height of the Soviet Union.
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Contradiction to reality
The trouble with memorials, which is particularly true for this case, is 
that they often do not paint the whole truth. We can accept that the 
purpose of memorials is to convey a certain ideology or sentiment from 
one side of the story, which inherently excludes the holistic account of 
what may be the complete truth. This becomes problematic when a 
memorial is used in such a way to promote and perpetuate a memory 
held by a newly formed society, such as what we see in the case of 
Treptower Park. It becomes problematic when it in effect changes the 
public discourse and narrative surrounding a historic event, in this case 
the Second World War and the relationship of East Germans with the 
Soviet liberators versus Hitler’s National Socialism. In his essay on 
Soviet War Memorials, author Ignatieff (1984, p.158) writes that Soviet 
memorials are immensely signifi cant in recording the Soviet suffering 
during WWII. He also discusses how they are part of “an invented 
tradition in the service of the Soviet state” and, as such, “facilitate 
forgetting as well as remembering” (1984). In Treptower Park, the 
facilitation of forgetting other stories, perspectives, and truths from the 
war period is apparent.
The memorial in Treptower Park deliberately excludes the harsh and 
violent reality of what took place throughout the Second World War 
and most intensely during the end of the war at the hands of the Soviet 
military. In using the sarcophagi to paint a story of the tragedy and 
hardship that Soviet civilians and soldiers suffered at the hands of the 
Nazis, the reality becomes systematically altered by excluding the 
other side of the story. What the sarcophagi depict is not intrinsically 
Figure 2. 
Sarcophagus bas-
relief of Prague 
scene. (Raimond 
Spekking 2006, 
CC BY-SA 3.0) 
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untrue; however, by omitting the suffering of innocent civilians—both Eastern European 
as well as Germans—at the hands of the Soviets, the creators of the site are altering the 
full truth. Perhaps one of the most well known series of crimes committed by the Soviet 
troops against German civilians were the hundreds of thousands of rapes that took 
place towards the end of the war and even after the war. One documentation of German 
hospital records reports that towards the end of the war there was an incredible increase 
in abortion rates, and “it is estimated that up to two million German women were raped ... 
around 100,000 of them in Berlin” (Remme, 2011). Furthermore, one German journalist 
working in Berlin during the end of the war documented that in addition to the R.A.F. 
(British air force) and the U.S. Air Force members who were targeting Hitler, the Soviet 
“fl iers [airplanes] also began to come as far as Berlin” (Schneyder & Lochner, 1967, 
p. 418). He wrote that those Soviet airplanes fl ew “low and attack[ed] moving trains of 
civilians” who were evacuating the city in anticipation of the imminent Soviet approach 
(Schneyder & Lochner, 1967, p. 418). Additionally, following the Battle of Berlin, tens of 
thousands German prisoners of war were forced to march to labour camps in the Soviet 
Union (Schneyder & Lochner, 1967). Is it possible that the German war survivors could 
have blocked these facts from their memories? Or maybe it is due in part to a larger 
German guilt complex that author Moeller discusses, suggesting their “commemorative 
culture allowed Germans only to express collective guilt for what the Nazi state had done 
to others, leaving them no space to mourn what others had done to them” (2005, p.149).
And this violence was not exclusive to Nazi Germany. Under the Soviet rule, many 
Soviet citizens and soldiers were targeted and suffered as well. The Soviet Union was 
not as innocent and peaceful as the memorial might suggest it was. In fact, what is 
known as the Great Purge (1936-1938), a movement initiated by Stalin to “eliminate 
his major real and potential political rivals and critics” (Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d), 
resulted in 19 million Soviet arrests, “a majority of whom either were executed or died 
in labor camps” (Stangl, 2003, p. 225). Included in these purges were many top military 
offi cials and leaders in the armed forces. An estimated twenty million Soviet citizens 
and soldiers died during the Second World War, either at the front, from starvation, or 
by war crimes. Some argue that it was due to Stalin’s “lack of preparedness for the 
German invasion” (Stangl, 2003, p.225), his having wiped out military leaders, and his 
recklessness at the end of the war in storming Berlin, that this toll reached so high.
Certainly none of these horrendous and violent Soviet acts against Soviets or Germans 
are depicted or mentioned in the Treptower Park site. Thus, the exclusive focus on the 
Soviet suffering at the hands of Nazi Germany, and the Soviet’s heroic role, procures 
a collective amnesia that omits the harsh truth. In the chaotic aftermath of the war, and 
during the full power of the GDR, under which fewer and fewer survivors spoke about 
their true memories, this memorial further served as a propagandistic alteration of the 
truth. So often has this trend occurred throughout history that we might almost perceive 
it as human nature to exclude chunks of historical truth from public memory. It might be 
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too diffi cult and confusing to remember all of the horrifi c tragedies, particularly when 
the political regime chooses one story to reiterate, and thus victims and survivors tend 
to go along with them.
Control of the memorial
When discussing the collective memory of a certain group of people, Assmann 
underlines that those certain events and points upon which the collective identity 
is based are necessarily only effective through “cultural formation and institutional 
communication” (1995, p.129). Institutional communication, that is, political and public 
discourse, serves to reiterate and support ideology and a shared sense of cultural or 
national identity. From the opening of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park in 
1949, it was seen as a meeting point for Soviet appreciation and giving thanks for their 
liberation.
The site was used for commemorative ceremonies, particularly on the 8th of May each 
year, and offi cials from both the “Soviet Union and the GDR jointly participated in large-
scale” commemorative events (Information Portal to European Sites of Remembrance, 
n.d.). When May 8 Victory Day (Siegestag) became Liberation Day (Befreiungstag) 
under the newly formed GDR, a shift toward explicitly including the German people 
under those as liberated occurred (Stangl, 2003). Now that the GDR was in power, they 
would offi cially take control of the memorial and those commemorative ceremonies 
surrounding it. Stangl writes that the Liberation Day ceremony became one of “offi cial 
pilgrimage for the East German state leadership and state-organized groups of East 
Berlin residents”, and that state leaders spoke, openly offering expressions of “friendship 
between the German and Soviet peoples” (2003, p. 228). On one occasion, for example, 
Walter Ulbricht, the Secretary General of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), 
spoke of Stalin as the “pioneer and standard-bearer of peace throughout the world”, 
and expressed his gratitude toward “General Stalin and the entire Soviet people” for 
their liberation (Stangl, 2003, p. 222).
As a new state, and one that was quickly viewed with skepticism by many of its citizens, 
the GDR needed an “employment of myths … to legitimize governmental authority” 
(Stangl, 2003, p. 228). They therefore used propaganda tactics not only to rally their 
citizens against the “imperialist West”, but also to demonstrate their strong “bond 
of friendship” with the Soviet Union. Throughout the GDR times, both GDR offi cials 
and Soviet offi cials used the Treptower site as a gathering point to promote political 
messages. Whereas the message of GDR offi cials reiterated thanks to “the Soviets 
for saving their country from Hitler’s oppression, ‘Soviet generals’ stressed the Soviet 
suffering and their country’s great victory” (Jirá sek, 2017). Although the tone of their 
messages varied slightly, the two groups of national leadership sought to rebuild a 
strong relationship between Germany and the East.
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Throughout the GDR times, the memorial was seen and used as 
propaganda to perpetuate the constructed narrative of East Germans 
as being liberated by the Soviets, and thus separated from the 
crimes of Hitler. In the 1980s, however, support for the Soviet Union 
began to crumble, and “open discussions of the war by survivors and 
admissions by the Soviet government revealed errors in the narrative” 
(Stangl, 2003, p. 229-230). Stalin’s violence was exposed and people 
began to speak about and remember more openly the Great Purge 
that had taken place within the Soviet Union. Due to the emphasis 
of the memorial on the Soviet people in general as liberators, it was 
able to withstand the shift in public discourse. It was still a site to 
remember the war dead, and for the East Germans to acknowledge 
and remember their so-called liberation by the Soviets.
The memorial after german reunifi cation
When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, many East Berliners 
attacked symbols and monuments of GDR oppression, such as the 
Figure 3. Statue of 
Soviet soldier with 
child - focal point 
of memorial on 
the 70 anniversary 
of the victory day 
(Kleiner Eisbär 2015 
/ CC BY-SA 3.0).
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Wall itself, the “Stasi headquarters and, perhaps the Palace of the Republic” (Crimmins, 
2011, p. 57). The Soviet War Memorial, however, “had been embraced during the GDR 
as a more positive stand- in for liberation, hope, and anti-fascist tradition”, and so it 
stood out from the “highly symbolic and politically charged sites in Berlin” (Crimmins, 
2011, p. 57). As part of German reunifi cation, the Two Plus Four Agreement between 
West Germany and the GDR as the two, and the UK, USA, Russia, and France as the 
four, was signed. As part of this agreement, the “Good Neighbor Treaty” was agreed 
upon, which stated that both sides would ensure the maintenance of “the other’s war 
memorial and burial sites on their respective territory” (Crimmins, 2011, p. 58). So now, 
by law, it was Germany’s obligation to maintain the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower 
Park. During the GDR times, despite the high regard for the Treptower memorial, little 
to no fi nancial support was given for preserving its condition. The state of the memorial 
was becoming so poor that in 1998, the Social Democrats (SPD) Faction Leader Klaus 
Böger claimed that the memorial was in a “catastrophic state”, as the Soviet soldier 
statue physically “threatened to collapse” (Crimmins, 2011, p. 59-60). There was much 
debate between political leaders as to what to do with the memorial, and whether the 
restoration was to be funded at a federal or state level, even though it was outstandingly 
clear that either way they would have to abide by the signed treaty in maintaining it. In 
October of 2003, the Soviet soldier statue was fi nally shipped to the island of Rügen 
for a complete restoration; the restoration took six months to complete and cost 1.35 
million Euros (Crimmins, 2011).
In addition to the debate about restoration, disagreements increasingly developed 
amongst political party leaders as to whether the site should be altered, or even 
demolished, given its strong socialist and pro-Stalin rhetoric (Crimmins, 2011). Leaders 
of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), in particular, were in favor of eliminating at 
least the Stalin quotations from the site (Crimmins, 2011). In 2003, a compromise was 
reached between party leaders, and it was decided that “informational boards would 
be erected at the memorial to explain its historical context” (Crimmins, 2011, p. 61). 
Eight signs were installed that offer a drier, more ideologically neutral explanation of 
the creation of the site, as well as the meaning of its various statues and quotations. 
One sign states:
The cemetery and memorial create a central place of commemoration for 
those Soviet soldiers who fell in the battle of Berlin, whose achievements 
resonate over Berlin and Germany. (Crimmins, 2011, p.62)
Here, no explicit reference to the terms victory or liberation is made, but rather the 
acknowledgement of the Soviet army’s achievements is noted. The fi rst informational 
sign explains the “good neighbor” treaty within the Two Plus Four Agreement, which 
obligates “the federal government and the City of Berlin to preserve the site as it stands” 
(Crimmins, 2011, p. 62). Therefore, through stating this fact for the public viewers to 
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read, the government is openly giving their reason for having to preserve and maintain 
the site. This would suggest that the preservation of the memorial is not necessarily in 
their political or ideological interest, but rather required by a legal contract.
Several other signs recount the use of the memorial during GDR times “as a ceremonial 
site for East German politicians and members of communist youth organizations” 
(Crimmins, 2011, p. 62). Once again, they place the memorial into a factual, historical 
context. Finally, what perhaps is the most opinionated of all the informational signs is 
an explanation of one of the sarcophagus texts. Regarding Stalin’s quotations, the sign 
states:
After the end of the Second World War, Stalin was celebrated by Soviet 
propaganda as the great strategizer and commander as well as the 
‘inspiration of all victories,’ under whose leadership the ‘mother homeland’ 
was defended. (Crimmins, 2011, p.63)
For the quotations, the German government allowed themselves to be subjective, 
and to classify the reverence of Stalin as one method of Soviet propaganda. These 
informational signs envelop the memorial in a new political ideology—that of the 
Federal Republic of Germany refl ecting back on its history since the Second World 
War, and dissociating itself from the Soviet Union while speaking to a newly unifi ed 
German population. The signs resituate the memorial into a new political and social 
environment, one that is refl ective yet at the same time attempting to be historically 
factual, ebbing away from the persuasive narrative the memorial once painted.
Conclusion
Public memory and collective identity are shaped by a society’s acceptance of a 
defi ning shared history. They set the tone for public discourse and contribute to a 
narrative, which in turn reaffi rms the truth of that society’s claim to identity. Given the 
context in which the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park was created, as well as 
the altered history that it offered its viewers in the newly formed German Democratic 
Republic, I would argue that it served as a tool to change and solidify the collective 
identity and public memory of the East German people. It is not exclusively through 
the presence of the memorial, but through the use of it by both the Soviet and GDR 
states-people, that it became such a propagandistic and manipulative element. It is 
due to unique circumstances—the chaos and non- nationhood after the Second World 
War in Germany, coupled with the Soviet Union’s defeat of Hitler’s National Socialism, 
and merged with the birth of the German Democratic Republic—that the memorial’s 
propagandistic and ideological message proved to be so persuasive.
Because of the design of the memorial, with its intentional abstention from placing 
blame upon the German nation as well as the German people, the creators were able 
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to facilitate the possibility for those Germans to group themselves 
together with the victims of National Socialism, and allowed them to 
participate in the memory of Soviet liberation. Due to the monument’s 
wide and immense inclusion of Soviet citizens, as well as the 
possibility of other Eastern Europeans as well as Germans to be 
included within the dialogue promoted by the monument, it could be 
used more broadly and effectively as a tool of propaganda.
After the Berlin Wall came down and the Two Plus Four Agreement 
was signed, the narrative of the memorial changed. The preservation 
of the site, along with the addition of informational signs in the early 
2000s, further contributed to a new interpretation of and relationship 
with the memorial for the newly unifi ed German government. The 
installation of these informational signs, as well as the emphasis of 
the site as a burial ground, illustrates the transformation of the mindset 
from GDR times to post-unifi cation, wherein the government no longer 
wishes to promote such a strong and close tie with the Soviet Union. 
As a person wanting to learn about a certain history over a period 
of time, the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park proves to be an 
exceptional example of how the discourse surrounding ideological 
monuments transforms with the change of government and politics. 
Today, the memorial still serves as a meeting point for those wishing 
to gather for the May 8th Liberation Day commemoration, but perhaps 
is more relevant as a cultural and historical site to be critically read 
within a beautiful tree-fi lled park next to the River Spree.
Figure 4. Central 
vista of the Soviet 
War Memorial. 
(Drrcs15 2014/
CC BY-SA 4.0)
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Paola Fontanella Pisa 
Social, Cultural and 
Political Implications 
of the Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial’s 
Interpretations
Introduction
The Hiroshima Peace Memorial, known in Japan as the Hiroshima Genbaku Dome, 
represents a symbol of peace on a global scale, although it was achieved by means of 
the fi rst nuclear weapon being used on humans. As the only remaining building that can 
be directly linked to this stage of human history, it plays a fundamental role in the process 
of shaping Japan’s national identity, affl  icted by many social, political, and cultural 
ambiguities. As a consequence, it also represents an important tool to understand the 
dynamics of current international relations between Japan and other countries. This 
paper aims to analyse these factors in relation to the heritage site, and its implications 
on a national and international level.
During the last 150 years, Japanese history has been marked by several changes as 
a result of the end of the period of national isolation in 1868 (Sakoku). From that year 
onward, Japan opened to Western culture, and an era of political, economic, social, and 
cultural change started (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, p. 13). Setting the beginning of the 
ambiguous opposition between Japan and the West, these years have been particularly 
infl uenced by three main events: the beginning of Meiji Restoration, the end of the Second 
World War, and the end of the Cold War (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, p. 13). Particularly 
relevant for this paper are the events related to the end of the Second World War and the 
post-war reconstruction. These years have seen the rebirth of a defeated Japan under 
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the directives of the United States (Ōe, 1994, p.6). Irremediably aff ected by the dropping 
of the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese community had to defi ne 
a new identity, while accepting the fall of nationalism in favour of democratic ideals.
Because of the complicated dynamics shaping this delicate scenario, the reconstruction 
of post-war Japan is characterised by many contradictions, both at a national and 
international level. This paper aims to defi ne these contradictions and to analyse them 
in relation to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome). The site is representative 
of the paradoxes regarding Japan’s approach to the nuclear disaster, to the West, and 
to the collective memory of the Second World War (Schofi eld & Cocroft, 2016, p.46). 
Although the transformation of the interpretation of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial 
towards its consideration as the “global shrine for peace” (Logan & Reeves, 2009, p.6), 
the inevitable link with the atrocities of the Second World War and the use of nuclear 
power cannot be denied. A World Heritage Site since 1996, its nomination to UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List represents the culmination of years of discussion concerning its 
interpretation (Schofi eld & Cocroft, 2016, p.35) and challenges its meaning as a shared 
heritage (Logan & Reeves 2009, p.11).
The paper starts by providing the theoretical background on which it is based, and 
then proceeds with a presentation of the case study of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial. 
Subsquently, an analysis of the direct interpretations of the site is provided, addressing 
its history and its conservation measures and their implications on Japanese society. The 
paper then continues to review the international concerns about the inscription of the site in 
UNESCO’s World Heritage List. Linking to the diff erent meanings of the site in Japanese and 
American collective memories, the discourse continues with an interpretation of Japanese 
literature and cinema, as representative of post-war society’s constructed identity, based 
on the events of 6 August 1945. Before concluding, the paper off ers a further look into 
the development of the discourse surrounding nuclear power from 1945 to today, and its 
implications for Japan’s identity and relationship with other countries.
Theoretical background
Proceeding with the analysis of the role of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) 
in the process of shaping post-war Japan’s national identity, an introduction to the socio-
political situation of this confl icted country is needed. In addition, it is important for this 
chapter to lay the groundwork for the discourse of memorialisation and the role of heritage.
Identity matters
As mentioned above, Japan’s opening to the rest of the world in 1868 represents the 
beginning of the opposition with Western countries (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, p.14). 
The initial approach for dealing with the West can be summarised in the expression 
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wakon yōsai (translated: Japanese spirit, Western science), showing their interest in 
introducing Western technology while maintaining their traditional culture (Novielli, 2010, 
p. 77). Despite the apparently clear intentions, this relationship soon developed several 
ambiguities. The fi rst use of the term “ambiguous” for defi ning the Japanese identity 
and Japan’s relation with the West was by the Nobel Prize recipient for literature, Ōe 
Kenzaburō (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, p.14). In his Nobel Prize discourse in 1995, titled 
Japan, the Ambiguous and Myself, he describes Japanese ambiguity as an opposition 
of poles that cause the split of the state of Japan and its people (Ōe, 1995, p. 6). The 
sudden modernisation on the model of the West without being able to renounce to their 
traditions (Bienati and Scrolavezza, 2009, p.15) caused Japan to become a country that 
can be considered neither completely Asian nor Western (Ōe, 1995, p. 6). The title of this 
discourse itself aims to denounce this uncertainty regarding identity, openly referring to 
Kawabata Yasunari’s Nobel Prize discourse Japan, the Beautiful and Myself (1968). In 
his discourse, Kawabata means to express the essence of Japanese culture as strongly 
related to a mysticism that cannot be understood by Western countries. In other words, 
he supports the idea of an incomprehensible and spiritual Japan that does not want to be 
understood, setting the basis of the ambiguity denounced by Ōe (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 
2009, p. 186). In his career, Ōe has often discussed the meanings of Hiroshima and 
the consequences of its tragedies in the post-war reconstruction, becoming one of the 
most relevant voices in the debate on the unspoken nature of Japan (Utaka, 2009, p.38; 
Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, p. 180). According to him, the tragedies related to the 
end of the Second World War and the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima represent a 
turning point for the ambiguity of Japan, as the many changes following the defeat have 
made the Japanese population waver in their understanding of themselves (Bienati & 
Scrolavezza, 2009, p. 14). On one side, the unexpected consequences of the nuclear 
bombing represented a terrible reality that Japan had to deal with. On the other side, with 
the declaration of defeat, Emperor Hirohito crushed all of the nationalistic ideals that fed 
the spirits of Japanese soldiers and citizens during the war, as he admitted his human 
origins. In Japanese tradition, the Emperor was considered a living god descending from 
the sun-goddess Amaterasu, and the trust of the nation that served during the war was 
founded on this belief (Walker, 2016, p. 146). The Emperor’s public surrender, confessed 
Ōe, has caused both humiliation and a sense of freedom, off ering his country a new 
opportunity for rebirth under democratic ideals (Bienati & Scrolavezza 2009, p. 181). It 
is on this basis that Japan started its physical and social reconstruction and its attempts 
to reconnect with other countries under US directives, which marks these years as the 
years of “America’s Japan” (Bienati & Scrolavezza 2009, p.13).
Collective memory
In a post-confl ict reconstruction process, heritage can play a fundamental role in 
defi ning social identities and a sense of belonging (Sørensen & Viejo-Rose, 2015, p.2). 
Especially following the Second World War, heritage acquired a new meaning not only 
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as a celebration of human achievement, but also as a physical manifestation of the 
darker side of history, marked by cruelty and destruction (Logan & Reeves 2009, p. 1). 
Both kinds of heritage sites can be representative of what Pierre Nora calls lieux de la 
mémoire (Pierre, 1989), which means that sites are collectors of memories that connect 
a community to their past and generate a sense of belonging (Logan & Reeves 2009, p. 
2). According to Nora’s defi nition of heritage sites, there is an opposition between history 
and memory, in which history is a representation of the past, while memory is an attempt 
by the community (or communities) to connect the past to the present (Pierre 1989, 
p. 8). This distinction between history and memory is relevant for the matters of this 
paper, as one must understand how the same history can be remembered diff erently at a 
national and international level, causing contrasting views and sometimes even reviving 
the confl ict. As will be discussed below, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) 
represents both a war related site and the place of a massacre, causing the generation 
of contrasting memories (Logan & Reeves 2009, p. 5). These kinds of heritage sites can 
be referred to as “places of pain and shame” (Logan & Reeves, 2009, p. 3).
The Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku dome)
The Hiroshima Peace Memorial, in Japanese called the Hiroshima Genbaku Dome (Dome 
of the Nuclear Bomb), was originally built between 1914 and 1915 by the Czech architect 
Jan Letzel (ICOMOS, 1996, p. 115; Utaka, 2009, p. 36). Located on the eastern side of 
the Motoyasu River, its original name was the Hiroshima Commercial Exhibition Hall, but 
was changed in 1933 to Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall (ICOMOS, 1996, 
p. 115; Schofi eld & Cocroft 2016, p. 35). With its 25-meter-high dome, it is a fi ve-storey 
building, and it was built to enhance Hiroshima’s industrial production in a period in which 
the city was becoming an important military base (Utaka, 2009, p. 36; ICOMOS, 1996, 
p. 115). On 6 August 1945, the Allied Powers dropped the atomic bomb Little Boy only 
few meters from this structure. Surprisingly, the building did not collapse, and it became 
the only standing structure in the area around the hypocentre of the explosion (Utaka, 
2009, p. 36). From that day on, the Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall would 
become an important symbol for Japan and for all humanity. The post-war reconstruction 
started immediately after America’s occupation of Japan. Already in 1949, a competition 
to build a memorial park for the victims of the nuclear bomb and the achievement of 
peace had been opened by the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Construction Law (Schofi eld 
& Cocroft, 2016, p. 35). The winner of this design competition was the architect Kenzo 
Tange, whose project aimed at refl ecting the new democratic ideals and the achievement 
of global peace (Utaka, 2009). Tange presented his design project with the following 
justifi cation:
Peace is not naturally obtained easily for us from nature and gods. We 
need to fi ght and acquire our peace strongly and practically…to realize this 
understanding of peace, we are going to develop and construct this museum 
as a factory of peace. (Tange 1949 cited in Utaka, 2009, p.37)
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“The site is representative 
of the paradoxes regarding 
Japan’s approach to the 
nuclear disaster, to the West 
and to the collective memory 
of the Second World War.”
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Figure 1. Hiroshima 
National Peace 
Memorial Museum 
(Fontanella, 2015)
The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park was built nearby the Genbaku 
Dome, between the Hon River and the Motoyasu River. Completed 
between 1950 and 1964, it is composed of a park and a museum that 
provide the interpretation of the Genbaku Dome itself (Fig.1) (Schofi eld 
& Cocroft, 2016, p. 35). The architectural style of the museum is inspired 
by Le Corbusier’s design of the Palace of Soviets (Utaka, 2009, p.37). 
In 1995, the dome was proposed to the UNESCO Committee to be 
enlisted in the World Heritage List under the name Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial for World Heritage criterion VI (ICOMOS, 1996, p.117). 
Despite strong opposition from the US and Chinese Delegations, the 
inscription succeeded on the basis of the following justifi cation:
Firstly, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, Genbaku 
Dome, stands as a permanent witness to the terrible 
disaster that occurred when the atomic bomb was 
used as a weapon for the fi rst time in the history of 
mankind. 
Secondly, the Dome itself is the only building in 
existence that can convey directly a physical image 
of the tragic situation immediately after the bombing.
Thirdly, the Dome has become a universal monument 
for all mankind, symbolizing the hope for perpetual 
peace and the ultimate elimination of all nuclear 
weapons on earth (ICOMOS, 1996, p.115)
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Conservation and interpretation of the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial
A fi rst understanding of the signifi cance that the Hiroshima Peace Memorial has acquired 
over time can already be obtained by reviewing anecdotes related to the construction of 
the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the conservation and interpretation measures 
that have been adopted since then. In addition, divergences that emerged after the 
nomination of the site in the World Heritage List will be explained to shed more light on 
the cultural signifi cance and its transnational entanglements.
Political ambiguity
As discussed before, the sudden shift from nationalism to the support of democratic ideals 
represents a deep mark in the Japanese national identity (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, 
p.181). This political confusion is also refl ected in the history of the memorialisation and 
interpretation of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Schofi eld & Cocroft 2016, p.38). During 
the war, the architect Tange Kenzo, who designed the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, 
had been a strong supporter of nationalism and he contributed to the realisation of many 
celebratory monuments for the Japanese Empire. For this reason, his sudden conversion 
to democratic ideals raised some concerns, suggesting his opportunistic attitude based 
on the political situation (Utaka, 2009, p.37). This fact enforces Ōe’s commentary on 
this particular stage of Japanese history, claiming that despite the apparent supportive 
response in reconstructing the nation in line with the directives from the US, Japan was 
still far from being democratic (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009. p.182).
Time for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
When addressing the interpretation and symbolism of the nuclear disaster related to the 
Hiroshima Genbaku Dome, time is one of the most important concepts. In the narratives 
of the nuclear, there is a tendency to represent the tragedy of the 6th of August 1945 as a 
timeless event (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, p. 133). The conservation of the dome itself 
aims to preserve the eternal condition of ruin for the building, keeping it exactly as it was 
after the explosion (ICOMOS, 1996, p. 115). The discussion on the preservation of the 
Genbaku Dome began in 1949; there was a general agreement on demolishing it, given 
that it is a reminder of a tragic event from which the people of Hiroshima were trying to 
recover (Utaka, 2009, pp. 37-38, 39). The Hiroshima City Government agreed only in 
1966 to preserve the building as it is, infl uenced by the new perspective presented by the 
project of Tange, who suggested the promotion of the site as a symbol of global peace 
(Utaka, 2009, p. 38; ICOMOS, 1996, p. 115). Since then, the building has been fenced in 
and several interventions have been made to maintain its state of conservation (Fig. 2) 
(Schofi eld & Cocroft, 2016, p. 36; ICOMOS, 1996, p. 116). Another link to the importance 
of time for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial is visible in the recurrent representation of a 
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clock, which always reads the time at which the bomb hit: at 8:16 am. It can be seen in 
the Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims (Fig. 3).
World Heritage inscription
Heritage is a strong tool for the manipulation of history, and it is often used by governments 
to help create an authorised national identity (Schofi eld & Cocroft, 2016, p.46). For this 
reason, many concerns about the shared meanings of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial 
(Genbaku Dome) were raised when its nomination to the World Heritage List was 
presented in 1995 (Schofi eld & Cocroft, 2016, p. 39). Already when analysing the name 
of the site, there is a clear paradox in the international and national interpretation of it, as 
the English name evokes the achievement of peace, while the Japanese name “Genbaku 
Dome” (Dome of the Nuclear Bomb) directly refers to the nuclear disaster (Schofi eld & 
Cocroft, 2016, p.35). To quote Renan (1882) in his discourse What is a Nation?, both 
the international and national interpretations of heritage have to be understood as a tool 
for the reconstruction of national identity (Renan, 1882, p. 10). Therefore, in the case of 
the Japanese interpretation, the nation is unifi ed by the shared suff ering caused by the 
nuclear disaster, whereas the international point of view aims to remember the costly and 
drastic achievement of peace. In light of its nomination to UNESCO’s World Heritage List, 
both the United States and Chinese delegations raised their opposition to the recognition 
of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial as equally shared heritage for all humanity (UNESCO, 
1996, p. 69). In the US’s point of view, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial should not have 
been listed, being a war related site. As the World Heritage List was understood by the 
US delegation as representative of the best human achievements, the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial could not be seen as a priority for the Convention (Schofi eld & Cocroft, 2016, 
p. 40). In addition, it could be argued that the recognition of this site as World Heritage 
would have highlighted the position of the US as the assailant of Japan at the end of 
the war, ignoring the reasons that brought the US to such a drastic solution (Schofi eld 
& Cocroft, 2016, p. 46). China supported the US delegation by arguing that there was 
historical inaccuracy in the nomination proposal, which presented Japan as a victim of 
the Second World War, with no mention of the war crimes that were committed by Japan 
in those years (Crawford, 2003., p. 110; UNESCO, 1996, p. 69, Annex V). Despite the 
many attempts from both delegations to contradict the nomination, the site was inscribed 
in 1996 under criterion VI, and the US’s and China’s concerns were recorded in the 
report as Annex V (Schofi eld & Cocroft, 2016, p. 40; UNESCO, 1996, Annex V).
Same history, different memories
The discussion related to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial’s inscription in the World Heritage 
List has further highlighted the gap in understanding between Japan and the US related 
to the site. Although the fi nal purpose of the site is to promote global peace and to remind 
all of humanity that such a tragedy should never be repeated (Utaka, 2009, p. 35), the 
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Figure 2. Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial 
(Genbaku 
Dome) under 
restoration in 2015 
(Fontanella, 2015)
collective memory of the site has been constructed diff erently by both 
nations (Utaka, 2009, p. 43). This chapter aims to identify the elements 
of contrast that can be found in the narratives of both countries, with 
a special focus on Japanese literary and cinematographic production, 
which is considered a valid refl ection of Japanese anxiety about the 
nuclear power and pollution caused by Western technology (Walker, 
2016, p. 262).
Science and nature
In the Japanese scenario, the horror of the atomic bomb generated 
a sudden need to document and express the disaster through many 
means, such as art, literature, and cinema (Novielli & Scrolavezza, 
2012, p. 149). As an incubator for these narratives, the new identity of 
Hiroshima has been continuously fed by these forms of interpretation 
(Utaka, 2009, p. 38). The literature genre that emerged in the post-war 
period is commonly known by the name Genbaku Bungaku, literally 
meaning “the literature of the nuclear bomb” (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 
2009, p. 127). It comprises productions coming from both hibakusha, 
and writers who have not directly experienced the 6th and 8th of 
August 1945, but who have nevertheless felt the need to talk about it. 
Hibakusha is the term used to represent the people whose lives have 
been directly aff ected by the nuclear disaster (Novielli & Scrolavezza. 
2012, p. 151). In these narratives, the bombing is always represented 
as a sudden interruption of everyday life (Novielli & Scrolavezza. 2012, 
p. 149), a silent white light bringing death and destruction (Bienati & 
Scrolavezza 2009, pp. 130-131). This representation of the moment 
of the explosion implies a personal involvement in the tragedy, in 
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contrast to the foreign interpretation that always depicts it as a mushroom-shaped 
cloud. A common thread connecting these various interpretations is the role of nature. 
The harmony of nature is a fundamental element in Japanese culture, and its role has 
become uncertain with Japan’s introduction to Western technology (Novielli, 2010, p. 
78). The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki therefore represent the culmination of 
these concerns, symbolising technology winning over nature, the West destroying the 
spirit of Japan (Novielli & Scrolavezza 2012, p. 150).
This abrupt break with nature is represented in many ways. An example that aims to 
express the lack of harmony in the post-nuclear nature of Hiroshima is the book Kakitsubata 
(The Crazy Iris, 1951), written by the author Ibuse Masuji (Bienati & Scrolavezza 2009, p. 
135). From the same author is also the book Kuroi Ame (Black Rain, 1965), a novel based 
on the tragedy of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and the “black rain” that followed the 
explosion, releasing radioactive waste that caused the death of many hibakusha in the 
years after the disaster (Novielli & Scrolavezza, 2012, pp. 150-151). Water is symbol of life 
and purity, and yet here it is seen as a false friend that brings death. Water’s symbolism 
is recurrent in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. 
The end of the destruction
For all the above explained reasons, the events of 6 August 1945 are perceived by 
the hibakusha as the beginning of a new kind of destruction by an invisible enemy: 
radioactive contamination (Novielli & Scrolavezza, 2012, pp. 151-152). In her book Ritual 
of Death or matsuri no ba, the author Hayashi Kyoko ironically concludes by quoting the 
end of an American documentary on the Second World War, which says “and so the 
destruction ended” (1975). The quote remains unexplained, and yet full of signifi cance, 
presenting the American point of view of this event, which is seen as the achievement 
of global peace and the end of destruction (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 2009, p. 134). The 
contrast generated by the US collective memory on the Hiroshima Peace Memorial can 
be understood by analysing how it is explained in authorised school history textbooks 
in the US. Textbooks are a valid tool for understanding the constructed memory of a 
nation, as they present an interpretation of history as it is wished the future generations 
will remember it (Crawford, 2003, p. 108). The drastic decision of the American president 
Harry Truman to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is usually justifi ed as a desperate 
recource to prevent a costly invasion of Japan (Crawford, 2003, pp. 111-112). There are 
divergent opinions as to whether Japan had been given the opportunity to surrender or 
not, as Japanese textbooks would stress that the Japanese were ready to admit their 
defeat if they had had the chance (Crawford, 2003, p. 114). This discrepancy in the 
collective memory of both countries is the proof that George Orwell’s words are true, 
“who controls the past, controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past” 
(1949, p. 24).
Social, Cultural and Political Implications of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial’s Interpretations | 209
Figure 3. Hiroshima 
National Peace 
Memorial Hall 
for the Atomic 
Bomb Victims 
(Fontanella, 2015)
Japan and the nuclear
The discussions about the Hiroshima Peace Memorial represent the 
beginning of the discourse on nuclear power in Japan. The Genbaku 
Bungaku (literature about the nuclear bomb) set the basis for the later 
Kaku Bungaku (literature about nuclear energy), continuously changing 
the general perception of this terrible power (Bienati & Scrolavezza, 
2009, p. 128). The following chapter provides an overview of the 
development of the discourse on nuclear energy from 1945 to 2011, 
the year of the Fukushima accident. Once again, the analysis is based 
on Japanese post-war cinema and literature, as main representatives 
of Japanese perceptions of the topic.
A foreign enemy
As already stressed above, the post-war political and social situation 
of Japan generated new and peculiar cultural productions in relation 
to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial’s interpretation and conservation. 
These cultural productions are strictly associated with the new fear of 
nuclear power. They mostly represent apocalyptic scenarios caused 
by a misuse of science, refl ecting the community’s need to provide 
testimony about and to denounce the tragic event of the nuclear 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Novielli, 2010, p. 30). It must 
be acknowledged that in the years following the end of the war, 
several nuclear tests were carried out in the Pacifi c by the US, causing 
psychological distress and concerns among the Japanese. These tests 
led to an episode of radioactive fallout that caused the death of some 
Japanese fi shermen around the Marshall Islands, where American 
scientists were working on a Bravo shot test of the hydrogen bomb 
(Tanaka, 2005, p. 2). This event became a source of inspiration for 
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the fi lm producer Honda Ishirō, who, after visiting Hiroshima, decided to create a movie 
to denounce the catastrophes caused by the misuse of science and the horrors of war 
(Novielli, 2010, p. 78). His product was the famous movie Godzilla, known in Japanese 
as Gojira (1954). The result of radioactive fallout caused by American scientists, Gojira 
is a terrible combination of a gorilla and a whale (kujira), symbolising the paradox of 
nature transformed by technology (Tanaka, 2005, p. 3). The paradox is further intensifi ed 
by the fact that in this movie, the enemy is not the monster, but the American scientists 
who created it (Novielli, 2010, p. 78). Godzilla is therefore a victim and an assailant, a 
“sad monster that mirrors human being” (Tanaka 2005, p. 8). Gojira is the fi rst example 
of a new genre, called kaijū eiga (movies with strange beasts) (Novielli, 2010, p. 78). 
The movie was exported to the United States in 1956, and in 1998 the producer Roland 
Emmerich presented an American version of it, erasing all connection with radiation and 
nuclear tests. With time, Gojira transformed from a sad monster, a metaphor for the 
senseless nature of war, into a superhero of justice (Novielli, 2010, p. 78), a refl ection of 
the American interpretation of the Second World War.
The enemy from within
In addition to the political consequences explained above, Emperor Hirohito’s 
announcement to the nation also implied the end of shintoism as the offi  cially-recognised 
state religion (Pruett 2010, p. 12). Shintoism is the religion on which the Japanese idea of 
harmony with nature is based, as it can be seen in the Kojiki (Record of ancient matters, 
712), the fi rst written narrative on the genesis of Japan (Villani, 2006). The claims that 
place the sun-goddess Amaterasu at the origins of the imperial dynasty also belong to this 
book (Walker, 2016, p. 27). In 1995, another terrible consequence of the Japanese defeat 
in the Second World War emerged, marking a new shift in Japanese identity in relation 
to nuclear power and to other countries. The fall of shintoism led to the creation of many 
diverse new religions, shinsyukyō, often based on the fear—or acknowledgement—of 
the end of society (Pruett, 2010, p. 12). Among these religions is the Aum Shinrikyō, a 
sect founded by Asahara Shōko. It already counted above 9,000 adepts in the country 
(Novielli, 2010, p. 13) when, in 1994, they made their fi rst appearance with a terrorist 
attack in Matsumoto, killing seven people (Asukai & Maekawa, 2002, p. 149). It only 
became clear that they were behind this event on 20 March 1995, when fi ve members 
of the sect attacked fi ve important stations in Tokyo, causing the death of 12 people 
and intoxicating thousands more (Asukai & Maekawa, 2002, p. 150). A major cause of 
shock was the mode in which this terrorist attack was carried out, as the sect hit the most 
populated city of Japan, interrupting the daily routine by using sarin, a colourless and 
odourless chemical weapon (Novielli, 2010, p. 30). The connection to the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki is therefore obvious, with the only diff erence being that this time, 
the inappropriate and drastic use of science was coming from the inside (Novielli, 2010, 
p. 13). This event caused deep distress within the population, modifying their perception 
of nuclear energy and irremediably changing their position as victims of nuclear power. 
Social, Cultural and Political Implications of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial’s Interpretations | 211
This distress is refl ected in Japanese cultural production with the creation of horror 
movies in which the fear of unexpected and silent death is represented as a curse that 
will chase whoever comes in contact with it. Representative of this genre are the movies 
Ring and Ring 2, produced by Nakata Hideo in 1998-1999, in which the malediction that 
causes unexpected and silent death is on a mysterious tape (Novielli, 2010, p. 30). The 
problem of fanaticism, which generated additional crises for the Japanese population’s 
identity issue, is another of the matters addressed by Ōe during his career. An example 
of his engagement with the topic is the novel Chūgaeri (Somersault, 1999) (Bienati & 
Scrolavezza, 2009, p. 185).
A defi nitive shift from the position of victim to that of being responsible for the inappropriate 
use of science (with consequent radioactive fallout) is seen in the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Accident, which occurred on 11 March 2011 following a strong earthquake and 
tsunami that struck Japan’s east coast (Walker, 2016, p.293). To paraphrase the words 
of the Japanese writer Murakami Haruki at a conference in Barcelona in June 2011, 
Japan has to fi nally face the reality that they have become directly responsible for a 
nuclear disaster themselves, and that the enemy should therefore not be considered a 
foreign power anymore (Bienati, 2013, pp. 31-32). Murakami continues, saying that the 
words engraved at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, “Rest in peace, Shall the mistake 
not be repeated”, should now be re-written as a reminder (Bienati, 2013, p.32), this time 
directed at everyone, with no exclusions.
Conclusion
The Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) is the only standing building that 
directly recalls the fi rst nuclear disaster in human history. During the reconstruction of 
the city of Hiroshima, the preservation of this building became the centre of attention, as 
maintaining it would have constantly reminded the local community of the atrocities of 
the war and the terrible consequences of the Japanese defeat. With the country on the 
path of both urban and ideological restoration, there were concerns about the message 
this memorial could send. With the contributions of architect Kenzo Tange, the building 
was preserved as an awareness-raising tool to prevent humanity from committing the 
same kinds of atrocities in the future. This interpretation soon proved to be strictly in line 
with the Japanese post-war ideology, which was characterised by a resigned approach 
to nuclear power. The humiliation of the defeat and the conditions under which they were 
forced to surrender caused a shift in position for the Japanese from assailant to victim of 
the war, as well as years of uncertainty and change at a political, social, and cultural level. 
Through an analysis of the Japanese approach to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial and 
the cultural productions related to it, it has been possible to gain a better understanding 
of the factors that deeply infl uenced the Japanese people’s perception of themselves. 
It also raised awareness about the discrepancies between Japan and other countries, 
pointing out unresolved issues with the US. In particular, the relationship between Japan 
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and the US has been the subject of many cultural productions, including Godzilla and 
Hayashi Kyoko’s matsuri no ba. However, most of these interpretations contradicted the 
image that Japan wants to create for itself, as the Nobel Prize Ōe Kenzaburō pointed out 
in his discourse in 1995, in which he claimed these elements to be part of the Japanese 
ambiguity. Most of these ambiguities can be linked to the cultural, social, and political 
implications of the Hiroshima bombing of 6 August 1945, which have generated a colourful 
variety of interpretations expressed through Japanese cultural productions. It therefore 
cannot be denied that the Hiroshima Peace Memorial has played a fundamental role 
in the process of shaping Japanese identity, as it is representative of such a diffi  cult 
stage of Japanese history. For these reasons, it is important to pursue an understanding 
of the Japanese perception of the site and of nuclear power in order to gain a better 
understanding of the issues that affl  ict contemporary Japan.
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Safeguarding and promoting Great 
War Heritage as remembrance of the 
confl icts XIXth century ideologies 
brought to Europe
Introduction
Di queste case
non è rimasto
che qualche
brandello di muro
Di tanti
che mi corrispondevano
non è rimasto
neppure tanto
Ma nel mio cuore
nessuna croce manca
È il mio cuore
il paese più straziato
Of these houses
nothing remains
but the rubble
of a ruined wall
Of the many
who were so close to me
nothing remains
not even that
But in my heart
not one cross is missing
This ravaged village
is my heart
This free verse poem by Giuseppe Ungaretti (1888-1970) was written in 1916 in the Friuli 
region (North-East Italy), where the author served as an infantry soldier in the trenches 
during the Great War. The village of San Martino del Carso was, in fact, razed to the 
ground in 1916 during the battles for the conquest of Mount St. Michele, a strategic 
landmark for both armies. This poem depicts very well not only the feelings the soldiers 
experienced on the fi eld during the periods of battle, but also the ravaged state in which 
many places were left at the end of the war. In this case, the poet refers to a human 
settlement literally swept away by the force of the war; nothing was left but rubble and 
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corpses. Many other sites were heavily modifi ed throughout the four 
long years of battle, but amongst those were also sites not previously 
settled, mostly mountains on the southern front and fi elds on the eastern 
one. It was at these sites that the harshest confl icts took place, leaving 
behind a landscape bearing the marks of this moment in history that 
which can be observed even a century later1. In this sense, it was the 
last war of its kind, opening a new era of modern warfare. As Ferguson 
states in The War of the World: History Age of Hatred “The fi rst world 
war changed everything” (Ferguson, N. 2006)
The changes brought about by this war can still be seen today. Despite 
the potential lessons taught to us by these happenings, current political 
situations can make one think we didn’t learn much from the experience 
in the end. How can raising awareness about the memory of past 
confl icts, taking Denti del Pasubio (a militarised landscape on Mount 
Pasubio, near Vicenza, Italy) as an example, be used to promote a 
sense of solidarity among contemporary citizens? This question inspired 
this paper, which will analyse the changes brought about by historic 
events in particular. It will support the idea that heritage sites such as 
the Denti del Pasubio, which infl uenced not only the landscape but also 
the attitude of Europe towards war, can fi nd a new use in moments of 
uncertainty. The main idea is that the safeguarding and promotion of 
this kind of heritage at a European level can help foster peace, rather 
than simply promote remembrance of the nationalist movements of the 
1 Cities were mostly left untouched, since warfare was, as for in the XIX century, 
still a business to be dealt with by soldiers, literally on battlefi elds.
Figure 1. Next 
to Cima Palon, 
were the two 
extremities of the 
front known as the 
Denti del Pasubio 
or Pasubioplatten. 
(Pagani, 2017) 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, the paper will fi rst discuss the ideologies of 
nationalism following Hobsbawm’s theories of invented traditions, a social feature of 
most European powers since the French Revolution that re-shaped the world. Then 
the case study of Denti del Pasubio will be introduced as one of many heritage sites 
of the First World War that could be used to sustain the ideal of European peace. This 
section will include an historical introduction to the case study, a description of the site 
and of the ideologies linked to it, as well as an overview of the measures undertaken 
for its safeguarding. The chapter “Why safeguarding” deals then with the ideologies of 
European peace sustained by projects such as the European Cultural Heritage Label 
(as one example among the many others carried out in the public and private sectors). 
Finally the conclusion will attempt to link the ideas of the paper to the current political 
situation in order to highlight the importance of war heritage sites.
On the Western Front between France and the German Empire, the frontlines were 
created using fortresses and hundreds of kilometres of trenches. Meanwhile, on the 
Italian ‘Southern’ front, the geomorphic features of the territory were used for the 
fortifi cation of the frontline between the two confl icting powers: the Kingdom of Italy and 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For most of the war, the border between these two powers 
almost entirely crossed a large section of the alps from one mountain peak to another. 
It extended from the Swiss border to Italy near Mt. Ortler to the Adriatic Sea, more or 
less around the Soča/Isonzo river, which the trenches surrounded until autumn 1917. 
The border and the regions of Trentino and South Tirol were the main reasons for Italy 
to change sides after the beginning of the war. These territories were annexed to the 
Austrian Empire after the Third Italian War of Independence in 1866 and were later 
reclaimed by the Italian kingdom. Italian Irredentism was the patriotic movement that 
developed at the end of the century that “sought to deliver Italian lands from foreign rule 
[…]; their object was to emancipate the lands of Trentino and South Tirol, Gorizia, Istria, 
Trieste, Ticino, Nice, Corsica, and Malta from Austrian, Swiss, French, and British rule” 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica).
Ideologies
Eric Hobsbawm and the invention of tradition
In The Invention of Traditions, Hobsbawm analyses the phenomenon of the creation 
of identities through traditions. He defi nes an invented tradition as a “set of practices 
[…] which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 1). He uses examples 
such as the folklore of the Scottish Highlands,and suggests that such traditions are 
pieces of evidence that have to be taken into consideration when analysing a society 
and a culture. The half century preceding the First World War was the period when the 
“invention of traditions” arose. Many states had been recently unifi ed or existed for only 
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short periods of time, and processes of unifi cation were still ongoing that lead to the 
creation of standard national languages, and identifi cation with symbols such as fl ags, 
national heroes, hymns, and so on. It was a period in which phrases like “We have made 
Italy: now we must make Italians” could be heard, with this line in particular being voiced 
by Massimo d’Azeglio, one of the fi ercest Italian unionists, in 1861.
In the case of Europe, religion also played a fundamental role in the creation of traditions; 
it was a trait of most European nation states, which shared many religious festivities, 
for example. Furthermore, the social traditions of the time were often developed around 
royal families (most of Europe). It was also the time in which the masses started their 
mobilisations and state traditions were created, such as the First of May, which remains 
a ritual for the working class. Furthermore, the re-creation of sport traditions occurred: 
it is not a coincidence that the modern Olympic Games recalling the ancient Greek 
traditions were held in 1896 as a fi eld of comparison between nations. All these features 
were present in the life of most of Europe’s inhabitants, with models of traditions being 
created that pitted nations and peoples against each other. The whole process proved 
very successful, as we now know that nationalisms, and the traditions related to them, 
became the driving force that shook the world not only before and during the Great War, 
but throughout the twentieth century with the onset of the Second World War and the 
Cold War.
Remembrance
The First World War has remained a vivid memory in the minds of the people, both for the 
soldiers who fought in it and the families who were touched by it. Jay Winter states that 
“the war was remembered initially and overwhelmingly as an event in Family History” 
(Winter, 1999, p. 42). It was a shock to the lives of millions of families who had either 
lost their husbands, sons, or brothers to the war, or had seen them come back wounded, 
with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Shell Shock), unable to take part in family life. 
Traces of this remain alive in family history up until now, but with the fl ow of time, the 
acts of remembrance, personal or collective, are becoming scarce. In the case of Mt. 
Pasubio, broader actions have been taken by the authorities throughout the years, more 
as a form of “healing through remembrance” than of what Winter defi nes as “memory 
business” (1999, p. 3). The war has become part of local history, and has left huge 
traces. The province of Vicenza, where Mt. Pasubio and much of the war landscape is 
administratively situated, bears marks that have become a sort of collective memory. The 
emblem of the province is an ensemble of the fl ag of the city and the four war memorials, 
all of them in the Pre-Alps: the Ossuaries in Mt. Cimone, Asiago, Mt. Grappa, and Mt. 
Pasubio. The entire mountainous region is crowded with memorials and cemeteries, the 
latter normally divided (and funded) by country. In the cities, entire districts dedicate their 
streets to the battalions, brigades, and sections of the army that fought the war. Nearly all 
villages and cities of the region, and many nationwide, remember the fallen on a yearly 
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basis with commemorations. Some memorial recreations of the war 
are also part of this act of remembrance (e.g. Mt. Novegno), but these 
are often linked with the new waves of nationalism that are becoming 
a reality again.
These are examples of what Jay Winter would defi ne as collective 
memories: they originate from the will of the people to share their war 
trauma, and to remember; it is their willingness to make these memories 
manifest themselves that makes them important. They become a way to 
overcome the traumatic experience through common memorialization, 
since “no man goes to war alone” (Winter, 1999, p. 60).
The case study
The decades before the start of the First World War were fi lled with 
development due to the industrial revolution combined with the 
imperial expansion of the Western powers, which managed to set up 
their respective empires by the beginning of the war. The arms race 
between the nations, the ever more technologically advanced warfare 
techniques, and the introduction of tanks, airplanes, and weapons, 
turned a war that was supposed to only last a few months into one 
of the largest confl icts that humans ever engaged in, one that would 
lead to over 37 million casualties (Encyclopaedia Britannica). The 
international atmosphere was increasingly tense, with an escalating 
number of crises and small confl icts. The European powers were still 
very young. Following the example of France and the creation of the 
United Kingdom, Germany had been unifi ed into the Second Reich 
Figure 2. The peaks 
fortifi ed through 
excavations, with 
deep trenches 
at their top 
(Pagani, 2017).
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during the second half of the nineteenth century, Italy in 1861, and Austria-Hungary in 
1867. Some of these nations had colossal empires, such as the British and the French, 
with overseas colonies and protectorates. Many others also had overseas territories, 
which brought the confl ict to a larger scale: a World War.
The militarism in which the states had fallen had spread throughout the peoples and had 
become palpable: some political parties were urging for war, and nationalism reigned over 
Europe. Patriotism, loyalty to one’s nation (and God), and devotion to it were unifying the 
newly ‘created’ peoples, while the almost automatic comparison and contrast with other 
nations was increasing the distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Assman, Hölscher. 1988, p. 13).
Nearly one year after the outbreak of war in the ‘powder keg of Europe’, the Kingdom 
of Italy still had not taken its position. On the night of 23 May 1915, the Italian Army was 
ordered to attack the Habsburg forces and to take back the territories of Trentino and 
South Tirol for Italy. The border between the two powers remained more or less the same 
for the entire duration of the confl ict, with the exception of the Friulian front, which was 
pushed back in 1917 during the Battle of Caporetto2.
The site
One of the most important areas along the front, cast between the Asiago Plateau and the 
Adige Valley and Lake Garda, is Mount Pasubio. The mountain range where most of the 
fi ghting took place includes the Adamello-Brenta massif to the west, the Asiago plateau 
with Monte Ortigara and the Dolomitic Pale di S. Martino on its back, Monte Civetta and 
the Marmolada, as well as Monte Grappa. Some of these names that are known today 
for being inscribed to the UNESCO World Heritage List were then fortresses of the Alps. 
And they were fortresses in the literal sense of the word, since some of these mountains 
were either used as natural defences to build fortifi cations or were hollowed out to turn 
them into unassailable bunkers.
The mountain range is shared today by the Province of Vicenza and the Autonomous 
Province of Trento, and it marks the provincial border between the regions of Veneto and 
Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tirol. Next to Cima Palon, two peaks of the massif, separated 
by a saddle, were the two extremities of the front known as the Denti del Pasubio or 
Pasubioplatten (Fig.1). The two peaks, known in Italian as Dente Austriaco and Dente 
Italiano and in German as Österreichische Platte and Italienische Platte, look “like 
two prows of a dreadnought”3 (Cipriani, Magrin. 2009, p. 59) facing each other. Both 
peaks had been fortifi ed through excavations, with deep trenches at their top (Fig. 2) 
and bottom, and a series of tunnels that had been hollowed out making the two crests 
2 Then, a coalition of Austro-Hungarian and German forces managed 
to push back the Italian defences to the Piave River.
3 Own translation
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“Such places of remembrance 
must therefore be safeguarded 
and promoted: after all, the 
knowledge of history can help 
us now and in the future to 
avoid repeating past mistakes.”
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huge fortresses. These spurs formed the front, the bridgehead that 
both armies were not allowed to step back from, because that would 
have meant the enemy could easily reach the backlines making them 
vulnerable. On the other hand, the goal of both sides was to take 
control of the Pasubio, so as to be able to claim the contested lands.
Short history
After, the front known as ‘Italian Front’, or ‘Southern Front’, ran along 
the alps down to the border to the east. This border line was more or 
less maintained until the Battle of Caporetto (1917), when a coalition of 
Austrian/German Imperial forces managed to breach the Italian lines 
to cross Tagliamento River and set up a new frontline along the Piave 
River. Althought it was strong national defeat, intimidating the entire 
Kingdom, the episode also managed to bring more unity behind the 
lines and to the whole of Italy, fostering resistance nationwide. The front 
line did not develop any further until the armistice in November 1918.
Meanwhile, the Pasubio played – at least for the fi rst two years of war 
and until Caporetto – a fundamental role. Abandoned by the Austrians, 
the summit remained under Italian control until 1916. In this fi rst year 
and throughout the winter of 1915/16, both armies kept positions and 
worked on strategic fortifi cations while fi ghting the fi rst real battle: 
that of survival against the harshness of winter in the high mountains 
(Cipriani, 2009, p. 33). The warfare started in the spring of 1916, when 
the Austrian Kaiserjäger attacked the front in a battle today known 
Figure 3. Two Denti, 
Mount Pasubio 
(Pagani, 2017)
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as the Strafexpedition4, (German for punitive expedition, intended to punish Italy for 
betraying the alliance), the Spring Off ensive, Trentino Off ensive or Zum Po/Po Off ensive. 
The Imperial army took control of the peak, which then became Dente Austriaco, and the 
front line on the Pasubio was set, where it then remained until the very end of the war. 
Because of the importance of the Pasubio in preventing enemy troops from entering the 
plain, the Porte del Pasubio (Pasubio’s Doors), the saddle between Cima Palon, was 
blocked, and the motto of the Royal forces became “Di qui non si passa!”5. The entire 
year of 1916 was the most brutal: both armies launched themselves in attacks on the 
enemy’s fronts, unsuccessfully trying to climb the two Denti in desperate attempts to take 
control of the mountain (Fig. 3). The fi nal attacks from the Italian side came in autumn of 
1916, but the Dente Austriaco was unconquerable:
The Dente is on average 70m high completely dominating the underlying 
area. Where the rocks are less elevated and more accessible, the Selletta 
dei Denti, the way through is inevitable, thus being under the crossfi re of 
the many machine guns in the hollows (Cipriani, Magrin. 2009, p. 71)
The winter of 1916/17 is remembered as one of the harshest of the last century, as 
it reached records of rain and snowfall throughout the continent. On the Pasubio the 
snowfall reached 7-8 metres (Cipriani, 2009). From then onwards, and during the year 
1917, the war on the Pasubio turned into mine warfare, with only few frontal attacks. The 
Austrian troops started to dig the Ellison Gallery, a tunnel crossing the Dente Austriaco 
to reach underneath the Dente Italiano, with the goal of blowing it up. On the Italian 
side, similar galleries were built, aimed at interrupting Austro-Hungarian attempts to 
blow up the stronghold. This lead to the creation of the Strada delle 52 (Road of the 52 
Tunnels), a masterpiece of military engineering, climbing up more than 700 metres in 
height along 6555 metres on the precipitous slopes of the South Face of Mt. Pasubio. 
With its 2280 metres of hollowed tunnels, this mule track was realised between February 
and November of 1917, and – protected from Imperial fi re – it served to refurnish the 
Italian troops on the front.
The fi nal chapter of the story of the Denti del Pasubio starts at 4.30 am on the 13th March 
1918. It began the moment that a mine of 50,000 kg of mixed explosives detonated 
under the Dente Italiano.
[…] to the gloomy thunder of the explosion which made the front crumble 
in apocalyptic ruin, followed the slam of the shattered rocks and their 
falling back down and rolling on the ground. Together came frightening 
bursts of fl ames and gases, for which the Dente appeared submerged in 
a sea of fl ames with terrifying tongues of fi re leaping like ranting snakes6 
(Pieropan, Baldi. 1989)
4 aka Battle of Asiago, because the Austrians took control of the city and the plateau of Asiago.
5 You don’t come through here. Own translation
6 Own translation.
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No infantry attack followed; the front line remained unaltered. Despite the last attacks, 
the lines kept up while other more important battles were being fought on the Piave- 
Grappa front section. The heart wrenching war was coming to an end: the mine warfare 
had not brought much loss of life, and after its end, guns and artillery remained silent. 
The enthusiasm for fi ghting had long vanished; the men were exhausted waiting for 
matters to be solved on the Piave, around which the last battles were fought before the 
Armistice of Villa Giusti in Padova on 3rd November 1918. This was a day in which, for 
the fi rst time, the Italian tricolour fl ag fl ew over the Buonconsiglio Castle in Trento.
Nationalism and its propaganda were the wood fuelling the fi re of the Great War. 
Many people were anticipating a war’s beginning, impatient to draw their swords. This 
nationalism helped to unify countries whose subcultures were still struggling to come 
together, especially in a nation such as Austria-Hungary, where the cultures were at least 
as many as the eleven7 languages spoken on the national territory. Despite the horrors 
of the First World War, there were fl ashes of humanity. Take, for example, when the 
numbers of prisoners of war increased, and the men realised that, behind uniforms with 
different fl ags were the same humans as they were, and not simply the monsters depicted 
in propaganda. Or when, during the Christmas Truce of 1914, soldiers of opposing forces 
unoffi cially crossed No Man’s Land to exchange greetings, food, and souvenirs, hand 
back war prisoners, and share the feasting moment with others. At the end, on both 
sides of the trenches, there were widespread Christian values that were a fundamental 
part of the social structures of that time. Values of Dio, Patria, Famiglia (God, Homeland, 
Family) attributed to Ferdinando Urli (Cipriani, Magrin, 2009, p. 8) were shared by most 
as much as those of camaraderie, sacrifi ce, and loyalty. The summation of these was the 
sacrifi ce of dying for one’s ideals.
Events like the Christmas Truce were not appreciated by the commanding forces, as 
such heart-softening situations were not supposed to reach the soldiers or the people 
working on the home front. For this reason, commanders censored letters from soldiers 
to their families that could have spread the awareness of the carnage at the fronts. 
Men reached levels of alienation that allowed them to shoot masses of people and fi ght 
brutally with bayonets.
State of conservation
According to Nataloni, even during the war people were incentivised to recuperate as 
many military manufactures as possible in order to re-use them. By the end of the war in 
1918, materials, bombs, munitions, as well as soldiers and even corpses paved the way 
to the valley. After the most dangerous objects were removed, one year after the armistice 
7 German, Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, Romanian, Croatian, Slovenian, 
Slovak, Serbian, Hungarian, Italian. (Kolb, C. 2017).
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at the end of 1919, the dangerous search of remains on the battlefi eld 
became one of the most popular activities for people returning to their 
lands. Nataloni defi nes three timeframes for the collection of fi nds: the 
fi rst was after WWI, to amass reusable materials. The second was 
after WWII, the period when the dismantlement of fortresses, armoured 
buildings, and military villages was undertaken (it became, again, an 
occupation for some families living in the areas, who risked their lives 
handling unexploded materials).
The third era of activity began around the 1970s. This time, the 
purpose was not to sell the fi nds, but rather to collect them as an act 
of remembrance. In this period (still ongoing) the sons, daughters, or 
grandchildren of people who witnessed or died in the Great War started 
looking for objects that could enrich the tales they heard. This lead to 
the fi rst private and public collections that can nowadays be found in 
many of the villages and in some of the fortresses around the former 
front.
Following the decades of private sector archaeology in the mountains 
and the apporaching centenary of the start of the Great War, in 2001 
the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Activities and The Ministry 
of Tourism took their fi rst safeguarding actions: law 78 regarding the 
“Tutelage of historic heritage of the First World War” was passed. Even 
Figure 4. DI QUI 
NON SI PASSA, 
reads the sign at the 
Porte del Pasubio 
(Pagani, 2017) 
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if the initial idea was to fi nance the safeguarding and recovery of the remains for the 
Province of Vicenza, it became a greater action for the safeguarding of the historic heritage 
related to the Great War. This law followed periods in which all European countries had 
taken care of building monuments and cemeteries to commemorate the ‘heroes of the 
motherland’. Law 78 went beyond that, however, since it was intended to safeguard 
heritage as a witness of the historic events that had shaken Europe, hence for the historic 
cultural values linked to the objects. The funds for the safeguarding projects are given 
through the Special technical and scientifi c committee for the historic heritage of the First 
World War, which was created in response to law 78. One of the main projects fi nanced 
was the Open-Air Museum of the Great War of Vicenza’s Pre-Alps. This included the 
conservation of the characteristic objects from the war, the safeguarding of the territory 
where interventions took place, as well as the organisation of management for the new 
system (2015). Furthermore, it included the interventions on the Pasubio, where the 
Road of the 52 Tunnels was fi xed, together with the many tunnels on the two Denti, and 
the memorial monuments by Porte del Pasubio. Trenches, as well as many posts on both 
peaks, were restored, and interventions were made for them to resist inclement weather.
Why safeguarding?
The projects of safeguarding the Great War’s heritage, such as that found at the Denti 
del Pasubio, does not merely address Italy, where now most of such heritage is. This 
safeguarding is an effort undertaken by, and for, the whole of Europe.
European ideals
After two world confl icts, which both started in the Old Continent, brought immense pain 
to the entire world, and after the failure of the League of Nations and of the peace 
agreements following the First World War, theorists who had believed in the unifi cation 
of the continent started to gain a following. Among them was Immanuel Kant, who in 
his essay Perpetual Peace had maintained how a federation could have brought peace 
to Europe (Brown, 2014). The grounds of what has nowadays become the European 
Union were those of building economic interdependency so as to avoid future confl icts 
like the two that just occurred. The economic agreements then spread to other fi elds, 
reaching health, environment, justice, security, and other policies. Nowadays, the EU’s 
achievements, including respect of human rights, environmental protection, common 
growth and economic stability, and, among many others, the freedom of movement 
and the abolition of borders8. There are many opinions against this, such that as Chris 
Bickerton, who claims that the EU has not at all brought peace (2015). It is a fact, however, 
that in the EU peace has now remained for seventy years, and actions and development 
of the EU have certainly fostered this period of peace, despite the tensions that may 
occur between member states.
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If regions such as Trentino-South Tirol and Tirol have become so intertwined, this also has 
to do with the developments of the EU and of its treaties. Projects such as the Euroregions, 
(e.g. Euregio Tirol-Südtirol-Trentino), systems of cooperation between two or more regions 
of different European countries, were promoted by the Council of Europe to create 
collective spaces (MOT, 2017) where development is communal and not slowed down by 
the presence of a border. This is remarkable, in a zone where, until the 70s, minorities (or 
majorities) had exponents who would take up arms against the (Italian) system.
Using this heritage
In the last fi fty years, the commemoration of the war has been supported by regional, 
national and international authorities. The EU has also achieved much in terms of the 
safeguarding of the heritage of the war, mostly through the Council of Europe. Projects such 
as the Euroregions draw people nearer to one another, in the case of Südtirol, by working 
towards a sort of comprehensive administrative system highlighting the importance of 
interconnection in that area. Tools such as the Faro Convention on the Value of Cultural 
Heritage and the many funds made available to the member countries for the promotion 
of heritage have brought many achievements in the fi eld of remembrance. One of the 
most relevant projects promoted by the EU through the European Commission was the 
European Heritage Label (EHL). The initiative was initially pushed by single member 
states of the Union and was then brought to fruition in 2011. This label, somehow similar 
to the UNESCO World Heritage one, focuses on sites with values related to Europe and 
the European Union, and to the path that brought to the foundation of the latter. The 
label and the organisations supporting it, mostly national heritage bodies, monitor the 
safeguarding and the promotion of the listed sites to make educational use out of them. 
Among the sites that have been awarded the label of European Heritage (European 
Commission, 2017d) are the World War I Eastern Front Cemetery No. 123 in Łużna-
Putski, Poland, which:
is the fi nal resting place for soldiers from [the] three armed forces, coming 
from territories that are part of today’s Austria, Hungary, Germany, 
Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Slovenia,.. and from different religious and 
linguistic backgrounds (European Commission, 2017c). 
The importance of these heritage sites and of their use in awareness-raising about 
the dark chapters of European history have seen growing attention in the last decade, 
especially with the centennial of the confl ict nearing. In this framework, more such sites 
have been proposed for EHL, such as Fort Cadine in Trento (Fondazione Museo Storico 
del Trentino, 2017); or even for the World Heritage List: Cemeteries and Memorials of 
the First World War is a joint nomination by Flanders, Wallonia, and France. The EHL is 
only one of the many examples of safeguarding that have been undertaken in the past 
few years on war sites. Throughout Europe, considerable amounts of funds have been 
allocated to World War Heritage in the past few years, many of them coming from EU 
228 | Heritage Conservation and Ideologies: a reader  
bodies through several programmes. In this heritage niche, previously managed mostly 
by the private sector, fi rst big steps are being taken. Nevertheless, smaller activities 
and support from local organisations remain essential; on this path, initiatives such 
as the European Cultural Heritage Year or the Cultural Heritage Weeks, the other two 
pillars of the EU’s action plan for cultural heritage, are fundamental to patronise and 
highlight heritage initiatives of diverse scale. In the former case are initiatives such as 
shared Heritage, a platform for heritage-related events to be organised throughout the 
European Heritage Year 2018, where organisations and institutions have the opportunity 
to advertise their heritage-related activities. In the latter case, it is a yearly programme 
with similar goals but a time schedule restricted to the month of September (European 
Heritage Days, 2017).
In a safeguarding framework like this, the legacy of a site like the Denti del Pasubio 
becomes important for the common use of the peoples of Italy, Austria, and Hungary. 
Such heritage should continue to be conserved and promoted as a symbol of the steps 
that had to be taken to reach the abolition of borders. Crossing borders has been diffi cult, 
and in some cases even impossible, for a long time; now the interrelation of the peoples 
of Europe has achieved much. The crossing of frontiers itself has become so taken for 
granted that recent political developments should make one ask themselves, “have we 
learned anything from the past?”. If the bloodbaths of the Great War, the cruelties of the 
Second World War, the separation of the Cold War have taught us anything, it is that 
together, the people of Europe can be stronger and live in peace with one another. Let 
this break the “attempt to establish continuity with an historic past” (Hobsbawm, 1983, 
p. 1) of confl ict, ‘creating a tradition’ of peace rather than one of hostility. If nations must 
exist, then let them be transcendent of race, language, religion, borders; make them “a 
great aggregation of men, in sane mind and warm heart, with a moral conscience that 
calls itself a nation” (Renan, 1882).
Conclusion
The ‘Migrant Crisis’ that started in 2015 managed to cast doubt about the ideals of unity 
that this paper has dealt with so far. The border controls for the containment of migrants 
have shown the worst EU peoples and governments can reach and highlighted that 
the way to true integration is still far off. It is now 2017; exactly one hundred years 
ago, the war was still being fought along our borders. Reading about Austria sending 
troops and tanks to the Brenner pass, imagining that the border line is ready to be wired, 
should make one think about contemporary implications. These are actions that, after 
all, not only evidence the self-centredness of some, but also annihilate all the efforts 
taken by one’s own fathers. What happened a century ago were “episodes of highest 
valour of Alpini and Bersaglieri on the one side, Kaiserjäger and Landesschützen on the 
other” (Cipriani, Magrin. 2009, p. 103); a possibly-avoidable confl ict during which people 
died to allow us to have the environment we live in. Objects like this case study have 
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an immense potential, if used as educational tools about more than the mere historic 
values, which might lead to similar nationalisms like the ones they were built for. The 
lesson to be learnt from ideologies of separation can be supported by these elements 
of the past, standing as reminders of darker times. Such places of remembrance must 
therefore be safeguarded and promoted: after all, the knowledge of history can help us 
now and in the future to avoid repeating past mistakes. “Those who cannot remember 
the past are condemned to repeat it.” wrote G. Santayana at the beginning of the XXth 
century; this lesson still must be learned. Knowledge brings, after all, understanding: 
War Heritage Sites shall be used, visited, to realise what cruelty man is capable of. 
Fortresses, trenches, buildings are still there, taking the visitors back to a period when 
ideologies controlled the minds of men. It is a duty of the EU to foster peace, towards 
a future when ravaged hearts (Ungaretti, 1916) will not be the results of man’s cruelty.
[The mountains around the Vallarsa], a poetry of landscapes and natural 
beauties that nature offers us generously. A poetry made also by the 
works and the days of thousands of men who dwelled here, hoped, who 
feared, screamed, killed and cried here for things they often didn’t even 
understand, but of which we today, also often so unconsciously, enjoy 
and benefi t: peace and freedom (Cipriani, Magrin, p. 104)
DI QUI NON SI PASSA, reads the sign at the Porte del Pasubio (Fig. 4), before the 
Sacred Zone with the soldier’s graves. Then, “one didn’t come through”, the one step 
across the border used to cost one’s own life risk. The same step today, there at the 
Brenner pass is made in total freedom. Today, di qui si passa.
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